REVOCATUR

marriage, or insanity, the act itself terminates the power of the arbitrator at once, and all acts thereafter done by him are of no force; 11 Vt. 525; 5 East, 266.

The form of the revocation is not important, if it be in conformity with the submission, or if, when it is not, it be acquiesced in by the other party; 7 Vt. 237.

593

It is said in the books that the revocation must be of as high grade of contract as the submission. This seems to be assumed by the text-writers and judges as a settled proposition; Caldw. Arb. 79; 8 Co. 82; Brownl. 62; 8 Johns. 125. Where the submission is in writing, the revocation "ought to be in writing" 18 Vt. 91. But see 7 Vt. 237, 240; 15 N. H. 468. It seems questionable whether at this day a submission by deed would require to be revoked by deed, since the revocation is not a contract, but a mere notice, and no special right is conferred upon such an act by the addition of wax or wafer; 8 Ired. 74. See 2 Keb. 64. But see 26 Me. 251, contra. But it is conceded the party may revoke by any act which renders it impracticable for the arbitrators to proceed; 7 Mod. 8; Story, Ag. 474.

So a revocation imperfectly expressed, as of the bond instead of the submission, will receive a favorable construction, in order to affectuate the intention of the party; 1 Cow.

325.

It has been held, too, that bringing a suit upon the same cause of action embraced in the submission, at any time before the award, was an implied revocation; 6 Dana, 107; Caldw. Arb. 80.

THE POWER OF A PARTNER to contract in the name of the firm may be revoked, by injunction out of chancery, where there is a wanton or fraudulent violation of the contract constituting the association; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 673. This will sometimes be done on account of the impracticability of carrying on the undertaking; 1 Cox, Ch. 213; 2 V. & So, too, such an injunction might be granted on account of the insanity or permanent incapacity of one of the partners; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 673. But insanity is not alone sufficient to produce a dissolution of the partnership; 2 My. & K. 125. See PART

B. 299.

NERSHIP.

AN ORAL LICENSE to occupy land is, where the Statute of Frauds prevails, revocable at pleasure, unless permanent and expensive erections have been made by the licensee in faith of the permission. In such case a court of equity will decree a conveyance on equitable terms, in conformity with the contracts of the parties, or else require compensation to be made upon equitable principles; 1 Stockt. 471; Red. Railw. 106; 13 Vt. 150; 10 Conn. 375.

For the law in regard to the revocation of wills, see WILLS.

REVOCATUR (Lat. recalled). A term used to denote that a judgment is annulled for an error in fact. The judgment is then!

VOL. II.-38

REWARD

said to be recalled, revocatur; not reversed, which is the word used when a judgment is annulled for an error in law; Tidd, Pr. 1126.

REVOLT. The endeavor of the crew of a vessel, or any one or more of them, to overthrow the legitimate authority of her commander, with intent to remove him from his command, or against his will to take possesand navigation of her, or by transferring sion of the vessel by assuming the government their obedience from the lawful commander to some other person. 11 Wheat. 417.

According to Wolff, revolt and rebellion are nearly synonymous: he says it is the state of cit prince or government. Wolff, Droit de la Nat. § izens who unjustly take up arms against the 1232. See REBELLION.

By R. S. § 5359, if any one of the crew of an American vessel, on the high seas or other waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the U. S., endeavors to make a revolt, any other of the crew to disobey lawful orders, etc., or conspires, etc., so to do, or incites, etc., or to neglect their duty, or assembles such others in a mutinous manner, or makes a riot, or unlawfully confines the master, etc., he is punishable by a fine of not over $1000, or imprisonment for not over five years, or both. By § command of the vessel, or deprives him of au5360, if any one of the crew, etc., usurps the thority, or resists his authority, or transfers the same to one not entitled thereto, he is punishable by a fine of not over $2000, and imprisonment for not over ten years. Foreign seamen on tion; 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 88. If, before a voyage American vessels are punishable under this secis begun, the seamen for good reason believe that the vessel is unseaworthy, they may resist an attempt to compel them to go to sea in her, without being guilty of a revolt; 1 Sprague, 75.

Revolts on shipboard are to be considered as 306. defined by the last-mentioned act; 1 W. & M.

The in

A confederacy or combination must be shown; 2 Sumn. 582; 1 W. & M. 305; Crabbe, 558. The vessel must be properly registered; 3 Sumn. 342; must be pursuing her regular voyage; 2 Sumn. 470. dictment must specifically set forth the acts which constitute the crime; Whart. Prec. § 1061, n. And see 1 Mas. 147; 5 id. 402; 1 Sumn. 448; 4 Wash. C. C. 402, 528; 2 Curt. C. C. 225; 1 Pet. C. C. 213.

