Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers

The uninformed observer could be forgiven for thinking that no such thing as an unconstitutional constitutional amendment exists. This concept, or in other words, the question of constitutionality of constitutional amendments, is a contentious one. It immediately calls for a clarification, a convincing definition of the constitution, and of what it means to be constitutional. A constitutional amendment, once it is enacted, is part of the constitution--how can it be unconstitutional? How does one infer what is untouchable in a constitution? Who is it in a constitutional order that can decide that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional? What does constitutional unamendability mean, and what are its implications? A powerful attempt to grapple with these challenging questions and their derivatives is on offer in Yaniv Roznai's Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: the Limits of Amendment Powers, due to be published in February by the OUP. By studying the phenomenon of substantive limitations on formal constitutional amendments comparatively, exploring the nature and limits of "the amendment powers", and putting forward a justification for the judicial enforcement of constitutionality of constitutional amendments, the book provides a compelling theory of constitutional unamendability. The first thing that strikes the eye in this revised and updated version of Roznai's doctoral thesis is the cover image: Richard Westall's Sword of Damocles. Perhaps a spoiler to the sharp-eyed reader, it captures the dread of the amendment power and the bitter sanction it faces, which is placed atop menacingly by an anterior, and presumably superior, authority. Setting the scene thus dramatically, Roznai proceeds to demonstrate in what different ways this has come to be the case.