this opinion, that the soul also dies simult the body, and that all things are annihilated 1 Ever since the time of Cicero the subject of the immor has been incessantly discussed; by some as a conclusion o by others as a doctrine of revelation. The following sum ment is given by Dugald Stewart in the second part of his Philosophy, cap. ii. sec 1. The reasons he here states wit tion for believing the doctrine of a future state, are the fol "1. The natural desire of immortality, and the anticip inspired by hope. 2. The natural apprehensions of the mind when unde remorse. 3. The exact accommodation of the condition of the their instincts and to their sensitive powers, contrasted wit ness of the present state of things to the intellectual facu his capacities of enjoyment, and to the conceptions of happ fection which he is able to form. "4. The foundation which is laid in the principles of our a progressive and an unlimited improvement. 5. The information we are rendered capable of acquirin more remote parts of the universe; the unlimited range w the human imagination through the immensity of space the ideas, however imperfect, which philosophy affords us and attributes of an overruling mind acquisitions for which cause may be traced on the supposition of a future state, l supposition be rejected, could have no other effect than to ness of life appear unworthy of our regard. "6. The tendency of the infirmities of age, and of the p strengthen and confirm our moral habits, and the difficul upon the hypothesis of annihilation for those sufferings w put a period to the existence of man. 7. The discordance between our n oral judgments and course of human affairs. 8 The analogy of the material world, in some parts of complete and the most systematical order may be traced; a views always become the more satisfactory the wider our kno It is the supposition of a future state alone that can furni present disorders of the moral world; and without it ma striking phenomena of human life must remain forever ine "9. The inconsistency of supposing that the moral laws the course of human affairs have no reference to anythi limits of the present scene; when all the bodies which comp universe appear to be related to each other, as parts of one system. "Of the different considerations now mentioned, there is 1 which, taken singly, would be sufficient to establish the brought to prove, but taken in conjunction, their force appe They not only all terminate in the same conclusion, but the flect light on each other; and they have that sort of consis IV. The authority of the ancients has more weight with me, either that of our own ancestors, who paid such sacred honors to the dead which surely they would not have done if they thought these honors did in no way affect them; or that of those who once lived in this country, and enlightened, by their institutions and instructions, Magna Græcia (which now indeed is entirely destroyed, but then was flourishing); or of him who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men, who did not say first one thing and then another, as is generally done, but always the same; namely, that the souls of men are divine, and that when they have departed from the body, a return to heaven is opened to them, and the speediest to the most virtuous and just.1 Which same opinion was also held by Scipio; for he indeed, a very few days before his death, as if he had a presentiment of it, when Philus and Manilius were present, and many others, and you also, 1 So striking is the resemblance between the religious tenets of Cicero and those of modern philosophy, corrected by a divine revelation, that it is difficult to suppose that they should have originated in his own reflections, unaided by any light derived through the medium of tradition or report The idea contained in this passage we find reproduced, with little modification, in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, by a moralist and ethical philosopher, neither of whom was at all likely to derive his opinions on such a subject from the writings of Cicero. By giving the former passage entire, I may perhaps lead the reader to believe that Sir Thomas Browne has added nothing to the conceptions of Cicero touching the immortality of the soul but superstition and folly. "I believe," he says, "that the whole frame of a beast doth perish, and is left in the same state after death as before it was inaterialed into life; that the souls of men know neither contrary or corruption; that they subsist beyond the body, and outlive death by the privilege of their proper natures, and without a miracle; that the souls of the faithful, as they leave earth, take possession of heaven; that those apparitions and ghosts of departed persons are not the wandering souls of men, but the unquiet walks of devils, prompting and suggesting us unto mischief, blood and villainy instilling, and stealing into our hearts; that the blessed spirits are not at rest in their graves, but wander solicitous of the affairs of the world; that these phantasms appear often, and do frequent cemeteries, charnel-houses, and churches; it is because these are the dormitories of the dead where the devil, like an insolent champion, beholds with pride the spoils and trophies of his victory in Adam."