"And so with the liquor law of 1875. The general law was passed March 17, 1875. (Acts of 1875, special session, p. 55, section 7276, Burns' R. S. 1894.)

"In 1889 (Acts of 1889, p. 288, section 7280, Burns' R. S. 1894) an act was passed governing appeals from the action of the board with reference to the granting of licenses.

"Each of these acts might be said to be as amendatory of the original and existing laws upon the same subject as is the statute in controversy. This continued and repeated praetice of the legislature, unquestioned for a period of over forty years, becomes a potent factor and lends much strength to an interpretation of the constitution favoring the authority of the general assembly to enact in the manner it did the law under consideration. Were we in doubt of this legislative right we should feel obligated to be controlled by such a practical exposition. Hovey, etc., v. State ex rel., 119 Ind. 386; French v. State ex rel., 141 Ind. 618.

"It is obvious, we think, that the provisions of the law of 1875 are not repealed by that of 1895, but that the latter only provided supplemental provisions for the better regulation and restriction of the traffic in intoxicating liquors." Section 2 of article IV of the Alabama constitution provides as follows:

"The style of the laws of this State shall be, 'Be it enacted by the general assembly of Alabama.' Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, and no law shall be revised or amended unless the new act contain the entire act revised or the section or sections amended; and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed."

By statute (Code 1876, see. 586) the general assembly of Alabama fixed the salary of the marshal and librarian of the Supreme Court at $2,000 annually.

The general assembly of 1878-1879 passed an appropriation act the title of which read as follows:

“To make appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1879, and September 30, 1880,"

The fifteenth subdivision of this appropriation act provides: 15. For compensation of the marshal of the Supreme Court and librarian, fifteen hundred dollars for each year--in all three thousand dollars."

The marshal and librarian of the Supreme Court claimed that he was entitled to the salary named in the original statute, but this contention was denied by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of Riggs v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 282. The Court said:

"Applying these established rules of construction to the case presented by the second, the relator has not the right he asserts. It seems too plain for argument that the legislative intention was that for the fiscal years of 1879-80 and until the first day of January, 1881, the salary of the marshal and librarian should be fifteen hundred dollars annually. All that is appropriated for that purpose and for that period is three thousand dollars-in all three thousand dollars are the words employed. The fiscal year expires on the 30th day of September. The appropriation is continued of force until the first of January, 1881, as the general assembly would not convene until the preceding second Tuesday in November. Without this provision or with an appropriation under the general statute the marshal would have been entitled to a salary of two thousand dollars. To avoid this result is the purpose of this provision. The last section of the act, declaring that the appropriations thereby made are not to be construed as in addition to former appropriations for the same purpose, points clearly to a legislative intention to exclude all other appropriations. The general statute, fixing the salary at two thousand dollars, cannot stand consistently with the later statute, which was doubtless intended as a substitute during the time by its own terms it remains of force. The obvious difference between this case and that of Reynolds v. Taylor, supra, is that the statute then construed by the court did not contain such a clear and plain intention to take the place of the former statute, as is shown by the act of February 13, 1879."

The case from which the above quotation is made is on all fours with the facts here under consideration. The Alabama constitution requires substantially the same things in reference to amendatory acts as the Indiana constitution. There was no reference made in the title or body of the Alabama act to the prior act, which was in effect changed by the appropriation bill. The court held that the sum named in the appropriation was of controlling force, and it was not even intimated that the appropriation act was invalid

because it was an amendatory act and did not comply with the constitutional provision hereinbefore set out. The whole basis of the matter is that these constitutional provisions only refer to an act which is in its terms an amendatory act.

Collins v. State, 51 N. W. 777, was a case where the salary of the state veterinarian of South Dakota was fixed by a statute at $2,500 per annum, and a subsequent appropriation act gave that officer but $1,200. The court held that the appropriation act controlled, and that the officer was not entitled to anything more than the sum therein named. There is in the case above referred to an extensive review of the authorities upon the question of whether a statute or an appropriation act controls. The court in this conneetion said:

Guided by these rules, we are to settle the question before us. There is no express repeal of the provision of seetion 2333, Comp. Laws, in relation to the pay for services of the veterinary surgeon declared in the appropriation act of March 10, 1890, but the later act does declare that 'all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.' Now, between the section of the act which fixes the amount that may be paid the veterinary surgeon and the unlimited amount allowed him for traveling expenses, and the amount designated as his salary and the fixed amount for the expenses of his office in the appropriation act of March 10, 1890, there is a clear repugnancy. The first act makes the compensation $2,500. The second provides for the payment of but $1,200 for these services. The first act says the veterinary surgeon shall be allowed all his actual and necessary expenses for traveling. The second provides that $500 only shall be paid for the expenses of the office. When repugnant provisions like these exist in two acts the later is held, according to all authorities, to operate as a repeal of the first act, for the later act expresses the will of the government in the premises. Justice Field in the case of U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 91, has clearly and tersely collated the leading cases on this question, which sustain the position we have taken, but we have other and later cases more directly in point. The case of U. S. v. Mitchell was an appeal from the Court of Claims, reported in 109 U. S. 146, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151. Mitchell brought his suit to recover an alleged balance of salary claimed to be due him as

an Indian interpreter at the Santee agency, in the State of Nebraska, under section 2070, tit. 23, Rev. St. That section provided that the salaries of interpreters lawfully employed in the service of the United States in certain states and territories should be $500 a year each, and of certain other ones $400. Section 2076 of the same law provides that the several compensations should be in full of all emoluments and allowances whatsoever. Afterwards, in 1877, Congress, in its appropriation act, specifically appropriated for the pay of Indian interpreters the uniform sum of $300 each, and so continued from year to year to make this appropriation for the payment of the salaries of Indian interpreters. Mitchell contended that this was not a repeal of the law which expressly gave them $500, and therefore he was entitled to the balance of that sum. The Court of Claims held that his contention was correct, and gave him judgment accordingly. The United States, however, appealed to the Supreme Court, and, after considering the case, Justice Wood, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: We find, therefore, this state of legislation: by the Revised Statutes, the salaries of the interpreters were fixed, some at $400 and some at $500 per annum, with a provision that such compensation should be in full of all emoluments and allowances whatsoever. By the acts in force during appellee's term of service the appropriation for the annual pay of interpreters was $300 each, and a large sum was set apart for their additional compensation. This course of legislation, which was persisted in for five years, distinctly reveals the change in the policy of Congress on the subject, namely, that instead of establishing a salary for interpreters at a fixed amount and cutting off all other allowances, Congress intended to reduce the salaries, and place a fund at the disposal of the secretary of the interior, from which, at his discretion, additional emoluments and allowances might be given to interpreters. The purpose of Congress to suspend the law fixing the salaries of the inte , preters in Nebraska at $400 per annum is just as clear as its purpose to suspend the section forbidding any further emoluments and allowances. Our opinion is, therefore, that the intention of Congress to fix by the appropriation acts, to which we have called attention, the annual salaries for interpreters for the time covered by these acts at $300 each, is

plain upon the face of the statute.

* This purpose is, of course, irreconcilable with the provisions of the Revised Statutes on the same subject, and these provisions must be considered as having been suspended until finally repealed.

* As the appellee has been paid in full his salary as fixed by the later acts, which were in force before and during, and continued in force after his term of service, he has no cause of action against the United States. The cause of U. S. v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 154, was also an appeal from the Court of Claims. The appellee, Fisher, held the office of chief justice of the territory of Wyoming, from 1876 to 1879. Up to June 30, 1877, he was paid his salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum. From June, 1877, to November, 1879, he was paid at the rate of $2,600. The appellee contended that he was entitled to his salary of $3,000 for the whole term of service. The act of congress regulating the salaries of chief justices and associate justices in the territories provides that their salary shall be $3,000 each per annum. This statute remained in fores until March 3, 1877, when congress passed an act entitled 'An act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government for the year ending June 30, 1878, and for other purposes.' That act declared as follows: "That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, in full compensation for the services of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1878, for the objects hereinafter expressed. * * Territory of Wyoming: For salaries of governor, chief justice, and two associate justices, at two thousand six hundred dollars each.' The acts of 1878 and 1879 contained similar provisions. Upon this state of the statute law the question is presented whether from June 30, 1877, up to and including November 26, 1879, the appellee was entitled to a salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum, or at the rate of $2,600. The appellee contended, as does the plaintiff in the case at bar, that he was entitled to the salary as fixed by the statute, instead of the amount named in the appropriation act. The supreme court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Justice Woods, says: 'We can not concur in this view. We think that the appropriation acts above referred to, so far as they con

# *