REWARD.

An offer of recompense of some act for the public good, which, when given by authority of law for the performance the act has been performed, is to be paid. The recompense actually so paid.

ment or by a private person.
A reward may be offered by the govern-
prosecutions, a person may be a competent
In criminal
witness although he expects on conviction of
the prisoner to receive a reward; 9 B. & C.
556; 1 Hayw. 3; 1 Root, 249; 4 Bla. Com.

294.

See 6 Humphr. 113.

fering a reward for information respecting a The publication of an advertisement ofloss or crime is a general offer to any person who is able to give the information asked; and the acceptance of it by giving such infor mation creates a valid contract; 82 N. Y.

RHODE ISLAND. One of the original thirteen states of the United States of America; its full style being, "The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations."

Its territory lies between Massachusetts and Connecticut, in the southwest angle of that portion of the territory of the former state which was known as the colony of New Plymouth, and is situated at the head and along both shores of the Narragansett bay, comprising the islands in the same, the principal of which is Rhode Island, placed at the mouth of the bay. The settlement was commenced as early as June, 1636, on the present site of the city of Providence, by five men under Roger Williams. Williams founded his colony upon a compact which bound the settlers to obedience to the major part "only in civil things;" leaving to each perfect freedom in matters of religious concernment, so that he did not, by his religious practices, encroach upon the public order and peace. A portion of the Massachusetts colonists, who were of the Antinomian party, after their defeat in that colony settled on the island of Aquetnet, now Rhode Island, where they associated themselves as a colony on March 7, 1638. These settlements, together with one "at Shawomet, now Warwick, made by another sect of religious outcasts, under Gorton, in 16423, remained under separate voluntary governments until 1647, when they were united under one government, styled The Incorporation of Providence Plantations in the Narragansett Bay in New England,' by virtue of a charter granted in 1643."

་

This colony remained under this charter, which, upon some divisions, was confirmed by Cromwell in 1655, until after the restoration, when a new charter was procured from Charles II., in the fifteenth year of his reign, under which a new colonial government was formed on the 24th of November, 1663, which continued, with the short interruption of the colonial administration of Sir Edmund Andros, down to the period of the American revolution. Under both the parliamentary charter which was procured by Williams, the founder of the settlement at Providence, and the royal charter which was procured by John Clark, one of the founders of the settlement at Aquetnet, religious liberty was carefully protected. By the parliamentary charter, the colony was authorized to make only "such civil laws and constitution as they or the greatest part of them shall by free consent agree unto;" and the royal charter, reciting "that it is much on the hearts" of the colonists, "if they may be permitted, to hold forth a lively ex

periment, that a most flourishing civil state may stand and best be maintained, and that amongst our English subjects with full liberty in religious concernments," expressly ordained "that no person within said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question for any differences in opinion in matters of religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony; but that all and every person or persons may, from time to time and at all times hereafter, freely and fully have and enjoy his and their own judg ments and consciences in matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of land hereafter mentioned, they behaving themselves peaceably and quietly, and not using the liberty to licentiousness and profaneness, nor to the civil law, statute or clause therein contained or to be injury or outward disturbance of others; any contained, usage or custom of this realm, to the contrary hereof, in any wise notwithstanding." In the general assembly of the colony, on the first Wednesday of May, 1776, in anticipation of the declaration of independence, an act was passed which absolved the colonists from their allegiance to the king of Great Britain, and which ordered that in future all writs and processes should issue in the charter name of "The Governor and Company of the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations," instead of the name of the king. The old colonial charter, together with a bill of rights adopted by the general assembly, remained the sole constitution of state government until the first Tuesday in May, 1843, when a state constitution framed by a convention assembled in November, 1842, and adopted by the people of the state, went into operation.

The third article of this constitution distributes the powers of government into the legislative, executive, and judicial.

The fourth article regulates the legislative power. It provides that the constitution shall be the supreme law, and the general assembly shall pass laws to carry it into effect; that there shall be a senate and house of representatives, constituting together the general assembly, and that a concurrence of these two houses shall be necessary to the enactment of laws, that there shall be one session to be holden at Newport, commencing the last Tuesday in May, and an adjournment from the same held annually at Providence, Amend. 1854, art. iii.; that members shall not take fees or be of counsel in any case pending before either house, under penalty of expulsion; against arrest of the person and attachment of the property of the members during the session and two days before and after; for freedom of debate; that each house shall judge the qualifications of its members, see Amend. art. 1., as to evidence required; what shall be a quorum, and for continuing the session without a quorum; that each house may prescribe rules of proceedings, and punish and expel members; for keeping a journal of its proceedings; for not adjourning, without consent of the other house, for more than two days at a time; that the assembly shall exercise all their usual powers, though not granted by this constitution; for regulating the pay of members and all other offlcers. It also provides for abolishing lotteries; for restricting the power to create a debt of more than fifty thousand dollars, except in time of war or invasion or insurrection, without the express consent of the people; that the assent of two-thirds of the members of each house shall be required to a bill appropriating public money for local or private purposes; that new valuations of property may be made by order of the

was before a court which had not jurisdiction.

