The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the CommonsRowman & Littlefield, 1994 - Всего страниц: 265 This book explores the economics of illicit drug markets, the connection between these markets and other crime, and the adjustments these markets make when faced with changes in drug enforcement. Focusing specifically on the most recent escalation of drug enforcement during the period from 1984-1989, Rasmussen and Benson adopt an economic perspective to explore the origins and effects of American drug policy. Rasmussen and Benson argue that effective drug policy is only possible if we realize that increasing drug enforcement can be a 'tragedy of the commons' because criminal justice resources are diverted from other uses and many unintended consequences are generated by politically popular drug enforcement initiatives. |
Содержание
The Rhetoric and Reality of Drug Policy | |
The Allocation of Law Enforcement Resources An Overview of the Commons Problem | 15 |
Drugs and Criminality | 37 |
The Impact of Enforcement on Drug Markets | 65 |
Indirect Costs of Drug Enforcement | 91 |
The Politics of the Drug War | 117 |
The Politics of Punishment | 149 |
Drug Policy in the Criminal Justice Commons | 173 |
Notes | 205 |
References | 235 |
| 255 | |
| 263 | |
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The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War: Criminal Justice in the Commons David W. Rasmussen,Bruce L. Benson Просмотр фрагмента - 1994 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
addiction agencies alcohol allocation asset forfeiture assets behavior Benson budget Bureau of Justice bureaucrats Chapter cocaine commit consumers consumption convicted corruption court crack criminal justice resources criminal justice system crowding demand deterrence Drug Abuse drug arrest rate drug crimes Drug Enforcement Administration drug enforcement policy drug market drug offenders drug policy drug users drug war Economic effect elasticity entrepreneurs example federal felony Florida forfeiture heroin illegal illicit drug Illinois impact incarcerated incentives income increasing drug enforcement inmates jail jurisdictions Justice Statistics Knapp Commission large numbers law enforcement law enforcement efforts legislation marijuana National non-drug crime officials opportunity costs percent plea bargaining police corruption police resources political potency potential probability of arrest problem prohibition property crime prosecutors Rasmussen rational drug policy reduce relatively reported response result Reuter rising risk seizures sellers sentences severity of punishment Stutmann suggests suppliers supply U.S. Department victims violent crime war on drugs Washington