of the different states have been declared unconstitutional because they violated them. Thus a statute allowing an additional fee to port-wardens for every vessel entering a port; 6 Wall. 31; a tax on passengers introduced from foreign countries; 7 How. 286; a tax on passengers going out of a state; 6 Wall. 35; a tax levied upon freight brought into or through one state into another; 15 Wall. 232; a tonnage tax on vessels entering the harbors of a state, either from foreign or domestic ports; 12 Wall. 204; 19 id. 581; 20 id. 577; 100 U. S. 434; have all been so decided. It is said that wherever subjects, in regard to which a power to regulate commerce is asserted, are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are exclusively within the regulating control of congress. But the mere grant of the commercial power to congress does not forbid the states from passing laws to regulate pilotage. The power to regulate commerce includes various subjects, upon which there should be some uniform rule, and upon others different rules in different localities. The power is exclusive in congress in the former, but not so in the latter class; 12 How. 297. Whatever these restrictions are, they operate on all states alike, and if any state laws violate them, the laws are void; and without any legislation of congress the supreme court has declared them so; 6 Cra. 100; 4 Wheat. 122, 518; 16 How. 304; cases supra; Cooley, Const. Lim. 729. The United States have certain powers, the principal of which are enumerated in art. 1, § 8, running into seventeen specific powers. Others are granted to particular branches of the government: as, the treaty-making power to the president and senate. These have an equal effect in all the states, and so far as an authority is vested in the government of the Union or in any department of it, and so far as the states are prohibited from the exercise of certain powers, so far in our domestic affairs we are a unity. Within these granted powers the sovereignty of the United States is supreme. The constitution, and the laws made in pursuance of it, and all treaties, are the supreme law of the land. Art. 6. And they not only govern in their words, but in their meaning. If the sense is ambiguous or doubtful, the United States, through their courts, in all cases where the rights of an individual are concerned, are the rightful expositors. For without the authority of explaining this meaning the United States would not be sovereign. when the constitution has established a disability or immunity, a privilege or a right, these are precisely as that instrument has fixed them, and can be neither augmented nor curtailed by any act or law either of congress or a state legislature. We are more particular in stating this principle because it has sometimes been forgotten both by legislatures and theoretical expositors of the constitution. It has been justly thought a matter of importance to determine from what source the United States derive their authority. 4 Wheat. 402. When the constitution was framed, the people of this country were not an unformed mass of individuals. They were united into regular communities under state governments, and to these had confided the whole mass of sovereign power which they chose to intrust out of their own hands. The question here proposed is whether our bond of union is a compact entered into by the states, or the constitution is an organic law established by the people. To this question the preamble gives a decisive answer: We, the people, ordain and establish this constitution. The members of the convention which formed it were indeed appointed by the states. But the government of the states had only a delegated power, and, if they had an inclination, had no authority to transfer the allegiance of the people from one sovereign to another. The great men who formed the constitution were sensible of this want of power, and recommended it to the people themselves. They assembled in their own conventions and adopted it, acting in their original capacity as individuals, and not as representing states. The state governments are passed by in silence. They had no part in making it, and, though they have certain duties to perform, as, the appointment of senators, are properly not parties to it. The people in their capacity as sovereign made and adopted it; and it binds the state governments without their consent. The United States as a whole, therefore, emanates from the people, and not from the states, and the constitution and laws of the states, whether made before or since the adoption of that of the United States, are subordinate to it and the laws made in pursuance of it. ing,-jus utendi et abutendi. It has very truly been said that out of the mass of sovereignty intrusted to the states was carved a part and deposited with the United States. But this was taken by the people, and not by the states as organized communities. The people are the fountain of sovereignty. The whole was originally with them as their own. The state governments were but trustees acting under a In these matters, particularly in the limita- derived authority, and had no power to delegate tion put on the sovereignty of the states, it has what was delegated to them. But the people, as been sometimes said that the constitution exe- the original fountain, might take away what cutes itself. This expression may be allowed; they had lent and intrust it to whom they but with as much propriety these may be said to pleased. They had the whole