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'ni8e that there are duties which we owe beyond the 'limits of these four seas; and, secondly, to breathe 'into the whole of that mighty mass I have described, 'a common spirit of unity—to find for it that which 'would be the nearest approach to the patriotism that 'you look for in an individual. But then you may say to me, what is patriotism ?—and here again I am afraid I may say that the term, like Imperialism, has 'varied greatly. Like the word liberty, it has often 'been abused. There is a true patriotism and a false 'one. Horace Walpole, I think it was, says in one of 'his letters that at one time there was no declaration a 'public man could make that was more popular on the 'hustings than that he neither was nor had been nor 'would be a patriot; and we all know Mr. Canning's 'definition of a patriot—a man who was the friend of 'every country except his own. Well, a true patriot 'is neither of these. Nor is patriotism to be found in 'the nation, again, which, so to speak, swaggers down 'the High Street of the world with its hat cocked, and 'on the look-out for some fancied insult or affront. I 'will only say that you might find for such a character 'in public a counterpart in private life; but I think 'we should all agree that in private life he was a very • disputative, quarrelsome, disagreeable companion. 'No, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that patriotism 'and imperialism both, if they are to be true, must rest 'upon the one sole foundation on which all true things 'can rest—that which is sound and moral. You cannot 'divorce your system of politics from your system of 'morals. There are not two sides to that shield; there 'are not two codes to be observed. I have seen it of 'late more or less denied. I was reading but a few Right of the Crown to alienate Territory. 413
'days since, in a periodical that enjoys deservedly a 'great circulation and reputation—I read to my amaze'ment the remark about a by-gone character of the 'middle ages, that he could not be a statesman because 'he paid obedience to the laws of morality. I utterly 'abhor and repudiate and detest such a doctrine as 'that. I believe there is no safety for a nation the 'moment that she departs from those eternal principles 'of right and wrong, which in our case have carried 'us through storm, and trial, and tribulation in past 'times.'
It has been a good deal disputed whether the Crown has any right by its Prerogative of disposing of the national territory in time of peace, whether by way of gift, exchange, or sale. In the year 1862 Lord Palmerston's Government agreed to hand over all the Ionian Islands to the new kingdom of Greece, if the Greeks would choose a king approved by England, which they accordingly did. The neutrality of the Islands was to be declared by the Great Powers, and the fortifications of Corfu demolished; both of which conditions were observed. The subject of the relinquishment of the Protectorate of these Islands was debated in the House of Commons in February 1863, and Lord Palmerston was asked whether it was competent, according to the Constitution, for the Crown to alienate them without the consent of Parliament. His Lordship answered that the Republic of the Seven Islands was, by the Treaty of 1815, placed under the Protectorate of the British Crown. He said that the distinction was manifest and radical, and added: • But 'with regard to cases of territory acquired by conquest 'during war, and not ceded by Treaty, and which are • not therefore British freehold, and all possessions that 'have been ceded by Treaty and held as possessions 'of the British Crown, there is no question that the 'Crown may make a Treaty alienating such possessions 'of the British Crown without the consent of the House 'of Commons.' He then instanced the cases of Senegal, Minorca, Florida, and the Island of Banca, which were 'all 'of them for a greater or less period of time possessions 'of the British Crown; and they were all ceded by treaty
• to some foreign power; therefore there cannot be a ques'tion as to the competency of the Crown to make such
• cessions.'1 Mr. Forsyth, however, commenting on this statement, observes that all these cases of cession were made by treaty of peace at the close of a war; and they do not touch the question whether the Crown has the power where there has been no war, and consequently no treaty of peace. Mr, Forsyth cites the case of the abandonment of the Orange River sovereignty in 1854, by the Queen's Letters Patent revoking previous Letters Patent of 1851, and by force of a proclamation whereby Her Majesty ' did declare 'and make known the abandonment and renunciation 'of our dominion and sovereignty over the said terri'tory and the inhabitants thereof.' One main difficulty in cases of cession relates to the allegiance of the inhabitants of the ceded territory. In the course of the negotiations for the cession of the Orange River Territory in 1854 the Duke of Newcastle, then Colonial Secretary, wrote to the Governor of the Cape as follows: 'With respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants who 'may have been born in British dominions either
1 Hansard, vol. clix. 230, 231.
Responsibilities of Colonial Governors. 415
'within or without the sovereignty, there is, I believe, 'little doubt that no measure resting on the Queen's
* Prerogative only for its authority, could release them 'from the tie of such negative allegiance. An Act of 'Parliament would be required for such a purpose.'1
(iii.) The position of theGovernor of a Crown Colony, in reference both to the Colony and to the Crown whose agent he is, can be understood from the following passage in a speech delivered by Sir Arthur Gordon, Governor of Fiji, in Aberdeen on November 15th, 1878. He said: 'The Governor of a Crown Colony not only 'reigns but governs in the strictest sense. All sub'ordinate officers act in accordance with his directions. 'He is responsible for their shortcomings if he fails to 'correct them. They are liable to suspension at his
* will. The Legislature is so constructed as to enable
* him to secure, should he deem it necessary, the pas'sage of any enactment he may frame. He is in the 'Colony the ultimate referee on almost every con'ceivable subject of administration or legislation. He 'is called on to consider a multiplicity of questions, 'great and small, having no relation to one another, 'and the strain upon the mind of keeping all of which 'before it must be felt to be appreciated. Indepen'dently of the greater objects which daily occupy him,
* he is constantly required to form opinions and give 'decisions upon a hundred topics. He is never free 'from harness, he cannot delegate his functions to 'another, his work is not limited by any office hours. 'It is evident that where such powers are committed 'and such duties imposed great responsibilities are
1 Forsyth's Cases and Opinions, p. 184.
'incurred, and that to discharge them efficiently is no 'light task. In all Crown Colonies there exist (and it 'is the reason for the maintenance of so peculiar a form 'of constitution) two or more different races, to neither 'of which can safely be entrusted the charge of govern'ing the other, and the existence of which is the cause 'of the establishment of what is in fact a species of 'despotism, modified by a power of appeal to the 'Imperial Government at home, and by the action of 'public opinion and common sense upon the mere legal 'rights of the post. The first qualification, therefore, 'that the Governor of such a Colony should possess is 'the power of entering alike into the views, modes of 'thought, and objects of interest of other races than 'his own. And next, a judicial impartiality in the 'power of applying that knowledge as between them 'where their interests are or seem to be at variance. 'He should possess a knowledge of the relations under 'which in past times men of one race have held 'sway over those of another, or those of different races 'have lived together uuder one Government—relations 'the history of which may in almost every case serve as a 'guide, either by way of warning or example. He 'should be imbued with the legislative spirit. 1 do 'not mean to say that he should be the slave of for'malised law in the strict shape in which it is best 'known to him at home, or that he should be anxiously 'eager to apply all the technicalities of the English 'law, in an indiscriminate manner, among those un'acquainted with it; but he should be penetrated by 'the spirit of law, and able to clothe that spirit with 'the various shapes which may best suit a rude and 'uncivilised people, or least chafe the sensitiveness of