tiers of Egypt. It is situated on the right or eastern bank of the Nile, and covers a perfect rectangle of 1600 yards by 400 yards, with the long side along the river's edge. It lies in the middle of a rather extensive plain, and has clear open ground unencumbered with trees or houses for about 1000 yards round the outer walls. In places there is a ditch. There are quarters for a regiment of infantry outside the south side, for another regiment outside the north side, and a third inside the fort itself. On the river face there is no wall. Across the river is a hospital and small fort. Two small detached forts lie between Halfa and the hills to the east; while at the mouth of the Khor Musa and the foot of the second cataract, about 4 miles to the south, are two strong forts on the eastern bank and one on the western bank of the Nile. The general appearance is that of a dusty Indian cantonment, with roads well lined out, and scarcely any trees, though these latter at an infant stage now receive considerable attention. Near the centre of the town on the river's edge is the terminal station of the railway to Sarras. The whole place strikes one as very smart. The best officers in the Egyptian army have had their hands in making it what it is, an impregnable post on the extreme south of Egypt.

Knowing that Argin was the object of Wad-el-Najûmi's first attack, Wodehouse Pasha had stationed there half the 9th battalion under Bimbashi Mitford, with two machine-guns. They had been They had been posted in a solid house at the north end of the village, and had loopholed the walls and cleared the ground in front of them. Argin is a long straggling village, about 3 miles in length and 100 yards in breadth, studded with

houses and palm-groves along the edge of the Nile. At the south end of the village, where there is a small fort with deep water in the Nile under the river's bank, a range of hills between 200 and 300 feet in height touches the river, and gradually recedes until, opposite the middle and also the north end of the village, it is two miles off. There are two or three gaps in the range, and behind one of these, about three miles from the river, is a broad undulating valley in which Wad-el - Najûmi subsequently pitched his camp. Coming down from the hills towards the village, there is a rocky plateau about a mile in breadth, and then a drop on to the level of the cultivated ground, with two or three ranges of low sand-hills, then a stretch of level ground about 200 yards in width, and then the village on the edge of the Nile. These sand-hills afforded magnificent shelter to the enemy, and enabled them to come within 200 yards of the village before they could be touched. An extensive sand-shoal lies between the village and the low-water channel of the river along the whole of the village except the southern end, where there is deep water.

On the 29th June, the day following Wad-el-Najûmi's arrival at Matûka, Wodehouse Pasha sent the 13th battalion under Kempster Bey, with Bimbashis Cunningham and Judge, to reinforce the half battalion at Argin. They occupied the middle of the village and intrenched themselves, loopholing the walls of the houses. It is a fact worth noting in this kind of warfare, that loopholing the walls of houses is not of much use: it is infinitely better to build a low battlement above the roofs of the houses, station the troops there, and fire from off the roofs. At

7.30 A.M. on the morning of the 2d July, Wad-el-Najûmi's advance guard, about 1500 strong, began to appear on the crest of the hills overlooking Argin. Wad-elNajûmi took up his position on a prominent hill opposite the middle of the village, and directed the operations in person. At 8.30 A.M. he sent a detachment of his troops northwards, as though he intended attacking the position held by the 9th battalion, but, deflecting them to the south, threw them against the weaker position of the 13th. Here he made a very determined effort to dislodge the Egyptian troops. Again and again the dervishes struggled to reach the intrenched post, but were mowed down by the heavy musketry-fire. Finding his efforts so far of no avail, Wadel-Najûmi sent one of his men, who was admitted into the Egyptian position as a deserter. He reported to Kempster Bey that the dervishes were bringing up their artillery, and had already put a gun in position behind one of the sand-hills some 200 yards off, and were going to open fire on him. Kempster Bey immediately led out a half company toward the place pointed out by the so-called deserter, in order to capture the gun. He had advanced only a short distance into the open when he was subjected to a heavy fire, and twelve of the fifty men with him fell, most of them severely wounded. Recognising the fact that he had been led into an ambush,he hurriedly withdrew his men, but was able to retire in good formation and prevent the enemy from entering along with them. Just then Wodehouse Pasha arrived opposite the village with his infantry and artillery on board the armed cruisers, and Wad-el-Najûmi withdrew to the plateau overlooking the village.

At daylight the Intelligence officer at Fort Barrow, near Matûka, had heard of Wad-elNajûmi's march, and forwarded the information to Halfa. The cavalry and camel corps had been immediately moved across the river to the west bank, on which the enemy were, while the other troops had hurried on to the steamers. They arrived opposite Argin between 9.30 and 10 A.M., to find the enemy occupying the level ground overlooking the village. Wad-el-Najûmi's practised eye soon discovered that in the southern half of the village was a place where the sand-hills approach the houses SO closely that he could enter the village without being subjected to the fire he had suffered from in the open ground surrounding the 13th battalion. This place is now known as the "Hugûm il Dervêsh." Here he hoped to make a lodgment, and to retain the position till night, when he would be able to strongly intrench himself, and gain a foothold on the river's bank. In order to withdraw attention from the spot, he divided his men into three companies, and sent them against different parts of the village, while he kept pouring men into the houses he intended occupying. To the north of these houses he put a gun in position on the river's bank. Wodehouse Pasha took up his position with his artillery and three companies of the 9th battalion, under Lewis Bey and Bimbashi Nason, on the east bank of the river, opposite the enemy's gun, and soon silenced it, and made it impossible for the enemy to bring any more guns into position. He ordered Hunter Bey to proceed with the 10th battalion, under Donne Bey and Bimbashis David and Fenwick, in the Metemma cruiser, and prevent the enemy