title, and, as absobe laws which the people have enacted them-lute proprietors, had the right of using or abusselves, and no laws of congress can either take from, add to, or confirm them. They are rights, A consequence of great importance flows from privileges, or immunities which are granted by this fact. The laws of the United States act the people, and are beyond the power of con- directly on individuals, and they are directly and gress or state legislatures; and they require no not mediately responsible through the state govlaw to give them force or efficiency. The mem- ernments. This is the most important improvebers of congress are exempted from arrest, ex-ment made by our constitution over all previous cept for treason, felony, and breach of the peace, in going to and returning from the seat of government. Art. 1, § 6. It is obvious that no law can affect this immunity. On these subjects all laws are purely nugatory, because if they go beyond or fall short of the provisions of the constitution, that may always be appealed to. An individual has just what that gives him,-no less and no more. It may be laid down as a universal rule, admitting of no exception, that confederacies. As a corollary from this, if not more properly a part of it, the laws act only on states through individuals. They are supreme over persons and cases, but do not touch the state; they act through them; 1 Wheat. 368. If a state passes an ex post facto law, or passes a law impairing the obligation of contracts, or makes any thing but gold or silver a tender in payment of debts, congress passes no law which touches the state: it is sufficient that these laws are void, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 767 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and when a case is brought before the court, it, without any law of congress, will declare them void. They give no person an immunity, nor deprive any of a right. Again: should a state pass a law declaring war against a foreign nation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, arm troops or keep ships of war in time of peace, individuals acting under such laws would be responsible to the United States. They might be treated and punished as traitors or pirates. But congress would and could pass no law against the state; and for this simple reason, because the state is sovereign. And it is a maxim consecrated in public law as well as common sense and the necessity of the case, that a sovereign is answerable for his acts only to his God and to his own conscience. The constitution and laws made in pursuance of it, that is, laws within their granted powers, -and all treaties, are the supreme law of the land, art. 6; and the judicial power, art. 3, § 1, gives to the supreme court the right of interpreting them. But this court is but another name for the United States, and this power necessarily results from their sovereignty; for the United States would not be truly sovereign unless their interpretation as well as the letter of the law governed. But this power of the court is confined to cases brought before them, and does not embrace principles independent of these cases. They have no power analogous to that of the Roman prætor of declaring the meaning of the constitution by edicts. Any opinion, however strongly expressed, has no authority beyond the reasoning by which it is supported, and binds no one. But the point embraced in the case is as much a part of the law as though embraced in the letter of the law or constitution, and it bin is public functionaries, whether of the states or United States, as well as private persons; and this of necessity, as there is no authority above a sovereign to which an appeal can be made. this strictness does not exclude incidental powers. These are included in a general and express power, both in the common and technical use of language. To take a familiar example. A merchant of Philadelphia or Boston has a cargo of tea arrive at New York, and by letter authorizes his correspondent to sell it. This is the whole extent of the power. But it necessarily and properly includes that of advertising, of removing and exhibiting the goods, etc. But it would not authorize the sale of sugar, a horse, and much less a store or real estate. These powers are not incidental to the general power, nor included in it. Or we may take an example directly from the constitution itself. The United States has power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." This includes the power to create and appoint all inferior officers and to do all subordinate acts necessary and proper to execute the general power: to appoint assessors, collectors, keepers and disbursers of the public treasures. Without these subordinate powers the general power could not be executed. And when there is more than one mode by which this general power may be executed, it includes all. The agent is not confined to any one, unless a particular mode is pointed out. 4 Wheat. 