 | Peter A. Morton - 1996 - Страниц: 522
...by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see...that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there... | |
 | Stephan Meier-Oeser - 1997 - Страниц: 514
...G. BERKELEY, Principles of Human Knowledge, Works (1948-57) 2 42f. 217 Ebd. 40. 218 Ebd. 42, 12-24: „The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it. ... There was an odour, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a... | |
 | John Skorupski - 1998 - Страниц: 612
...such a potentiality", and Mill quotes one of the passages where Berkeley came close to phenomenalism: The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see...that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.5 But "in itself the object was, in his theory, not... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - 1999 - Страниц: 452
...independently of being perceived if he attends to the meaning of the term 'exist' when applied to these things. 'The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see...that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.'1 Berkeley thus challenges the reader to find any... | |
 | James Van Cleve - 2003 - Страниц: 353
...Knowledge, he tells us that if he were out of his study, he would still say that his writing table exists, "meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it." 18. I should note, however, that Kemp Smith has... | |
 | John W. Cook - 1999 - Страниц: 241
...counterfactual form for our ordinary categorical form. This is apparently derived from Berkeley's remark: "The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see...that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it" (Principles, I, 3). Wittgenstein is agreeing with... | |
 | N. Praetorius - 2000 - Страниц: 518
...by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see...that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. [...] This is all that I can understand by these... | |
 | C. J. McCracken, I. C. Tipton - 2000 - Страниц: 314
...nothing but such a potentiality. "The table I write on," he says in the Principles of Human Knowledge, "I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if...that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does perceive it." But in itself the object was, in his theory, not merely a... | |
 | George Sotiros Pappas - 2000 - Страниц: 300
...the collections account. Consider Principles 3, where a phenomenalist position seems to be asserted: The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see it and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was... | |
 | David C. Stove - Страниц: 388
...this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see...thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a color or figure,... | |
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The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. 
