 | William Fleming - 1890 - Страниц: 458
...(Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xxvii.): — " To find wherein personal identity consists we must consider what person stands for; which, I...same thinking thing in different times and places." Personal identity thus consists in consciousness with memory. " Consciousness is inseparable from thinking... | |
 | Mattoon Monroe Curtis - 1890 - Страниц: 168
...consciousness and personality: The answer to this question will give Locke's position. "Person", says Locke, "is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason...and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, as the same thinking thing, in different times and places, which it does only by that consciousness... | |
 | 1891 - Страниц: 844
...the essential mark of personality in the intellectual sphere. 'A person, 'says Locke, ' stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and...and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being in different times and places' (Essay, ii. 27). In the moral sphere personality means self-determination... | |
 | Christopher Hamilton - 2003 - Страниц: 452
...same list of capacities or properties that a person has. John Locke (1632-1704) defined a person as 'a thinking, intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places' (Locke 1984: II, xxvii,... | |
 | François Debrix - 2003 - Страниц: 306
...a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it" (Locke... | |
 | Lilli Alanen, Charlotte Witt - 2004 - Страниц: 280
...interpretation.20 There is no mention of anything other than one's consciousness of one's self. He says, "... (W)e must consider what person stands for; which,...consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it" (E 2.27.9.)21 This is, as it were, the synchronic account of what... | |
 | Paul Ricœur - 2004 - Страниц: 661
...constitutes the difference between the idea of the same man and that of a self, also termed person: "which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being,...same thinking thing, in different times and places" (§9). The difference is no longer marked by the repudiated outside of "another thing" but by the displayed... | |
 | Renzong Qiu - 2004 - Страниц: 260
...personhood is highly reminiscent of John Locke's classical analysis of a person. whom he defines as a "thinking intelligent being, that has reason and...same thinking thing in different times and places" i1975. II.xxvii.61. These are the more commonly accepted cognitive capacities in the philosophical... | |
 | David Woodruff Smith - 2004 - Страниц: 330
...which set the problem in a rich phenomenological context: [T]o find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what Person stands for; which, I...Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that... | |
 | Robert Bees - 2004 - Страниц: 400
...(1689) (vgl. Book II, eh. 27, § 9: „This being premised, to find wherein personal Identity consists, we must consider what Person Stands for; which, I...Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it seif äs it seif, the same thinking thing in different times and places"); zu Locke und seinen Voraussetzungen... | |
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I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it... 