410. All that the constitution requires is that it should be necessary and proper. One consequence of this doctrine is that there must be a power expressly granted as a stock to bear this incidental power, or otherwise it would be ingrafted on nothing. Another question of great practical importance arose at an early period of our government. The natural tendency of all concentrated power is to augment itself. Limitations of authority are not to be expected from those to whom power is intrusted; and such is the infirmity of human nature that those who are most jealous when out of power and seeking office are quite as ready practically to usurp it as any other. A general abrogation commonly precedes a real usurpation, to lull suspicion if for no other purpose. When the constitution was new, and before it had been fully considered, this diversity of opinion was not unnatural, and was the subject of earnest argument, but is, we think, now settled, and rightly, both on technical reasoning and on that of expediency. The question is between incidental and constructive or implied powers. The government of the United States is one of delegated power. No general words are used from which a general power can be inferred. Incidental and implied are sometimes used as synonymous; but in accurate reasoning there is a plain distinction between them, and the latter, in common use, comes nearer to constructive than to incidental. The interpretation of powers is familiar to courts of justice, as a great part of landed property in England and much in this country is held under powers. A more frequent example is that of common agency, as every agent is created by a power. Courts whose professed object is to carry into effect the intentions of parties have, on this subject, established general rules. Among these no one is more immovably fixed than this, that the interpretation is strict and not liberal. 2 Kent, 617; 4 id. 330. But as, A constructive power is one that is inferred, not from an express power, but from the general objects to be obtained from the grant, and, perhaps, in private powers sometimes from the general language in which they are granted. The broad distinction between them may be illus. trated by two cases that came before the United States Court. The first is one we have already quoted, 4 Wheat. 317. The question in that case was whether the act incorporating the Bank of the United States was constitutional, or whether it lay beyond the limits of the delegated powers and was, therefore, merely void as usurped or an excess of power. The authority to create a corporation is nowhere expressly given, and if it exists it must be sought as incidental to some power that is specifically granted. The court decided that it was incidental to that of laying taxes as a keeper and disburser of the public treasure. This power could be executed only by the appointment of agents; and the United States might as well create an agent for receiving, keeping, and disbursing the public money as appoint a natural person or an artificial one already created. In the case of Osborn vs. The United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 859, the general question was presented again, and reargued, and the court reaffirmed their former decision, but, more distinctly than before, adding an important qualification. They might not only create an artificial person, but clothe it with such powers and qualities as would enable it with reasonable convenience to perform its specific duties. The taxes are collected at one end of the country and paid out at another, and the bank instead of removing the specie might pay it where collected, and repay themselves by purchasing a bill of exchange in another place, and this could be conveniently and economically done only by a power of dealing in exchange generally, which when reduced to its last analysis is merely buying specie at one place and paying for it at another. It is in this way, and this only, that the bank got its general power of dealing in exchange,-that it is essential and proper to enable it to perform its principal duty, that of transferring the funds of the United States. Thus, the authority to create a bank is incidental to that of receiving, keeping, and paying out the taxes, and is comprehended under the specific power. The argument is principally derived from Hamilton's report on a bank, which proved satisfactory to Washington, as that of Chief-Justice Marshall has to the public at large. This is very different from a constructive power which is inferred not as included in any special grant, but from the general tenor of the power and the general objects to be obtained. The objects of the constitution are stated in the preamble, and they are to promote the common weal. But this is followed by the grant of specific powers. And it is the dictate of common sense as well as technical reasoning that this object is to be obtained by the due exercise of these powers. Where these fall short, none are granted; and if they are inadequate, the same consequence follows. No one would infer from a power to sell a ship one to sell a store, though the interest of the principal would thereby be promoted. The general power to regulate commerce is useful, and it is given, and it may be carried to its whole extent by having incidental powers ingrafted upon it. A general power to regulate the descent and distribution of intestate estates and the execution and proof of wills would be on many accounts useful, but it is not granted. The utility of a power is never a question. It must be expressly granted, or incidental to an express power,-that is, necessary and proper to carry into execution one expressly granted, or it does not exist. The other illustrative case is that of 16 Pet. 539-674. It will be found on a careful examination that in this a constructive power only is claimed. The only point involved in the case was the constitutionality of the statute of Pennsylvania under which Prigg was indicted as a kidnapper. The court decided this to be unconstitutional; and here its judicial functions properly terminated. But to arrive at this conclusion it was deemed necessary to determine that the general power of arresting and returning fugitives from labor and service was intrusted to the United States. It was not pretended that this power was expressly given, nor that it was incidental to any that was expressly given,-that is, conducive or proper to the execution of such a power. The court say that "in the exposition of this part of the constitution we shall limit ourselves to the considerations which appropriately and exclusively belong to it, without laying down any rules of interpretation of a more general nature." 