satisfied his mind. He was familiar with the writings of the great expounders of the law of all civilized nations; with the writings of the great moralists, from Confucius down; with the principles of the civil law and the Code Napoleon; and had gathered in his mind the treasure of knowledge flowing from all the great fountains of jurisprudence. He gave little attention to the decisions of courts in the investigation of his cases. He first learned the facts, then brought to bear upon them the power of his reasoning, to determine where lay justice and right. He then had little difficulty in satisfying himself as to the law. This made him truly great as a lawyer, and gave to his opinion a value exceeded by those of no man in the Nation. His labor was constant and unremitting. He never ceased to be a student. He was almost a martyr to his profession. He gave to it his time and his strength. For it, he neglected recreation, proper exercise and relaxation, and took upon himself the cares and anxieties of his clients. In this way he passed his long professional career, undermined his powerful physical organization, and was called to his rest at a time when, but for this, he might have been in full possession of all his powers, mental and physical. From the commencement of his career in our State he commanded a valuable clientage, and rapidly rose to the summit of his profession. In my judgment, as a lawyer, pure and simple, he had no superiors in the Nation. With no expensive tastes, unostentatious and simple in his habits, and always in the receipt of a large professional income, he accumulated no fortune. The reason for this is to be found in the unselfishness and generosity of his character, and the fact that in serving his clients he lost sight of his own pecuniary interests. Riches or money had no charm for him except as it could be made to contribute to the welfare of his family, his friends, and, last of all, himself; and his thoughts were never given to its accumulation. Standing, as he did, at the head of his profession, he was constantly consulted by his brethren at the bar, and, without compensation, expended in this way more time than any man I ever knew. To the young he was ever most kind and considerate, and very many are indebted to him, not only for advice, but for advancement in their profession. He was always kind and courteous to his adversaries and honest to the court, and few men ever lived in Illinois who had fewer enemies or more friends. 2-133 ILL. A big hearted man and a great lawyer has passed away. To his family and his friends, to his brethren at the bar, and to the courts of the country, he has bidden an eternal farewell. Nevermore in this chamber, nevermore in the courts of this State or Nation, will his voice be heard; but the city he loved, his adopted State, his children and our children, and their descendants, will reap the benefits of his labors in the influence he has exerted in moulding and developing the jurisprudence of our State. I move that the memorial be received and placed on record. Judge J. R. DOOLITTLE, in seconding the motion, said: May it please the Court-I rise, not to add anything to the bar memorial, or to the eloquent eulogy just pronounced by my brother Monroe upon the late Judge BECKWITH. I rise simply to second the motion to spread them on the records of this honorable court, as a just tribute to the memory of that great lawyer and great man. My personal acquaintance with him began in 1856,—about the beginning of that great epoch in our national history during which it was my fortune to be brought into association, in public and in private life, with many of the men whom the world calls great,-presidents, judges, generals, statesmen, senators and representatives,-and among them all I do not recall one who, in mental capacity and intellectual force, was the superior of CORYDON BECKWITH. Mr. Chief Justice SCHOLFIELD, on behalf of the Court, responded: This expression of opinion by the members of the Cook county bar of the abilities and worth of the late Judge BECKWITH as a man and a lawyer, has the cordial concurrence of the members of this court. It is, as we believe, truthful, just and ample. When Judge BECKWITH took his seat upon this bench, although he was then a comparatively young man, he had acquired throughout the State a reputation for legal ability and learning unsurpassed by that of any other lawyer at our bar, and his published opinions, during the time that he remained here, prove that he well deserved that reputation. For precision, clearness and force, those opinions have not been, nor will be, surpassed. The relations of Judge BECKWITH, as a practicing lawyer, with this court, were uniformly of the most agreeable character. He was always courteous and respectful in discussion, whether in oral or in written arguments; whatever the provocation, he indulged in no offensive epithets or ill-natured criticism at the expense of the court or any of its members. He relied upon his ability to make that clear and manifest to the court which he believed to be right, and, trusting in the honesty and courage of the court, he was satisfied that it would always readily correct any error within its power to correct, when kindly pointed out. He impressed himself upon the court as its friend, and so he was always listened to by the court with interest and pleasure. To us his death is a personal loss, since no court ever did or ever can obtain a high standing for ability without the assistance of an able, learned and upright bar. The request is granted, and the memorial will be spread upon our records, and published in the current volume of our Reports. 1. NEGLIGENCE-combustible materials on right of way-duty of railroad companies. Under section 2 of the act of 1874, in relation to fencing and operating railroads, making it the duty of all railroad corporations to keep their right of way clear from all dead grass, dry weeds and other dangerous combustible material, a failure of a railway company to keep its right of way clear of combustible material other than dead grass and dry weeds can not be held to be negligence per se, unless such combustible material is dangerous; but a failure to perform a duty commanded by statute may be properly denominated negligence per se. 2. In an action against a railway company, to recover for the burning of the plaintiff's property by fire communicated by an engine to the right of way, the court, for the plaintiff, instructed the jury, “that if the right of way was not clear of dry weeds and combustible materials, but that the fire took on said right of way in consequence of such combustible material being there, and was thus communicated to the plaintiff's property," then, in the law, the defendant would be liable, without regard to the condition of the engine: Held, that the instruction should properly have used the word "dangerous" before the words "combustible materials;" but as the only combustible materials shown to have been 133 21 58a 161 133 21 70a 512 133 21 75a 438 1133 21 177 520 81a 396 |