passed through changes of which our fathers had no conception. If we are to take up the task of world leadership in the near future we need not fear for men to fill the places of responsibility. In Mid-west America is to be found today more of that old-fashioned but still indispensable stock, the Anglo-Saxon, than anywhere else in the world. We may confidently predict that the solution of the problem of world recovery from the shock of war will be the product of the statesmanlike coöperation of the peoples in that particular part of Canada and the United States which we have already described. Here above all other places in the continent are to be found the enlightened and fearless constituencies whose support will be the most important factor in carrying out the vital measures that are to restore society to its normal condition.

The plain and simple utterances of the Monroe Doctrine fell upon the ears of an astonished clique of militarists at a time when all the world seemed to be theirs to trample upon and devastate. It was the mandate of a free people announcing the end of Old World dominance and the appearance of the day-star of hope above the western horizon. Some such clear and free note as this is being listened for anxiously by the new little countries of Europe and by the battle-torn nations who have lost their power to will and to do as they have been accustomed in the past. The time is not far distant when the people of Mid-west America will speak out in the full consciousness of strength and purpose to serve, and their utterances, like their deeds, will express the ample breadth of their well-matured statesmanship and the vision and the uplift of their own generous democracy.

UNIVERSITY OF North DakOTA

GRAND FORKS

ORIN G. LIBBY

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY PROBLEMS AND THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1

Think of the West and the Revolution and what name or event occurs to your mind? A mental test, you ask? Well, yes, something like that. Your answer, without doubt, is "George Rogers Clark and the conquest of Kaskaskia." That name and that event have been so heralded by history, idealized in novels, and sung in metrical measure, that almost everybody with a pretence to culture would blush for ignorance of the outstanding facts or fancies connected with them. So dramatic was Clark's expedition, and so seemingly momentous, that even the eastern historians who know little or nothing concerning the West make room forcibly for a brief account of it between the stories of Valley Forge and the southern campaigns, whereas western historians in their enthusiasm trace to the success of Clark most of the benefits accruing to us from the Revolutionary War.

It would not be surprising, therefore, if many of you upon reading or hearing the title of my paper have prepared yourselves for the arousing of your imaginations with an impassioned and rhetorical review of the events connected with the occupation of the Illinois country by the Virginians during the most romantic period of American history. I am sorry to disappoint you. Although I have been guilty of adding many printed pages to the bulky volume of Clark literature, I have decided not to increase its size today. The names Clark and Kaskaskia may have raised intriguing images in your minds, but they must function like the announcement of a future picture attraction at the movies; for no sooner have your eyes fastened upon the advertisement than you are compelled to let the reel roll on to the movie of the day.

1 Read at the annual meeting of the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, January 9, 1922.

I fear that the movie which I am about to produce will prove about as exciting and hair raising as a scenario of that popular work of fiction entitled The Education of Henry Adams. Still I will beg you not to be too doleful over this billboard announcement, for, although I shall not depict Clark and his officers tripping a minuet with the olive-skinned beauties of Kaskaskia, I promise to introduce some close-ups of painted Indians, buck-skin clad pioneers, land-speculators, and muddling empire-builders. It is not exactly a wild west show which I am promising you, but it is a jamboree with some jazz. The situation in the Mississippi Valley before and during the Revolutionary War was not so simple as usually described by historians, nor were the issues raised so trivial. In fact the situation was inextricably complex and the issues most vital for the future welfare of the new state that was in the making. In the short time at my disposal, however, I can do no more than present to you an outline of the most significant complexities of the western conditions, and I must limit myself in general to the period preceding the outbreak of the war.

By the treaty of peace in 1763 which brought to an end the French and Indian War, the British Empire was acknowledged to extend westward to the Mississippi River; and from France there was further received Canada and from Spain, Florida, or, since this term is today more limited in its territorial significance, the gulf coast. To the politicians at Westminster this newly acquired territory presented for the next eleven years a most perplexing problem, and whenever they soberly and seriously discussed the question of the American colonies, the vital phase to them was not the disturbances of the madding crowd" of Boston and New York but the development of this vast transmontane region, where dwelt the American Indians but into which the white men were inexorably pressing in increasing numbers with a consequent disturbance of the equilibrium. American historians have fastened their eyes so attentively on the popular outbursts of the East over the stamp tax, the Townshend taxes, and the tea ships that

they have failed to grasp much of the significance of British colonial legislation.

Every extension of the British Empire has brought with it heavy financial burdens to the people of the island. Civil government and military and naval protection for the expanding imperial territory have been furnished by the mother country. It is only in recent years that the discovery of the secret of local autonomy for the dominions has alleviated to any extent the burden of the British taxpayer. Let us remember the difficulties of this subject before we condemn the eighteenthcentury politicians for their failure to solve a new and almost inexplicable problem.

Before the French and Indian War was over it was evident to the imperialists of Westminster that the new territory to be acquired must be defended by the imperial might; British troops must be maintained in Canada, in Florida, and in the Mississippi Valley to defend the territory from France, from Spain, and from the American Indians. For this purpose it was determined to scatter ten thousand troops in small detachments throughout the newly acquired territory. For instance, there was to be a body of troops in Canada, but from there detachments should be sent to occupy forts at Niagara, Detroit, Machinac, Green Bay, and several smaller posts in the Ohio Valley. The Illinois country was connected for military purposes with Pittsburg, whence troops were sent to Fort de Chartres. In a similar way military centers were created on the lower Mississippi and along the gulf coast. Besides the defense from foreign nations and the Indians that would be secured by this distribution of the troops, it was expected that the merchants engaged in the fur trade would be assisted in their operations and that the gradual and controlled creation of new colonies in the Mississippi Valley would be promoted.

This distribution of troops in small detachments separated from the settled region by wide stretches of wilderness was very expensive, far more so than their concentration near the populous towns would have been. Then too, the cost of the

new colonies which it was proposed to erect in Canada and the Floridas must be paid for at first out of the imperial exchequer. It was estimated that the new burden which would thus be placed upon the taxpayers of the empire would amount to about three hundred thousand pounds. This additional expense was undertaken for the welfare of the colonies. Was it fair, asked the politicians, that people living in England, Scotland, and Wales should pay the whole bill? The answer was naturally in the negative; and so it was decided that the colonies should pay one-third of the expense for maintaining the army. The result was, as you know, the passing of the stamp tax, which must be placed in the succession of causes that led to the later revolt of the colonies.

The outcry aroused by this piece of legislation is well known. The colonies united in resistance. This story we must pass by; but we are interested in the fact that the decision to employ this means of taxing the colonies arose out of the conditions existing in the Mississippi Valley. It was a western issue, not

an eastern.

Out of the very same conditions came the next dispute between the colonies and the mother country. The repeal of the stamp tax had cut off a supply of money which was to be appropriated for colonial defense and the promotion of colonies in the Mississippi Valley. What now was to be done? Over this question politicians in England divided. Those who had repealed the stamp tax proposed that nothing should be done; the troops should be withdrawn from the West and concentrated in the populated areas where their support would cost less, and the merchants engaged in the fur trade should be prohibited from going beyond the mountains. Let the Indians come to the colonies, if they wished to trade. Of course this policy included the prohibition of all colonizing activities. The Mississippi Valley was to be left a huge Indian reservation from which all white men should be excluded. In this way the expense of the colonies could be curtailed. The exigencies of politics make strange bedfellows, it is said. On this new