16 Pet. 610. They do not, as in McCulloch's case, quote the express authority to which this is incidental; but a general argument is of fered to prove that this power is most safely lodged with the United States, and that, therefore, it has been placed there exclusively. If the canon of criticism which we have endeavored to establish, and which is generally admitted, is correct, the existence of such a power cannot be inferred from its utility. It will be seen, also, that this case stands in strong contrast with that of Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat.304-326, in which the opinion was delivered by the same judge. This was on the validity of the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act, authorizing an appeal from a final judgment of astate court to the supreme court of the United States; and perhaps in no case has the extent of the powers granted by the constitution been more fully and profoundly examined. In this case the court say that "the government of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted by the constitution; and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication;"—that is, as the reasoning of the court in the whole opinion proves, such as are included in the express powers, and are necessary and proper to carry them into execution. Such was the uniform language of the court whenever this question was presented previously to the rebellion. The doctrine as now held, however, is somewhat broader, finding its exposition in the decision of the supreme court in the Legal Tender Cases; 12 Wall. 457. It is there said that it is not indispensable to the existence of any power claimed for the federal government that it can be found specified in the words of the constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the substantial powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. It is allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them all that the power claimed has been conferred. Before any act of congress can be held to be unconstitutional, the court must be convinced that the means adopted were not appropriate or conducive to the execution of any or all of the powers of congress, or of the government,-not appropriate in any degree; and of the degree, the court is not to judge, but congress. We have seen that the constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance of it are the supreme law of the land, and that of the true meaning of these the supreme court, which is nothing else than the United States, is the rightful expositor. This necessarily results from their sovereignty. But the United States government is one of delegated powers; and nothing is better established, both by technical reasoning and common sense, than this,-that a delegate can exercise only that power which is delegated to him. All acts beyond are simply void, and create no obligation. It is a maxim also of constitutional law that the powers of sovereignty not delegated to the United States are reserved to the states. But in so complex an affair as that of government, controversies will arise as to what is given and what is reserved,-doubts as to the dividing line. When this is the case, who is to decide? This is a difficulty which the convention did not undertake to settle. To avoid all controversy as far as possible, the plainest words in granting powers to the United States were used which the language affords. Still further to preclude doubts, the convention added, at the close of the seventeen powers expressly given, this clause: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof." Art. 1, § 8. This clause contains no grant of power. But in the Articles of Confederation, which was a compact between the states as independent sovereignties, the word EXPRESSLY was used; and a doubt troubled congress how far incidental powers were included. Articles of Confederation, art. 2. This clause was introduced to remove that doubt. It covered incidental, but not constructive, powers. Strange as it may appear, both those who wished larger powers granted to the United States, and, in the language of that day, thought that things must be worse before they could be better, and those who honestly feared that too much power was granted, fixed their eyes on this clause; and perhaps no part of the constitution gave UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 769 greater warmth to the controversy than this. To disarm the designing and counteract the fears of the timid, the tenth amendment was offered by the friends of the constitution. But so jealous were parties of each other that it was offered in the convention of Massachusetts by Governor Hancock, who favored and had the confidence of the opposition, though it was in the handwriting of Mr. Parsons, afterwards chief-justice. Life of Chief-Justice Parsons. That amendment is