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devil. No man is fit for citizenship in an earthly republic, who is not in full sympathy with its fundamental principles; so no one can be fit for citizenship in the New Jerusalem, without being sincerely in sympathy with its fundamental principles.

II. Though sincere, though truthful, the citizen of the New Jerusalem is not uncharitable, is not intolerant. "He that backbiteth not with his tongue; nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor."

Some think sincerity and severity are synonymous. They pride themselves upon their frankness, as though too great freedom of speech was not a vice, rather than a virtue. The bridling of the tongue is the severest test of Christian character. "If any man among you seemeth to be religious and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, that man's religion is vain."

The importance of the subject may be inferred from its connection. It is one of the few qualities enumerated in the compendium of the character of a citizen of the New Jerusalem: that he "backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor."

III. The citizen of Zion prefers religious to irreligious society and associations. "In whose eyes a vile person is contemned; but he honoreth them that fear the Lord."

The line is not drawn here between those respectable and those not respectable in position, dress, culture, wealth; but between the religious and irreligious. If a man lacks the fear of God, no other qualities or acquisitions can be substituted. He may not be awkward or vulgar. He may lead the fashionable world. It is nothing to the citizen of Zion. He looks for loyalty to God, as the soldier looks for loyalty to his country.

IV. The citizen of the New Jerusalem is faithful to his covenants and contracts with men. "He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not."

Some men interpret the power and opportunity of receding from their engagements as license to do so. A promise is nothing, if not reduced to writing, or made in presence of witnesses. Is a man to be true, only as he can make money by it? You have sold your house. Before you have given the deed, real estate advances. You decline consummating the bargain. Not so the citizen of the New Jerusalem. The hurt spoken of here is material, not moral. The moral law, not human laws, is to be our standard. He who deprecates the love of the truth, and its practice among men, does worse than to counterfeit their currency.

V. The citizen of the New Jerusalem has a very tender regard for the poor and neglected among men. He espouses them as his friends. He adopts them as fellow-citizens. He takes them as his Master's representatives. "He that putteth not out his money to usury: nor taketh reward against the innocent."

The Levitical law against oppressing the poor, is not a law against taking interest. The poor were to be helped and encouraged. The innocent are constantly before the public for judgment. They are constantly urging upon men some claim for redress of grievances, for restoration to privilege and immunities. No good time coming till Christ comes, when this will not be the case. Right and wrong are in deadly conflict. In this country are four millions of men, women and children, whose status civil, social and religious, is to be determined by the citizens of the nation. They are innocent of all crime against the republic. They were faithful among the faithless. They have purchased the civic crown. They have helped to save the life of the state. If we are citizens of the New Jerusalem, we shall look after their interests. We shall not accept political tranquility, place, anything, as a reward against them.

These are the qualities requisite for entrance upon the joys of the New Jerusalem. It is a sanctified character, a sanctified spirit, a sanctified tongue, sanctified taste, a sanctified life, all sanctified by the blood of the Redeemer, that gives man a passport to heaven. Have we these qualities. If so, we shall never be moved. Though heaven and earth pass away, His word shall not pass away.

CHRIST AS A PREACHER.

"A greater than Jonas is here."-Math. xii. 40.

THE Lord Jesus Christ was greater than Jonas, and greater than all others, as a PREACHER.

Preaching was a great work with him, as many texts show. "And he said unto them, let us go into the next town, that I may preach there also; for therefore came I forth." in their synagogues throughout all Galilee." Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to to the poor."

And he preached "The spirit of the preach the Gospel

He was greatest of all preachers in real eloquence. This was predicted of Jesus by Isaiah xi. 1, 2, 3, 4. And the Psalmist refers to him when he says, "Grace is poured into thy lips." He

was earnest, natural, clear and complete in his views, and master of language. He recognized the dependence of thought upon language, and was exact in statement, and could draw at will upon all imagery, and paint to the life. Witness his summary of the Decalogue, his talk with Nicodemus, and many of his parables. Neither Peter the Hermit nor Whitfield drew such vast and admiring crowds to hear them as he drew, even into deserts. How often his crafty enemies secretly counseled to take him, and no man daređ to lay hands on him lest the people should rise up in his defense.

