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with propriety be taken under the present circumstances. We have drawn a minute of Cabinet on these ideas, and have thought it best to send it to you, that you may take the first convenient opportunity of laying it before the King. In the mean time, as every hour may be material to the execution of the instructions, they will be immediately forwarded to Admiral Cornwallis, and His Majesty will, I am persuaded, not disapprove of this step being taken without waiting for his previous orders.

It will of course be necessary to follow this measure either by fresh instructions to Frere's brother at Madrid, or by sending out Wellesley1 immediately, if his health will admit of it, and if it should on consideration be thought right in the present situation to send any new Minister to Madrid. On this point, however (which is not quite so urgent), it will be time enough to decide after your return from Weymouth.

I have deferred going out of town for two or three days, but I have appointments on local business which will probably oblige me to go to Walmer for a day or two at the end of the week.

Ever sincerely yours,

W. PITT.

The Hon. Henry Wellesley, afterwards Lord Cowley.

Mr. Pitt to Lord Harrowby.

DEAR HARROWBY,

Downing Street,
Nov. 6, 1805.

I cannot let Jackson depart without one word to congratulate you on the glorious news of which he is the bearer. One hardly knows how in the first moment to enjoy the triumph, considering the sacrifice it has cost. But I trust that the battle of Trasalgar1 will operate in no small degree even on the Continent to counterbalance the impression of that of Ulm, and will teach Bonaparte what his chance is of acquiring "the ships, and commerce, and colonies" which he wants. It will not escape you to state how much the more we value this victory, as it will enable us to co-operate with additional vigour in every effort on the Continent. We are still without any farther intelligence from Berlin. Ever sincerely yours,

Mr. Pitt to Lord Harrowby.

W. PITT.

Downing Street,

DEAR HARROWBY,

November 19, 1805.

Oubril immediately on his arrival went to Woronzow in the country. They are returned to town, but Woronzow has desired to put off our seeing him till to

1 So in the original MS.

morrow.

At this moment, therefore, we are still unable to communicate to the Cabinet any knowledge of the Secret Article, and must consequently defer till tomorrow or next day preparing any official instructions on this new state of affairs. In the mean time I am so far from regretting your having set out to Berlin, that I feel only additional reason for rejoicing that you are there.

If the mediation is rejected (as is most probable), I am sanguine in believing that the proposals you are enabled to make will decide Prussia at once to make the two great efforts, against Bonaparte in Germany, and on this side for the recovery of Holland. A comparatively small force (suppose 40,000 men) added to the Russians, Swedes, and our own, would suffice for the last of these; and would leave, I should hope, a Prussian force amply sufficient with Saxons and Hessians to give a decided superiority in Germany. All this might be done even under Lombard's modification, which reserves to Prussia the liberty (if the demand for Hanover is not complied with) of making peace on its own terms, at six months' notice. But if once Prussia is embarked even on these terms, I think it cannot be impossible to find some other territorial arrangement (for Hanover is clearly out of the question) which will answer the purpose of giving it a more connected and solid frontier against France. One great advantage is gained towards the discussion of such arrangements with Russia and Austria, as they can now no longer object on their part to any other acquisition to Prussia of the same value with Hanover.

If the mediation is accepted, and any serious negotiation for peace takes place, it is certainly of the utmost importance for us to press to be included in it; and we ought, I think, to let both Russia and Austria feel how impossible it is for them to make a peace separate from us without a breach of faith that might render desperate all hopes of further support from this country. Still, even if this should happen, we have a strong interest that a separate peace should provide all the security that can be obtained for the Continent. If decent terms are obtained, particularly if France is obliged really to evacuate Holland and leave it in a state of independence; and if the three great Continental Powers, after extorting concessions from France in the moment of victory, unite cordially in an obligation to resist all future encroachments, not only Europe will have gained much, but we shall have gained for the separate objects of this country more than enough for all the expense of subsidies in this year; and we may return to a state of separate war with little to guard against but the single point of Boulogne, and with increased means of concentering both our naval and land defence.

The first object therefore of my wishes is the immediate rejection of the mediation, and the embarking Prussia at any rate in active and decisive operations towards Germany and Holland, leaving it to be considered afterwards what territorial arrangements can be agreed upon to secure her permanent co-operation. The next would be in the event of negotiation our being included in it, on the terms of restoring all our

conquests except Malta and the Cape; and the third (and though the worst, not a bad one) as good a separate peace as possible for our perfidious Allies, leaving us to fight our battle for ourselves. These are my

present speculations; and I would not omit the opportunity of saying hastily all that occurs to me, by the messenger whom Castlereagh is sending with instructions to General Don. The nature of those instructions and other military details you will learn from Castlereagh.

Ever sincerely yours,

W. PITT.

Mr. Pitt to Lord Harrowby.

DEAR HARROWBY,

Downing Street, November 23, 1805.

At

I have little occasion to trouble you by this messenger. You will see by the official despatch that notwithstanding the new situation produced by the Treaty of Potsdam and its Secret Article, we are still sanguine in hoping that you may in some degree, more or less, succeed in effecting the purposes of your mission. the same time do not suppose that we are either insensible of all the difficulties of your task, or unprepared for the total failure of the attempt to embark Prussia in the war. At any rate I continue persuaded that even a peace in which we are not included will be productive of much good; and I hope you will think that we have taken the most prudent line, as well as the only one which could save our dignity and the honour

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