1. Under a judgment for household necessaries, the defendant caused a span
of mares to be sold as the property of the plaintiff's husband. There is
no merit in the claim of the plaintiff that she owns the mares under an
oral gift from her husband. Livingston v. Erickson, 111.
1. A deed from husband to wife of a statutory homestead in 1891 is valid al-
though the wife did not concur and join in the execution thereof, pursuant
to the law then existing. Wehe v. Wehe, 280.
1. Where one is charged with murder and is duly placed upon trial therefor,
and a plea of not guilty is entered, and the defense is justifiable homicide
based upon a claim of self-defense, threats of the deceased made prior to
the time of the homicide are not admissible, though it appear, assuming
the evidence offered on behalf of defendant to be true, that at the com-
mencement of the final trouble resulting in the homicide, the deceased
committed an overt act by threatening to take the life of defendant and
engaged in physical encounter with him, though displaying no dangerous
weapons, and where later, desisting from the struggle, threatened to go
to the house and get a gun and shoot the defendant, the barn being on
one end of a village lot, and the house where the crime was committed
on the other, where it further appears that defendant might have retired
to a place of safety when deceased went to the house, but instead of doing
so. pursued the deceased and shot at him while pursuing him, followed
him into the house and through it to the bedroom, where deceased had
taken refuge, and where he and his mother-in-law tried, by holding against
the door, to prevent the defendant from entering, and who after failing to
push the door in, shot into and through it twice, wounding the deceased,
and afterwards entering and shooting him to death. State v. Lehman, 572.
2. The claim of self-defense is not maintainable where the defendant had ample
and full opportunity to retire to a place of safety and thus avert the
crime. State v. Lehman, 572.
3. When the deceased first assaulted and attacked the defendant, it was an
overt act, initiating the right of self-defense in behalf of the defendant.
Had he then acted, there possibly would be merit in his claim of self-
defense, and evidence of prior threats would have properly been admissible.
After the deceased retired to the house and was followed by defendant to
and through the house to the bedroom, and there, with his mother-in-law,
tried to hold the door thereof in an effort to protect his life, by preventing
the entrance of the defendant, who persisted in trying to enter, and who,
in endeavoring to enter, shot twice through the door, and afterwards gained
entrance and shot his victim to death,
It is held, in these circumstances, the defendant was not acting in self.
defense, but as a persistent aggressor, and evidence of prior threats was
properly excluded and were not admissible for the purpose of establishing
a claim of self-defense. State v. Lehman, 572.
1. The owner of an automobile, kept and used for the business and pleasure
of the family, is liable for its negligent operation by his wife, when driven
for such purposes, with his knowledge and consent. Ulman v. Lindeman,
2. The mere fact that the wife was the record owner of a certain house occu-
pied by her and her family, including her husband, as a home; and that
she knew that the plaintiff was installing or altering certain plumbing
therein, does not make her liable for the work so performed by the plain-
tiff, where it appears that the services were performed under a contract
made by the husband alone; that plaintiff performed the work and ex-
tended the credit solely to the husband, charged the amount of the in-
debtedness to him upon its books, received partial payment from him,
brought suit and recovered judgment against him alone for the balance
due on the account and had execution issued upon the judgment. Minot
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Bach, 71.
3. In such action, where the father, after such conveyance to his wife in 1891,
farmed and occupied the premises until 1896, and thereafter removed from
the same, but managed and controlled the land through tenants and gen-
erally paid the taxes thereon until the year 1913, and in other ways
treated the farm as his own, it is held that such acts were not hostile to
the title of the wife and do not constitute acts of adverse possession. Wehe
V. Wehe, 280.
1. This is an appeal from a judgment against defendant for $1,000 on its
insurance of a registered Belgian stallion that weighed 2,000 lbs. and was
worth $2,200. The defense is that the insurance for which defendant re-
ceived $100 was obtained by a false representation, which was that the
horse never had colic, while in the proof of loss it is written that the
horse had a slight colic in the winters of 1916 and 1917. The proof of
loss was written by the state agent of the plaintiff, and two witnesses swear
that it did not contain anything about colic. It is held: Under the evi-
dence the question of the falsity of the representation was for the jury.
Fekjar v. Iowa State Live Stock Ins. Co. 389.
1. A judgment binds only parties and privies, not strangers to it.
strangers, it is not evidence to prove any of the facts upon which it was
rendered. Union Nat. Bank v. Western Building Company, 336.
2. A judgment in a prior suit is deemed final and conclusive in subsequent liti-
gation between the parties, or their privies, as to those matters necessarily
determined or implied in reaching the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made with reference thereto. Reko v. Moore, 644.
3. Where, in an action to set aside transfers on the ground of incompetency
of the original grantor, an accounting is ordered and had to determine
the value of the use and occupation of the premises and the amount, if
any, of payments made by the transferees for taxes and encumbrances
upon the premises, a transferee cannot avoid the conclusive effect of the
judgment merely by withholding proof of the amount of payments made
by him. Reko v. Moore, 644.
1. In an action in the justice court for damages for tort, the amount claimed
in the summons was $200, with interest. Held that the interest commenced
from the date of the summons, and not from the time of the commission
of the tort; that the amount in controversy did not exceed $200. Jorgen.
son v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 98.