RIGHT. A well-founded claim.

original and exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions for less than $100, excepting actions relating to real estate. The justice courts have also jurisdiction or cognizance of all crimes committed within the town in which they are severally established. And this jurisdiction is exclusive where fine does not exceed $20 or im-lishes or proves certain claims, either upon felprisonment three months.

Courts of Probate are held by the town councils of the various towns, except in Providence, where the municipal courts acts as a probate court. This court has jurisdiction of the settlement of estates of deceased persons, supervision of guardians, probate of wills, and other similar matters, with a right of appeal to the supreme

court.

RHODIAN LAWS. A code of maritime laws adopted by the people of Rhodes, who had by their commerce and naval victories obtained the sovereignty of the sea, about nine hundred years before the Christian era. There is reason to suppose this code has not been transmitted to posterity, at least not in a perfect state. A collection of marine constitutions, under the denomination of Rhodian Laws, may be seen in Vinnius; but they bear evident marks of a spurious origin. See Marsh. Ins. 15; CODE.

RIBAUD. A rogue; a vagrant.

RIDER. A schedule or small piece of paper or parchment added to some part of the record; as, when on the reading of a bill in the legislature a new clause is added, this is tacked to the bill on a separate piece of paper, and is called a rider.

RIDING. In English Law. An ascertained district; part of a county. This term has the same meaning in Yorkshire that division has in Lincolnshire. 4 Term, 459.

RIDING ARMED. The offence of riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons. It is a misdemeanor; 4 Steph.

Com. 357.

RIDING CLERK. One of the Six Clerks in chancery, who, in his turn, for one year kept the controlment books of all grants that passed the Great Seal. Whart. Dic.

RIEN. A French word which signifies nothing. It has generally this meaning: as, rien en arrere; rien passe per le fait, nothing passes by the deed; rien per descent, nothing by descent: it sometimes signifies not, as, rien culpable, not guilty. Doctrina Plac. 435.

If people believe that humanity itself establow-beings, or upon society or government, they call these claims human rights; if they believe that these claims inhere in the very nature of man himself, they call them inherent, inalienable rights; if people believe that there inheres in monarchs a claim to rule over their subjects by divine appointment, they call the claim divine right, jus divinum; if the claim is founded or given by law, it is a legal right. The ideas of claim and that the claim must be well founded always constitute the idea of right. Rights can only inhere in and exist between moral beings: and no moral beings can coexist without rights, consequently without obligations. Right and obligation are correlative ideas. The idea of a well-founded claim becomes in law a claim founded in or established by the law: so that we may say a right in law is an acknowledged claim.

Men are by their inherent nature moral and social beings; they have, therefore, mutual claim on others is called a right, and, since the claims upon one another. Every well-grounded social character of man gives the element of mutuality to each claim, every right conveys along with it the idea of obligation. Right and obligation are correlative. The consciousness of all constitutes the first foundation of the right or makes the claim well grounded. Its incipiency arises instinctively out of the nature of man. Man feels that he has a right of ownership over matter, for instance, the bow he has made of apthat which he has produced out of appropriated propriated wood; he feels that he has a right to exact obedience from his children, long before laws formally acknowledge or protet these rights; but he feels, too, that if he claims the bow which he made as his own, he ought to acknowledge (as correlative obligation) the same right in another man to the bow which he may have made; or if he, as father, has a right to the obedience of his children, they have a corresponding claim on him for protection as long as they are incapable to protect themselves. The idea of rights is coexistent with that of authority (or government); both are inherent in man; but if we understand by government a coherent system of laws by which a state is ruled, and if we understand by state a sovereign society, with then rights precede government, or the estab distinct authorities to make and execute laws, lishment of states, which is expressed in the ancient law maxim: Ne ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est, regula flat. See GOVERNMENT. We cannot refrain from referring the reader to the noble passage of Sophocles, Edyp. Tyr. 876 et seq., and to the words of Cicero, in his oration for Milo: Est enim hæc, judices, non scripta sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legiexpressimus; ad quam non docti sed facti; non mus ; verum ex natura ip›a arrijuimus, housimus,

RIEN EN ARRERE (L. Fr. nothing in arrear). In Pleading. A plea which alleges that there is nothing remaining due und un-instituti sed imbuti sumus. paid of the plaintiff's demand. It is a good plea, and raises the general issue in an action for rent. 2 Wm. Saund. 297, n. 1; 2 Chitty, Pl. 486; 2 Ld. Raym. 1503.