from occupying the north of the village, which they seemed to be threatening. They landed, and opened fire on the enemy, who were 1200 yards off, and who withdrew immediately. On this Wodehouse sent Lewis and the half of the 9th on board the Teb to order Hunter to the southern

half of the village. Hunter took with him half of the 10th under Fenwick, and proceeded to the south end of the village, where there was deep water, against the river's bank. He landed the half battalion, and told Fenwick to begin clearing the village. Fenwick was met by such a superior force of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, that he had to take shelter below the bank. Meanwhile Wodehouse had directed the other half of the 10th battalion under Donne to land on the immediate south of the position held by the 13th, and capture the enemy's gun. This they did. He then sent the three companies of the 9th to support Fenwick. They landed on the extreme south of the village with Hunter, who also took with him Dunning and the dismounted camel corps, and advanced towards Fenwick. On coming up to him, Hunter drew all his men into the plain between the sand-hills and houses, and forming them up two deep, with a company in support of the left flank, he set himself to clear the village in earnest. The enemy's cavalry charged them three times, appearing suddenly through the gaps in the sand-hills on their left; while the enemy's infantry threw themselves on their right flank as they passed each set of houses. Hunter practically annihilated the dervish cavalry, and was making a steady though slow progress towards the houses Wadel - Najûmi intended occupying, when suddenly the main body of

VOL. CXLVII-NO. DCCCXCVI.

the enemy's force appeared on the hills and began to take up their position on the rocky plateau above him. These were fully 2000 strong, and had composed the rearguard of the dervish army as it advanced from Matûka to Argin. They looked a dense, imposing mass of men, with countless banners, ready to swoop down on the small force in the plain below. Hunter immediately drew up his men into as strong a position as he could find, with two long houses at right angles to each other on his left and rear, forming two sides of a square, while he put his men into position along the other two sides. In spite of his being in this strong position, he would certainly have been attacked by the enemy had not Wodehouse, who had seen the first appearance of this force from the opposite side of the river, and crossed over to Hunter's assistance, just then come up with the half battalion of the 10th under Donne, the cavalry under Beech, and all the troops not actually occupying intrenched positions. Wad-el-Najûmi had before this brought only his advance-guard into the field, while he had evidently kept his rearguard concealed behind the hills, in order to bring them out unexpectedly at some favourable moment during the engagement, and by their sudden and formidable appearance, to surprise the Egyptian forces into a backward movement of some kind, when he would have fallen on them in their disorganised state. This was the supreme moment of the day. A false move now on Wodehouse's part would have met with one of those disasters of which the history of oriental wars is so full. Any backward movement would have demoralised his men while in the presence of an enemy who

3 D

had the better position, and who outnumbered them as two to one. He had, however, fully grasped the situation he hastened up to Hunter and ordered him to take the three companies of the 9th battalion under Lewis Bey, and continue the clearing of the village as before, while he put himself in command of the remaining troops, and advanced boldly on the left of Hunter in the face of the dervish force. Tactics such as those of Wad-el-Najûmi were of no avail, while his opponents remained firm and undaunted, and he wisely refrained from attacking them. By his masterly disposal of his troops during the afternoon Wodehouse more than redeemed the waste of time of the forenoon. He was enabled to snatch a brilliant victory from a very able opponent, who outnumbered him, as already said, as two to one, and who had had years of experience of this kind of desert warfare to guide him on that day. Hunter did his part of the work well. He kept thirty yards off the outer line of houses, set fire to the roofs, shot down the enemy as they rushed out from the burning houses, or charged from behind the enclosures. At this kind of work, which is one uninterrupted series of surprises, there are no better troops in the world than the Sudanese, with their complete ignorance of fear.

The 9th battalion well sustained its high reputation. The enemy inside the houses made their last stand at the position chosen by Najúmi, where the sand-hills touch the houses. The fire of the 13th battalion prevented them from advancing northwards, while the troops under Wodehouse barred the way to the south. After hesi tating a few minutes they took advantage of their well-chosen position, and, to the number of about 600, escaped through the

sand-hills. Najûmi covered their retreat with his rear-guard, which all this time had remained stationary. At about half-past three Wadel-Najûmi withdrew his men; while the whole village was completely cleared of the enemy by five o'clock and occupied by Wodehouse.

The dervishes left 900 dead on the field of battle, but this was not known definitely till the following day. On the evening of the 2d, the day of the fight itself, there were considerable differences of opinion among the different officers as to the number of the enemy's dead. The lowest estimate was 600, while the highest was 1200. In a manner characteristic of him, Wodehouse Pasha decided that there should be no exaggeration, and reported 500 men as killed. On the following day he was able to rectify this. On the Egyptian side 11 men were killed and 55 wounded. The disparity is too great to be passed by without an explanation. While the Arabs will persist in arming only the blacks with rifles, and fighting themselves with swords and spears, against well appointed troops armed with the most improved modern weapons, there will always be this same disparity in the numbers killed on the two sides. Their only chance lies in being able to come to close quarters, when their great strength, skill, and bravery are really formidable. On the day of Argin they were opposed to experienced officers like Wodehouse and Hunter, who had on previous fields gauged the distance within which these desert troops were dangerous, and by carefully placing their men, had never allowed the enemy to come to close quarters, except as single combatants or in very small numbers. The least confusion or timidity displayed in the face of the Arabs would have been fatal.