2. An action was brought in justice's court upon two notes secured by chattel
mortgages. The plaintiff asked judgment for the amount due upon the
notes, and, also, for foreclosure of the chattel mortgages. The defendant
appeared and, without objection, tendered an issue as to his liability upon
the notes. Such issue was tried, and the justice of the peace rendered
judgment against the defendant for $106.44, the amount due on the notes.
The justice further adjudged that the plaintiff was entitled to the posses-
sion of the property described in the chattel mortgages; that the amount
found due the plaintiff was a lien upon such property, and that the prop
erty be sold to satisfy such lien. The defendant, claiming that the justice
of the peace had no jurisdiction to adjudge foreclosure of a chattel mort-
gage, brought suit in conversion against the officer who made the levy and
sale. In such suit it is held that that portion of the jeweler's judgment
which awarded judgment for the amount due on the notes was valid, even
though the portions relating to the enforcement of the chattel mortgages
were invalid and that the officer was not guilty of conversion in making
levy and sale under the execution. Palmer v. Donovan, 348.
1. Where a lease to a certain tract of land was oral. and there was a dispute
LANDLORD AND TENANT-continued.
as to what were the actual terms of the lease, and testimony was intro-
duced by each of the parties as to what were the terms, what the terms
of the lease actually were was a question of fact for the jury. Sandvig
v. Kleppe, 5.
2. Plaintiff having recovered for the value of certain hay alleged to have been
converted by the defendant, it is held the verdict is sustained by the evi-
dence. Sandvig v. Kleppe, 5.
1. Under § 4353, Comp. Laws 1913, the false and unprivileged publication of
an oral statement which charged any person with crime, or imputes to
him want of chastity, constitutes slander. Martinson v. Freeberg, 363.
2. It is not necessary that the charge of unchastity should be made in direct
terms; but it is sufficient if the words used are such as impute unchastity
and were so understood by those who heard them. Martinson v. Freeberg,
363.
3. A complaint charging the false and unprivileged publication by the defendant
of an oral charge that plaintiff and defendant's wife went upstairs to-
gether, and that this did not look good to the defendant and that the charge
was understood by the persons who heard it to mean that the plaintiff and
defendant's wife went upstairs for the purpose of having carnal intercourse,
-states a cause of action. Martinson v. Freeberg, 363.
1. In an original application for a writ of mandamus to compel the state audi-
tor to issue the salary warrant of the tax commissioner, where it appears
that the state auditor, without warrant of law, has transferred from the
general fund into a specific fund, known as the Glander and Dourine Horse
Fund, cash moneys in the sum of $15,000 of which amount there remains
therein over $13,000 unexpended, and where it further appears that such
amount so unexpended, together with the balance remaining in the general
fund, is sufficient for the payment of the salary warrant of such tax com-
missioner, it is held that a peremptory writ of mandamus will be awarded.
State ex rel. Wallace v. Kositzky, 291.
2. Where it appears from the return of the state auditor that there are
claims filed in the state auditor's office, payable out of the general fund,
prior in point of time to the claim of the tax commissioner for his salary
warrant, but where no contention is made that any of such prior claims
should first be paid, and no attempt is made to prove or establish the
priority of any of such claims for purposes of refusing the writ, no issue
is presented to this court for consideration upon the priority of such
claims, and the writ of mandamus will issue if there are moneys in the
general fund with which to make payment of the salary warrant demanded.
State ex rel. Wallace v. Kositzky, 291.
3. This is a mandamus proceeding against the secretary of state to compel
him to receive and file a certain certificate presented by the plaintiff cor-
poration on August 4, 1919, showing that said corporation by a majority
vote of its stockholders on July 12, 1919, decided to accept the benefits
of and to be bound by the provisions of chapter 99, Laws 1919. The secre-
tary of state asserts that the statute is unconstitutional for the reason
that it impairs the contract obligations existing in favor of stockholders,
and that as to stockholders who do not consent it is violative of the con-
tract and due process provisions of the Federal Constitution. For reasons
stated in the opinion it is held that these defenses are not available to
the secretary of state. Mohall Farmers Elevator Co. v. Hall, 430.
4. Thomas Hall, as secretary of state, having refused to attest and certify that
certain bonds in the sum of $2,000,000, issued pursuant to law by the gov-
ernor and treasurer of the state of North Dakota, were within the debt
limit, a petition was presented to this court on behalf of the state that
a writ of mandamus issue out of this court requiring and commanding
him to do so. Held that it is proper that the writ of mandamus should
issue in this case. State ex rel. Langer v. Hall, 536.
1. In 1919 the legislative assembly of North Dakota enacted a compulsory
Workmen's Compensation Act to cover employees engaged in hazardous
employment, wherein hazardous employment is defined to be an employ.
ment in any business, trade, or occupation wherein one or more persons
are employed, not casually, excepting agricultural, domestic, and railroad
employees. Upon the issue raised by the relator engaged in the real
estate and loan business, that this definition by legislature first covers
his employment which is nonhazardous and free from danger, it is held
that it is within the province of legislative power, in the exercise of the
police power pursuant to public demand and as a matter of public policy,
to classify generally a given employment as possessing elements of risk
or hazard, and that such legislative expression will not be deemed arbi-
trary and unreasonable by the court unless a specific showing be made
as a matter of fact that the employment of such relator is nonhazardous
and without risk. State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 307.
2. It is within the province of the legislature, in the proper exercise of its
police power as a matter of public policy, to declare that there is an ele-
ment of hazard or of danger in employment in the modern business world,
and this court, upon construction of its definition in that regard, will not
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