As rights precede government, so we find that now rights are acknowledged above govern ments and their states, in the case of interna

tional law. International law is founded on rights, that is, well-grounded claims which civRIEN PASSE PER LE FAIT (L. Fr. ilized states, as individuals, make upon one annothing passed by the deed). In Pleading. other. As governments come to be more and A plea which avoids the effect of a deed more clearly established, rights are more clearly where its execution cannot be denied, by as-right comes to mean a claim acknowledged and acknowledged and protected by the laws, and serting that nothing passed thereby for ex- protected by the law. A legal right, a constituample, an allegation that the acknowledgment | tional right, means a right protected by the law,

by the constitution; but government does not imperfect one. If a man demand his procreate the idea of right or original rights; it ac

lation to come from a source not human.

perty which is withheld from him, the right that supports his demand is a perfect one, because the thing demanded is or may be fixed and determinate; but if a poor man ask relief from those from whom he has reason to expect it, the right which supports his petition is an imperfect one, because the relief which he expects is a vague, indeterminate thing. Rutherforth, Inst. c. 2, § 4; Grotius, lib. 1, c. 1, § 4.

Rights might with propriety be also divided into natural and civil rights; but as all the rights which man has received from nature have been modified and acquired anew from the civil law, it is more proper, when considering their object, to divide them into political and civil rights.

Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the estab lishment or management of government. These political rights are fixed by the constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of being elected: these are the political rights which the humblest citizen possesses.

knowledges them; just as government does not create property or values and money, it acknowledges and regulates them. If it were other wise, the question would present itself, whence does government come? whence does it derive its own right to create rights? By compact? But whence did the contracting parties derive their right to create a government that is to make rights? We would be consistently led to adopt the idea of a government by jus divinum,-that is, a government deriving its authority to introduce and establish rights (bestowed on it in par- Rights are also absolute and qualified. A ticular) from a source wholly separate from hu- man has an absolute right to recover property man society and the ethical character of man, in which belongs to him; an agent has a qualithe same manner in which we acknowledge reve-fied right to recover such property when it Rights are claims of moral beings upon one had been intrusted to his care and which another when we speak of rights to certain has been unlawfully taken out of his possesthings, they are, strictly speaking, claims of sion. persons on persons,-in the case of property, for instance, the claim of excluding others from possessing it. The idea of right indicates an ethical relation, and all moral relations may be infringed; claims may be made and established by law which are wrong in themselves and destitute of a corollary obligation; they are like every other wrong done by society or government; they prove nothing concerning the origin or essential character of rights. On the other hand, claims are gradually more clearly acknowledged, and new ones, which were not per ceived in early periods, are for the first time perceived, and surrounded with legislative protection, as civilization advances. Thus, original rights, or the rights of man, are not meant to be claims which man has always perceived or insisted upon or protected, but those claims which, according to the person who uses the term, logically flow from the necessity of the physical and moral existence of man; for man is born to be a man,—that is, to lead a human existence. They have been called inalienable rights; but they have been alienated, and many of them are not perceived for long periods. Lieber, in his Political Ethics, calls them primordial rights: he means rights directly flowing from the nature of man, developed by civilization, and always showing themselves clearer and clearer as society advances. He enumerates, as such especially, the following: the right of protection; the right of personal freedom,-that is, the claim of unrestricted action except so far as the same claim of others necessitates restriction: these two rights involve the right to have justice done by the public administration of justice, the right of production and exchange (the right of property), the right of free locomotion and emigration, the right of communion in speech, letter, print, the right of worship, the right of influencing or sharing in the legislation. All political civilization steadily tends to bring out these rights clearer and clearer, while in the course of this civilization, from its incipiency, with its relapses, they appear more or less de veloped in different periods and frequently wholly in abeyance: nevertheless, they have their origin in the personality of man as a social being.

Civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government. These consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying property, of exercising the paternal and marital powers, and the like. It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by a sentence of civil death, is in the enjoyment of his civil rights,-which is not the case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no political, although in the full enjoyment of his civil, rights.

These latter rights are divided into absolute and relative. The absolute rights of mankind may be reduced to three principal or primary articles: the right of personal security, which consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation; the right of personal liberty, which consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's inclination may direct, without any restrainst unless by due course of law; the right of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. 1 Bla. Com. 124-139.

the first are those which subsist between the The relative rights are public or private: people and the government; as, the right of protection on the part of the people, and the right of allegiance which is due by the people to the government; the second are the re