in these words: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or the people." Were the words of the original constitution and the amendment both stricken out, it would leave the true con struction unaltered. Story, Const. § 1232. Both are equally nugatory in fact; but they have an important popular use. The amendment formally admits that certain rights are reserved to the states, and these rights must be sovereign. We have seen that, within their limited powers, the United States are the natural expositors of the constitution and laws; that when a case affecting individual rights arises, the supreme court stands for the United States, and that they have the sole right to explain and enforce the laws and constitution. But their power is confined to the facts before them, and they have no power to explain them in the form of an edict to affect other rights and cases. Beyond these powers the states are sovereign, and their acts are equally unexaminable. Of the separating line between the powers granted and the powers withheld, the constitution provides no judge. Between sovereigns there can be no common judge, but an arbiter mutually agreed upon. If that power is given to one party, that may draw all power to itself, and it establishes a relation not of equal sovereignties, but of sovereign and subject. On this subject the constitution is silent. The great men who formed it did not undertake to solve a question that in its own nature could not be solved. Between equals it made neither superior, but trusted to the mutual forbearance of both parties. A larger confidence was placed in an enlightened public opinion as the final umpire; and not until the the two sovereignties finally settled by the ultima ratio regum. The status of the states and their political rights under the constitution have been considered at large by the supreme court in the case of Texas vs. White, 7 Wall. 700. The student of constitutional law will find in the opinion of the court a masterly discussion of the delicate question of the relations of the state and federal governments. It is there held that authority to suppress rebellion is found in the .constitutional power to suppress insurrection, and carry on war; authority to provide for the restoration of state governments under the constitution when suspended and overthrown is derived from the obligation of the United States to guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government. The unity of the states never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to be perpetual; and when these articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect union.” But the perpetuity and indis war of the rebellion was this conflict between VOL. II.-49 UNIVERSAL AGENT solubility of the Union by no means imply the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the states. On the contrary, it may, not unnecessarily, be said that the preservation of the states and the maintenance of their government are as much within the design and care of the constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the national government. The constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible states. UNITY. An agreement or coincidence of certain qualities in the title of a joint-estate or an estate in common. unities: that of interest, for a joint-tenant In a joint-estate there must exist four cannot be entitled to one period of duration or quantity of interest in lands, and the other to a different; one cannot be tenant for life and the other for years: that of title, and, therefore, their estates must be created by one and the same act; that of time, for their estates must be vested at one and the same period, as well as by one and the same title; and, lastly, the unity of possession: hence jointtenants are seised per my et per tout, or by the half or moiety and by all: that is, each of them has an entire possession as well of every parcel as of the whole. 179; Co. Litt. 188. Coparceners must have the unities of interest, title, and possession. 2 Bla. Com. In tenancies in common, the unity of possession is alone required; 2 Bla. Com. 192. See ESTATE IN COMMON; ESTATE OF CoPARCENARY; ESTATE OF JOINT-TENANCY; TENANT; Tud. L. Cas. R. P. 876. UNITY OF POSSESSION. This term is used to designate the possession by one person of several estates or rights. For example, a right to an estate to which an easement is attached, or the dominant estate, and to an estate which an easement incumbers, or the servient estate, in such case the easement is extinguished; 3 Mas. 172; Poph. 166; Latch, 153. And see Cro. Jac. 121. But a distinction has been made between a thing that has its being by prescription, and one that has its being ex jure naturæ: in the former case unity of possession will extinguish the easement; in the latter, for example, the case of a watercourse, the unity will not extinguish it; Pothier, Contr. 166. By the Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 801, every servitude is extinguished when the estate to which it is due and the estate owing it are united in the same hands. But it is necessary that the whole of the two estates should belong to the same proprietor; for if the owner of one estate only acquires the other in part or in common with another person, confusion does not take effect. MERGER. See UNIVERSAL AGENT. One appointed to do all the acts which the principal can personally do, and which he may lawfully delegate the power to another to do. Such an agency may potentially exist; but it is difficult to conceive of its practical ex-ing the property to belong to some person istence, since it puts the agent completely in unknown is improper. 