Our Saviour was the greatest of all preachers in the presentation and enforcement of doctrine. Even Paul did not set forth depravity so positively and forcibly as did Christ. "The Son of man is come

to seek and to save that which was lost." "The whole have no need of the physician, but they that are sick." "A good tree can not bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." In the parable of the laborers, he brought out Divine Sovereignty with such force as to silence cavilers; and again, at Nazareth, referring to the many widows, and the many lepers in Israel, in the days of Elias, that were utterly passed by, he so pungently preached this humbling doctrine that all that were in the synagogue were filled with wrath. In the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, he presented the doctrine of eternal punishment with such vivid reality as no other preacher ever did. The freeness and fulness of divine grace stands out to all the world in the parable of the Prodigal Son. And so of all the doctrines of the Gospel sys

tem.

He could expose and rebuke with terrific power. No prophets ever unearthed and denounced wickedness as he did in the case of the scribes and Pharisees. The invective of Demosthenes is nothing in comparison for severity.

No minister could comfort the sorrowing as he did Martha and Mary, and others, nor minister hope to the trembling penitent, as he did to Mary Magdalen. He never broke the bruised reed, nor uenched the smoking flax.

1.-The Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated. By JAMES McCosн, LL.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. pp. 448.

THIS is an effort to state the claims, define the limits, and rescue intuitions or native convictions from the modern school of sensational and experential" philosophers. Not that the claim for the validity of the intuitions is a new one. On the contrary, an important place has been assigned to intuitions by every writer of note, from Plato to Sir William Hamilton, but the tests and grounds of evidence have not been so strictly defined till now.

The position here taken is that the mind begins its acts of intelligence with knowledge. (p. 100.)

This was the ancient doctrine to which a return is now proposed. Since the days of Hume it has been a favorite theory with many that perceptions of the mind were only impressions, and that ideas were only faint images of such impressions. It has always been difficult to show the steps by which we get from impressions to ideas of externalities. If the mind in its earliest operations can not perceive, at what precise period of its existence, it may be asked, does it begin to perceive? Not that the mind in its earliest operations possesses abstract knowledge, but it is claimed that it has perceptions, just as truly as years afterward. From such perceptions of the concrete comes the abstract.

The author holds that the mind is endowed with at least two cognitive powers, semi-perception and self-consciousness. This consciousness of externality is fundamental, and hence trustworthy. If not trustworthy, when does it become so?

The doctrine is expected to find opponents. There will be found men who affirm the unreliability of the senses, and deny the existence of matter. Such speculative minds content themselves with unsettling rather than establishing views. But the great body of intelligent men have neither time nor inclination for metaphysical bewilderment, and will forever return to their native convictions as proof of the existence of matter, the general reliability of the senses, and the duty of divine worship.

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Native convictions or intuitions are defined by McCosh, as ceptious formed by looking in upon objects." He shows that there are intuitions regulating our cognitions, beliefs and judgments, whether intellectual or moral.

An inquiring mind will naturally ask: Though we in general resort to native convictions for proof of many phenomena, can we place implicit confidence in those convictions? Are not our intuitions sometimes in error, and if so, what degree of reliance can be placed on them? What are the evidences of reliability? "May we, when hard pressed, resort to native convictions as self-evident, and declare them beyond the reach of refutation?" The author answers such inquiries by giving some tests of intuitive knowledge. First, the primary mark of the truth of such convictions is self-evidence. A second mark may be necessity, and a third universality of conviction. These are not necessarily distinct and equal. A conviction which is universal would seem to be necessary, and therefore self-evident. If argued that the truth of such tests is not susceptible of demonstration, it may be answered that the reasoning is as conclusive as most metaphysical reasoning, and much more satisfactory, and that if the same principle can be used in later years in derived operations, why not in earlier years in primary mental operations?

Passing from primitive cognitions, he considers the relation between our intuitions and primitive beliefs. He connects belief intimately with cognitions, holding that all belief is dependent on and subsequent to, knowledge; that the mind starts with cognitions, but that the representative power involves beliefs; that beliefs gain upon cognitions, so that a body of primitive beliefs soon goes far beyond our knowledge; that the superstructure of belief may be grand and imposing, but the foundation must always be knowledge.

Of the objective existence of space and time, it is held the mind has clear, native convictions. It must be admitted that McCosh argues for the validity of our intuitions, in this respect, in a negative manner, as if to avoid rather than establish results. He holds that if we deny the objective existence of space and time, we may as easily deny the existence of objects in space and events in time, which would be repugnant to common sense. So he falls back upon

our intuitions to relieve us from this dilemma.

Primitive judgments follow naturally after primitive beliefs. important place is given to intuitions in morals and theology. It is held that intuitions require man to be a moral and religious being, and point him to the one being, the source of all power and good

ness.

This book is something of a novelty in one direction. It is full of readable metaphysics. The style, somewhat diffuse, will perhaps render it popular, while supplementary chapters and sections give critical notes of the history of the several points discussed.