 | George Berkeley - 1843 - Страниц: 542
...; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like...something which is intangible ; and so of the rest.] .1 IX. The philosophical notion of matter involves a contradiction. j — Some there are who make a... | |
 | George Berkeley - 1843 - Страниц: 552
...intangible ; and so of the rest.] IX. The philosophical notion of matter involves a contradiction. — Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities : by the formerj they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number: by the... | |
 | 1851 - Страниц: 588
...there is no other substance but spirit, or that which perceives." " Some make a distinction, between primary and secondary qualities : by the former, they...latter, they denote all other sensible qualities as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. Secondary qualities, they acknowledge exist only in the mind,... | |
 | 1859 - Страниц: 662
...; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one, whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible, hard, or soft — like...something which is intangible, and so of the rest." This, indeed, is now generally admitted as regards what are called secondary qualities, such as colour,... | |
 | George Jamieson - 1859 - Страниц: 280
...gained : but, if they are not, I appeal to any one, whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like...something which is intangible ;" and so of the rest. If an object is not perceivable by us, of course it is invisible or intangible, as the case may be... | |
 | Frederic William Farrar - 1860 - Страниц: 292
...but another colour or figure. I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert that a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like something which is intangible." Whflt,_thgnL ia the word (?.. g. rainbow) fa qg ? In itself it is worthless, a mere hieroglyphic, which... | |
 | George Henry Lewes - 1867 - Страниц: 692
...point : but if you say they are not, I appeal to anyone whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like something which is intangible ? ' (Sect. 8.) Realism is without a shadow of an answer. The philosophers are powerless against a theory... | |
 | George Berkeley - 1871 - Страниц: 478
...point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something...distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities i0 . By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number... | |
 | George Berkeley - 1871 - Страниц: 478
...point ; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like...rest. 9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt prlmary and secondary qualities 20. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity... | |
 | Robert Jardine - 1874 - Страниц: 338
...point ; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like...latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these we acknowledge not to be the resemblances... | |
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... whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to... 
