...2:116o). One is too inclusive, the other too distributed. A radical empiricism would not "admit into its constructions any element that is not directly...from them any element that is directly experienced" (W 2:116o). Like the stream of thought as he describes it in the Principles, James's radical empiricism...

...and can always be particularized and defined' (James 1976 [1912]: 7). The central argument is that 'any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as "real" as anything else in the system' (p. 22; emphasized in original). The point of James's radical empiricism is not just the recognition...

...the inclusion in philosophical reflection of all aspects of phenomena under philosophical scrutiny: To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit in...must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.2 The radicalness of this empiricism lies not only in its insistence on the inclusion of all...

...particular which makes me add the epithet radical. To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly...accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system. Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real...

...as things experienced. Thus he insists that, "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly...must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system."42 This means, in contrast to ordinary empiricism, that conjunctive and disjunctive relations...

...as the terms in relation (subjects, objects, sense-datal. And relations are themselves experienced: "[T]he relations that connect experiences must themselves...accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system. "(42l "The parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves part...

...treated simply as hypotheses.' James also rejects the principle of reductionism with his assertion that "the relations that connect experiences must themselves...accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system"* In his view, the directly apprehended universe needs no extraneous trans-empirical connective support...

...scientific practice. As William James observed: "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly...from them any element that is directly experienced." (James 1912: 42). Good science requires that we "... observe what there is to observe, whether it is...

..."To be radical," James posited in "A World of Pure Experience," an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly...accounted as "real" as anything else in the system. "Like that of Hume and his descendents," the radical empiricist's "Weltanschauung" is "essentially...

...the exclusion of others. As James cogently argues, very much in accordance with Buddhist principles, "the relations that connect experiences must themselves...accounted as "real " as anything else in the system' (James, 1912/1977, in McDermott, 1977, p. 195). In the traditional practice of applying mindfulness...