--Religio Medici, chap. xxxvii. "We have," says Dr. Thomas Brown, "therefore to conceive the mind Scævola, had gone with me, for three days the subject of government: of which discus was almost entirely on the immortality of so said he had learned in sleep through a vision nus. If this be the fact, that the spirit of t most easily flies away in death, as from the and chains of the body; whose passage to we conceive to have been readier than tha Wherefore, to be afflicted at this his depar would be the part rather of an envious pers friend. But if, on the other hand, this be truth, that the death of the soul and of the and the same, and that no consciousness there is no advantage in death, so certainly evil. For when consciousness is lost, it becom as if he had never been born at all; yet, both are glad, and this state, as long as it shall ex joice that he was born. Wherefore (as I said him indeed all ended well: with myself, les for it had been more equitable that, as I enter first, I should likewise first depart from it. B enjoy the recollection of our friendship, that have lived happily because I lived with Sc at death matured by experience, and nobler than it was w permitted it to exist; and the Deity himself, with all those ings of love to man which the adaption of human nature to it display, and in these very circumstances, if we affirm with proof the annihilation of the mind, we are to find a reason fo lation. If even we in such a moment, abstracting from all erations, would feel it a sort of crime to destroy, with no ot that of the mere destruction what was more worthy of love th earlier being, are we to believe that he who loves what is n more than our frail heart can love it, will regard the improve a signal of destruction? Is it not more consonant to the go who has rendered improvement progressive here, that in s mind from its bodily frame, he separates it to admit it into sc anted on which he Dest man On-house gods can an of a ther the y is one ins; as re is no he same urselves will re ve) with appily; pon life vet I so whom I had a common anxiety on public and private affairs, and with whom my life both at home and abroad was associated, and there existed that, wherein consists the entire strength of friendship, an entire agreement of inclinations, pursuits and sentiments. That character for wisdom, therefore, which Fannius a little while ago mentioned, does not so delight me, especially since it is undeserved, as the hope that the recollection of our friendship will last forever. And it is the more gratifying to me, because scarcely in the history of the world are three or four pairs of friends mentioned by name;2 and I indulge in the hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity in this class.-FANNIUS. Indeed, Lælius, that must be so. But since you have made mention of friendship, and as we have leisure, you will do what is very agreeable to me (I hope also to Scævola), if, as your custom is concerning other matters when your opinion of them is asked, so you would descant on friendship, [telling us] what is your opinion, of what nature you consider it to be, and what direction you would lay down. -SCEVOLA. To me it will be exceedingly agreeable; and in fact, when I was endeavoring to prevail with you, Fannius anticipated me: wherefore you will confer a very great favor on both of us. V. LÆLIUS. I indeed should not object, if I could feel confidence in myself; for not only is the subject a splendid one, but we, as Fannius said, have nothing to do. But 1"The consideration of moral worth will always enter deeply into the motives which actuate wise and good men in their choice of friends; but it is far from constituting the only one; a certain congeniality of mind and minners, aided by the operation of adventitious circumstances. contributes a principal share toward the formation of such unions."--Robert Hall's Funeral Sermon for Dr. Ryland. 2 Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Pythias, Nisus and Eurvalus, are the most famous pairs of friends recorded in ancient history. who am I? or what ability is there in me for the practice of scholars, and of Grecian sch subject be given them on which they are to d ever suddenly. It is a great undertaking, a no little practice. Wherefore, as to what ma the subject of friendship, I recommend yo from those who profess such things.1 I can o to prefer friendship to all human possessions; nothing so suited to our nature, so well adapt perity or adversity. But first of all, I am of o except among the virtuous, friendship can n do not analyze this principle too closely, as t inquire with too great nicety into those thin with truth on their side, but with little general for they maintain that there is no good man b man. Be it so; yet they define wisdom to be mortal has ever attained to: whereas we oug template those things which exist in practice a mon life, and not the subjects of fictions or wishes. I would never pretend to say that C cius, Marius Curius, and Titus Coruncanius, wh cestors esteemed wise, were wise according to ard of these moralists. Wherefore let them ke selves the name of wisdom, both invidious and gible; and let them allow that these were good they will not even do that; they will declare th not be granted except to a wise man. Let us proceed with all our dull genius, as they say. so conduct themselves, and so live that their h integrity, their justice, and liberality are app that there is not in them any covetousness, or 1 The Greek sophists, like the modern Italians. professed to any given subiect See Plato's Georgios Protecores ota |