Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way. This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen. This volume is thematically unified and will interest a broad spectrum of scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy.
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Aenesidemus ancient argues assert Berkeley Berkeley’s Bob Fogelin Cartesian skepticism claim to know conception concerning conclusion context contextualist contrast class defeaters deny Descartes distinction dogmatic domain Doubting Pyrrhonist eliminated endorsement Enquiry epistemic merit skepticism epistemic responsibility epistemological Ernest Sosa essay establish the truth everyday evidence existence externalist faculties fallibilism false foundationalism Hume Hume’s skepticism hypothesis ideas ignorance imply inductive intuitive judgment justified in believing kind Knowledge and Justification knowledge-claims language level of scrutiny logic Mauthner meditator mind nature neo-Pyrrhonian normative objects one’s belief ordinary Oxford University Press Peter Unger philosophical skepticism possibility practicing skepticism prescriptive skepticism Principles Prior Grounding Requirement problem propositions Protagoras Pyrrhonian Reflections Pyrrhonian skepticism Pyrrhonism Pyrrhonist question radical rational support reason relevant Robert Fogelin sense Sextus Sextus Empiricus skeptical hypothesis skeptical scenarios someone specious present Theaetetus theory of justification things Tractatus traditional Treatise true understand uneliminated unlimited contrast class unmitigated theoretical skepticism Wittgenstein