Granovsky combated the Slavophil notion that the people are the dynamic force in history, and along with the other Westernists he defended individual initiative and humanitarian interests.1 2 His thesis is that of the disintegration of the masses by thought. He says: "Each people has many beautiful and deep political traditions but there is something higher than these this is reason, which destroys tradition's positive influence on life." Although viewing society as a static mass and the individual as the actual factor of progress, he realized man's limitations; brought upon him through natural law. The life of mankind is subject to the same laws to which is subjected the life of nature, but the law does not equally realize itself in these two spheres. The phenomena of nature are much more uniform than the phenomena of history. Constant development is not to be had in history. History has a law which must inevitably be fulfilled; but no set time is given it-it may take ten years or ten centuries. The law stands like the goal towards which man is moving, but it is not concerned, as to which road he chooses thither, nor as to how much time he may spend on the way. Here the individual is not the tool, but is an independent abettor or opponent of the historical law; he takes upon himself the responsibility for a whole line of events called forth or suppressed by himself.3 Besides his discussion on the "laws" of society and historical phenomena Granovsky was probably the first to introduce among Russian scholars the statistical method of studying history. He says: "So long as history will not 1 1 Cf. his essays on the four historical characters: Timur, Alexander the Great, Louis IX, and Francis Bacon. Works, 4th ed., pt. ii. 2 Essay in review of Mishel's History of Cursed Nations, 1847. Cf. Works, 4th ed. in one volume, Moskow, 1900, pp. 26-27. adopt the necessary statistical method, it can never be called an experimental science." 1 As the discoveries of naturalists did away with old and harmful prejudices that obscured man's view of nature . . . so the interpretation of historical laws will lead to a like result. It will put an end to those non-realizable theories and notions which disturb the regular development of the social life. History will not appear as a past cut off from the present, but as a whole organism of life, in which the past, the present and the future are in continuous interaction. With Granovsky we may dismiss the Westernists who belonged to the transitional stage of Russian social theory, i. e., from the humanitarian-metaphysical stage to the naturalistic and positivist stage. Apart from their methods the theories now to be analyzed are those known as Russian Populism or Russian Socialism. As we have already observed, they presupposed a special evolution of Russian Society. VI. The Populist Theories of Chernishevsky Russian populism is associated with the work of Chernishevsky, its principal theorizer, who, although he was not primarily a sociologist, is important as one of the precursors of Russian sociology. 1 2 Chernishevsky built his theories on presuppositions 1 Cf. Works, op. cit., p. 27. "Nikolai Govrilovitch Chernishevsky (1828-1889) is best known by his Utopian novel, “What is to be done"? He was a bold, original thinker with an encyclopedic range of knowledge. His "Notes" to John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy are to be had in French translation. His work was prematurely curtailed by the severities of the Russian prison régime and by the Siberian exile to which he was condemned for no other offense than his advocating of some progressive ideas of society. He is considered the "Father" of Russian Nihilism. Works, St. Petersburg ed., 1906, ten volumes. much the same as those accepted by the left wing of the Hegelian school of philosophy, especially as interpreted in the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, i. e., on materialism, though he is influenced also by French rationalism and positivism. To him historical and social phenomena are dialectic processes of development. He believes in but one set of laws, which controls alike the organic and the inorganic worlds.1 Society is to him but the sum of individual lives. He says: "Aggregate life is the sum of individual lives "," and in its earlier stages is controlled by geographic and climatic conditions. But in civil society these influences become secondary. "Thus a people having entered the field of historical evolution, its occupations and customs cannot be explained by nature nor by temperament, which is a product of nature." Reason becomes predominant in civilized society. "Climate, soil, resources of capital, even the strength of physical force-all these are very negligible in comparison with the development of thought. Out of this development everything arises, everything clashes, even that greatness which is commensurate with it; by it only is everything upheld.' 66 Progress is nothing more and nothing less than a physical necessity. Progress is simply the law of growth." The elements of progress in the history of society are much more complex than in the history of nature, and, therefore, it is much more difficult to observe its laws in society; but in all spheres of life law is the same. To deny progress 1 1 Cf. his "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy," Works, vol. vi, P. 196. 2 Works, vol. iv, p. 327. 3 Works, vol. iii, p. 515. Works, vol. vii, p. 189. 1 is just as absurd as to deny the force of gravity or the force of chemical affinity.1 Progress takes place slowly, . . but nine-tenths of it is accomplished in brief periods of intense activity. History moves slowly and yet almost all its advance is by leaps. After each leap a reaction sets in, but of necessity each reaction gives an impetus to further advance." Great historical events are not dependent upon any one person's will, nor upon any personality. They are realized through a law as immutable as is the law of gravitation, or of organic growth. The rapidity or slowness of the process depends upon circumstances which can neither be predetermined nor foreseen. The most important of these circumstances is the rise of strong personalities, who by the nature of their activity give to the unchangeable trend of events a certain characteristic, and who hasten or retard the course of the trend; and by their superior strength give definite direction to the chaotic forces that move the masses.1 Accordingly, the individual appears to be but the agent of his time, but one of historical necessity. The individual, therefore, is himself subject to the demands and the standards of society. Satisfying the demands of society, man receives from it sympathy and coöperation, but when he deviates from it he arouses criticism and opposition. Yet the author does not regard public opinion as a direct force of control or of progress. He says: Public opinion only shows the evil and the means to remedy it; but if these remedies are not applied the evil remains unchanged. All social phenomena depend upon the laws gov 1 Cf. Works, vol. v, p. 490. erning society. ... Laws only then are powerless when directed against the mere symptoms of the disease: but they are all powerful when having learned the real cause of evil the legislator changes that institution which is productive of the evil.1 The author thinks institutions highly important social products. Thus, speaking of the institution of Russian serfdom, he says: "It arose just as naturally as later on arose the relation of hired laborer to the capitalist, . . . nothing in life comes about artifically, everything is a natural product." 2 Social habits and customs become subject to civil institutions and are modified or changed by them. He says: If we carefully survey the history of each European nation, all the so-called peculiarities are explainable by those civil institutions under whose influence they lived or live. . . . The nation changed its habits in harmony with the spirit of its institutions and laws. Events and institutions in various lands were different and, therefore, nations which began their existence with perfectly equal habits and inclinations appear at the present time entirely different." Customs are created by civil institutions. Laws which do not change civil institutions are also powerless over customs. But with the change in civil institutions, the customs of a people do necessarily change. The factors that change civil institutions in a nation are historical events of a critical nature. "Progress in institutions consists in changes which are in harmony with the evolution of existing social needs." * 1 1 Works, vol. iii, p. 526. Works, vol. iii, p. 522. 2 Works, vol. vi, p. 4. 4 Works, vol. vi, p. 91. |