To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. The Cambridge Companion to William James - Стр. 6редактор(ы): - 1997 - Страниц: 406Ограниченный просмотр - Подробнее о книге
| Elizabeth Grosz - 2001 - Страниц: 252
...object is the ongoing possibility of perception and action, the virtual trigger for responsiveness: "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception... | |
| Giles Gunn - 2001 - Страниц: 258
...of California address and, as here, in his chapter from Pragmatism entitled "What Pragmatism Means," "we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception... | |
| Giles Gunn - 2001 - Страниц: 272
...Means," "we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception... | |
| Andrew Bailey - 2002 - Страниц: 1002
...and thus affect our future experience. This is the core doctrine of what James called "Pragmatism." "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare" (Pragma tism). Finally, once we know how ideas get their meaning, we can ask what it is for an idea... | |
| Andreas Hess - 2003 - Страниц: 504
...that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only From: William James (ed. Russell B. Goodman), Pragmatism: A Contemporary Reader (London: Routledge,... | |
| William James, John Dewey - 2005 - Страниц: 320
...that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception... | |
| Andrew Ballantyne - 2005 - Страниц: 324
...that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception... | |
| Russell B. Goodman - 2005 - Страниц: 322
...inaccurate, paraphrase of Peirce's famous "pragmatic maxim": "To attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable...expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception... | |
| 2005 - Страниц: 164
...consequences, a basic pragmatist notion that is formulated by James (1975, p. 29) in the following manner: effects of a practical kind the object may involve - what sensations we are to expect from it, ,1 and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or UicUi... | |
| Russell B. Goodman - 2005 - Страниц: 332
...that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect... | |
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