2 East, Pl. Cr. 651; the place of the principal; Story, Ag. § 21.1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 512; 8 C. & P. 773; 12 Pick. 174. UNIVERSAL LEGACY. In Civil Law. A testamentary disposition by which the testator gives to one or several persons the whole of the property which he leaves at his decease. La. Civ. Code, art. 1606; Code Civ. art. 1003; Pothier, Donations testa-7 Ired. 27; but an indictment against him as mentaires, c. 2, s. 1, § 1. UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIP. The name of a species of partnership by which all the partners agree to put in common all their property, universorum bonorum, not only what they then have, but also what they shall acquire. Pothier, Du Contr. de Société, n. 29. In Louisiana, universal partnerships are allowed: but property which may accrue to one of the parties after entering into the partnership, by donation, succession, or legacy, does not become common stock, and any stipulation to that effect, previous to the obtaining the property aforesaid, is void. La. Civ. Code, art. 2829-2834. See PART NERSHIP. UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION. In Scotch Law. The heir universally represents his ancestor, i.e. is responsible for his debts. Originally, this responsibility extended only to the amount of the property to which he succeeded; but afterwards certain acts on the part of the heir were held sufficient to make him liable for all the debts of the ancestor. Bell, Dict. Passive Titles. UNIVERSITAS JURIS (Lat.). In Civil Law. A quantity of things of various kinds, corporeal and incorporeal, taken together as a whole, e.g. an estate. It is used in contradistinction to universitas facti, which is a whole made up of corporeal units. Mackeldey, Civ. Law, § 149. UNIVERSITAS RERUM (Lat.). In Civil Law. Several things not mechanically united, but which, taken together, in some legal respects are regarded as one whole. Mackeldey, Civ. Law, § 149. UNIVERSITY. The name given to certain societies or corporations which are seminaries of learning where youth are sent to finish their education. Among the civilians, by this term is understood a corporation. UNIVERSITY COURT. See CHANCELLOR'S COURTS IN THE TWO UNIVER SITIES. UNJUST. That which is done against the perfect rights of another; that which is against the established law; that which is opposed to a law which is the test of right and wrong. 1 Toul. tit. prél. n. 5; Aust. Jur. 276, n.; Hein. Leç. El. § 1080. In an indictment, where the name of the deit, he may be described as a person whose name fendant is unknown, and he refuses to disclose is to the jurors unknown, but who is personally brought before them by the keeper of the prison; person to the jurors unknown, without something to ascertain whom the grand jury meant to designate, will be insufficient; R. & R. 489. The practice is to indict the defendant by a specific name, as, John No-name, and if he pleads in abatement, to send in a new bill, inserting the real name, which he then discloses, by which he is bound. This course is in some states prescribed by statute; 5 Iowa, 484. So matters of fact not vital to the accusation, may be proximately described; 53 N. H. 484; 125 Mass. 387, 394. See Whart. Cr. Pl. & Pr. §§ 104, 111, 156. See INDICTMENT. UNLAGE (Sax.). An unjust law. Cowel. UNLAW. In Scotch Law. A wit ness was formerly inadmissible who was not worth the king's unlaw,-i. e. the sum of £10 Scots, then the common fine for absence from court and for small delinquencies. Bell, Dict. UNLAWFUL. That which is contrary to law. There are two kinds of contracts which are unlawful,-those which are void, and those which are not. When the law expressly prohibits the transaction in respect of which the agreement is entered into, and declares it to be void, it is absolutely so; 3 Binn. 533. But when it is merely prohibited, without being made void, although unlawful it is not void; 12 S. & R. 237; 8 East, 236; 3 Taunt. 244. See CONDITION; VOID. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY. In Crim inal Law. A disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons who meet together with an intent mutually to assist each other in the execution of some unlawful enterprise of a private nature, with force and viofence. If they move forward towards its execution, it is then a rout; and if they actually execute their design, it amounts to a riot; 4 Bla. Com. 140; Hawk. Pl. Cr. c. 65, s. 9; Comyns, Dig. Forcible Entry (D 10); Viner, Abr. Riots, etc. (A). This UNLAWFULLY. In Pleading. word is frequently used in indictments in the description of the offence: it is necessary when the crime did not exist at common law, and when a statute, in describing an offence which it creates, uses the word; 1 Mood. C. C. 339; but is unnecessary whenever the crime existed at common law and is manifestly illegal: 1 Chit. Cr. L. *241; 2 Rolle, Abr. 82; Bac. Abr. Indictment (G 1); 1 II. 199; 2 id. 120; L. R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 161. UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES. Such UNKNOWN. When goods have been stolen from some person unknown, they may damages as are unascertained. In general, be so described in the indictment; but if the such damages cannot be set off. No interest owner be really known, an indictment alleg-will be allowed on unliquidated damages; 1 |