...us its sole significance. "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object," he maintained, "we need only consider what conceivable effects of...expect from it and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is for us the whole of our conception...

...that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practise. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect...

...meaning which finds expression in Pragmatism. 'To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what conceivable effects of...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception...

...restate in his own way what he took to be Peirce's doctrine, he gave it a very Berkeleyan formulation: "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare" (Pragmatism [New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907], pp. 46-47). 35. Thus in The Career of Philosophy,...

...produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance" — in Pragmatism he would later say its truth. "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivable practical kind the object may involve— what sensations we are to expect...

...brings this out clearly is in Pragmatism: To attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object ... we need only consider what conceivable effects of...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception...

...hypotheticals. James stressed the definition that Peirce used in setting forth the maxim. So, said James: To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from...

...not examined the unpublished MSS of Peirce. 3 Thus, the whole of "our conception of the object" is "what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we have to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare," Pragmatism, pp. 46-47. See § 27 above....

...in the Revue Philosophique for January, 1879 (vol. vii). [See Section IV, p. 78, above.] practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception...

...movement of pragmatism. See Perry. James, 2: 410. In 1898 James observed in reference to this essay that "to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect...