CHAPTER IV THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF N. I. KAREYEV KAREYEV1 is the most synthetic of the subjectivist school. As a philosopher of history he recognized in sociology the science which can give to history a scientific interpretation, and saw that with its aid a formula of social progress can be found which, in his opinion, should help to solve the problems of the historian. He says: "A formula of progress must give an ideal criterion for the evaluation of historical progress; without such evaluation a reasoned judgment upon actual history and its meaning is impossible.' His major interest is the philosophy of history, which he is more careful than many writers are to distinguish from sociology." Accordingly he attempts to assign to so "2 1 Nikolai Ivanovitch Kareyev (1850- ) is the only contributor to the subjectivist school who belongs to the professorial rank. He holds the chair of the philosophy of history in the University of Petrograd, and he lectures also on sociology. Among the subjectivist sociologists he is distinguished by his wide and thorough scholarship and a degree of originality. He is the author of many works on history, philosophy and sociology. His sociological ideas are principally developed in volume II of his Principal Queries of the Philosophy of History, 1883; The Nature of the Historic Process and the Rôle of the Individual in History, 1890; Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes, 1896; and Introduction to Sociology, 1897. Although since this last date he has written considerably, he has not contributed anything of importance to sociology. 2 Kareyev, Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes, p. 211. 3 E. g., Dr. Paul Barth, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie, Leipzig, 1898. 173] 173 ciology its definite province. A study of his work suggests the following analysis of his sociological contributions. I. Kareyev's philosophical and methodological presuppositions. II. What society is in its various aspects. III. The nature of the historic process and the rôle of the individual in history. IV. The sociological problem of progress. V. Conclusion: Kareyev and the subjectivist school of Russian sociologists. I. Kareyev's Philosophical and Methodological Presup positions Like the other writers of the subjectivist school Kareyev is an idealistic positivist and empiricist. He believes that an idealistic attitude is compatible with a strictly positivist view. He explains it thus: "Idealism is misinterpreted and confused with spiritism, the latter being a metaphysical system as much as is materialism." 1 He observes that many writers who characterize idealism as unscientific are nevertheless not free from it, "because any seeking for a meaning in objective phenomena is idealism in the larger sense of the word." Therefore to consider psychic phenomena as objects of study according to scientific methods is not contrary to realism as some naturalistic sociologists assume. "If," he concludes, "philosophy should be scientific, science should be philosophic." 2 Looking at the problem of free will and determinism he believes it to be a mistake to regard it from the individualistic point of view. We should consider not the 1 Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes, p. 127. 2 Ibid., p. 128. 3 Ibid., p. 133. abstract individual versus nature, but the social individual versus nature, i. e. the individual in continuous interaction with other individuals. He says: Events do not run by themselves in a certain direction, we are directing them of course, the action of man upon the trend of history is not without an antecedent cause; but if my activity instead of being subjected, subjects things to itself, does it follow, that my activity, because independent of the general trend, must be independent of everything?" To him the process of history is the interrelation of human activity with the process of nature. "This," he says, "is why, although considering myself a determinist, I firmly believe in the necessity of individual interference with the process of history." " 3 2 1 These quotations sufficiently indicate Kareyev's attitude in the controversies upon subjectivism and objectivism which were carried on with his school. He spends much time in stating his position which here can be but briefly summarized. He does not advocate a subjective method but he emphasizes the subjective factor in society, which he believes cannot be disregarded by social science. He says: He says: "The very principle of scientific objectivism demands that an object be studied from all sides in all its manifestations, and if we once find a subjective aspect in social facts we cannot escape from the conclusion that there is a subjective factor in sociology." Since, according to Kareyev, social life and all of history are but one and the same product of a coördinated conscious and 5 1 Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes, Ibid., p. 301. The process of history is more fully treated in sec. iii, infra. 3 Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes, p. 302. 4 Cf. ibid., pp. 222 et seq. Ibid., p. 234. unconscious activity of individuals upon nature and upon each other, therefore, the activity of everyone is a social factor. Thus to the sociologist the principal object of investigation should be the individual in his social activity. The thinking, feeling, willing individual, who creates social institutions, and experiences their reacting influence upon himself has the right to demand a sympathetic evaluation. Kareyev concludes: The advocates of objectivism should recognize that in sociology there necessarily arises a subjective relation since the investigator meets with phenomena which he himself has experienced in his own life. On the other hand, those who recognize a subjective factor should limit themselves to such subjectivism as has just been indicated, and must bar any other.1 In dealing with the epistemological aspect our author recognizes four forms of knowledge: Numenological knowledge, which seeks for the nature of phenomena; phenomenological knowledge, which has to do with the phenomena themselves; nomological knowledge, which determines the laws under which phenomena work; and deontological knowledge which gives principles to our ideals. Numenological knowledge is hypothetical and cannot be listed among the empirical sciences. These phenomena, laws, and principles. . . . these three comprise the knowable to us.' According to this scheme natural sciences are limited to questions of what is, but social sciences must consider both what is and what ought to be. 66 A general law in science, according to Kareyev, “is a formula in which is expressed a constant relation of coexistence, or sequence." There are in existence not only 3 laws of nature but also laws of the human mind and laws of 1 Historico-Philosophical and Sociological Etudes, p. 245. human society. All these laws are natural laws. The problem of the social sciences is to discover the laws both of individual activity and of social conduct. The latter being ethical in nature has an additional philosophical element.1 In general Kareyev adopts Comte's classification of the sciences, but would improve upon it by dividing them into phenomenological and nomological sciences corresponding respectively to Comte's concrete and abstract sciences. The advantage of this change of nomenclature shows itself, Kareyev thinks, in distinguishing the philosophy of history from sociology, and assigning to each its own province. Thus history, which describes the consecutive process of events, is a phenomenological science; whereas the constant relations of its phenomena are its philosophical aspect and must be studied by a nomological science like sociology. Broadly speaking, sociology is "the general theory of society," 3 and philosophy of history is "that abstract phenomenology of the cultural and social life of man which has to answer the questions: what has humanity received, and what will it gain from its historic life." Thus history, the philosophy of history, and sociology are seen to be closely related to each other, history supplying the material, sociology pointing out what is constant in the historic process and the philosophy of history deducing its teleological lesson from established facts. 2 Besides the study of the historic process, sociology has also to deal with the social life of man in particular, which brings it again into a cross relation with biology and with psychology. "Sociology," Kareyev says, " must be directly based upon psychology which thus becomes the connecting |