man of the Arbitration Committee, the Board is not estopped from hearing the case on review.50 But if the stenographic report is filed without first submitting it to the applicant or his attorney for his authentication, or the stenographic report was not authenticated by any one representing either the applicant or his attorney, nor by the Chairman of the Arbitration Committee, the petition for review will be dismissed.51 A motion to dismiss for want of a stenographic report will be denied, where it is shown that a letter. was addressed to the Secretary of the Board, requesting that it be submitted for authentication.52 An insurer's requested rulings that a claimant was not entitled to compensation, on the report of the Massachusetts Board of Arbitration finding that she was not next of kin or a member of decedent's family, became immaterial where her claim was disallowed by the Industrial Accident Board.53 An employé was not precluded by a finding of the Massachusetts Committee of Arbitration that he agreed to a settlement on a basis of partial disability, which would cease at the end of a certain number of weeks, where such agreement had been made after the Committee had found that total disability would cease on a certain date, to which finding the employé did not assent, and as to which he did not waive his right of appeal, but he had a right to contend before the Industrial Accident Board that his disability was total." § 233. Dismissal Where a cause is called and applicant does not appear, a motion to dismiss will be allowed. Where after a delay of a year from 55 50 Bernstein v. Bothman, Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 163. 51 Petrock v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 89. 52 Hollas v. Illinois Steel Co., Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 158. 53 In re Kelley's Case, 222 Mass. 538, 111 N. E. 395. 54 Duprey v. Maryland Casualty Co., 219 Mass. 189, 106 N. E. 686. 55 Motely v. McDonald, Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 25. 56 the filing of the claim for compensation the parties had taken no steps to bring the matter to a hearing, and upon notice of the California Commission that the proceeding would be dismissed for want of prosecution, unless good cause be shown to the contrary, the parties fail to answer or show cause, the proceeding will be dismissed. Where the pleadings show that the application is filed more than six months after the occurrence of the accident complained of, and that no payment or agreement to pay the claim has been made, the action will be dismissed without any hearing.57 The case was dismissed without prejudice where after making claim a workman was not represented at the hearing on the date set, and his wife stated that he had disappeared and that she did not know where he was; 58 also where a workman claimed compensation for the loss of a finger due to blood poisoning, and died before the hearing of the case, and no one appeared to represent him.59 Where the attorney of record for the applicant, after the taking of testimony, but before a decision, files with the Commission a notice in writing that the applicant has waived all claims against the defendant and requests a dismissal of the action, the Commission is not bound to dismiss the action, but may proceed with the case and render an award of disability compensation to the applicant, where the evidence has shown him entitled to an award."0 § 234. Reopening of case, rehearing, and supplementary proceedings A case will be reopened and a rehearing granted when it appears from the showing made that justice requires it, but not otherwise.61 56 Hunter v. Mitchell, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 817. 57 Petch v. Lamont & Richardson, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 982; as to limitations, see § 214, ante. 58 Berthold v. McCormick Steamship Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 993. 59 Rokos v. Glaros & Papas, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 993. 60 Gerber v. Central Council of Stockton, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 580. 61 In Fiorio v. Ferrie, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 459 (on motion to open up award), where claimant authorized her counsel to agree to facts stated and Where compensation has been awarded subject to modification at a later hearing, if justified by further evidence to be produced at that hearing, and the wages of the workman are then found to have been more than the amount upon which compensation was based at the first hearing, the modification of the award can be made retroactive to cover all the payments awarded. Except where the parties otherwise agree or waive their rights in respect thereto, where a matter is recommitted under the Connecticut Act to the Commissioner by the superior court for further hearing, finding, and award, it becomes the duty of the commissioner to limit the scope of the inquiry at such hearing to the particular point on which the court found error.63 A settlement receipt in full, when not approved by the Michigan Board, will not prevent the Board from reopening the proceed request an award, which was done, it was held not to be ground for opening up the award that she understood she would receive $150 more than was in fact allowed her by the award. In Iacovazzi v. Coppolo, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 476, where the respondent at the time of the hearing was ill, though not seriously, and an hour before the hearing telephoned his business adviser, who then telephoned to the Commissioner to ask for a continuance, but, finding the Commissioner engaged, took no further action until after he had been notified of an award against him and execution taken thereon, it was held there was not sufficient ground to warrant a rehearing. In Becker v. Blake, on petition for rehearing, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 516, where no new witnesses were offered, and the new evidence offered amounted to no more than "threshing over old straw," the Commissioner denied the rehearing. In Braithwaite v. Rowley, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 355, where, after stating at the original hearing that she wanted only an allowance for medical expense, and no other compensation, claimant applied to reopen the award, and on evidence it appeared that claimant was also entitled to disability indemnity, and that at the prior hearing she had been without counsel or adviser, the Commissioner held that the case on its merits called for a revision of the award, and so ordered. The Commission's right to rehear a case is not cut off by an appeal being taken to a higher court on the original decision, the Commission having continuing jurisdiction. McNally v. Diamond Mills Paper Co. (on rehearing) The Bulletin, N. Y., vol. 1, No. 11, p. 12. 62 Ryan v. Griswold & Davis, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 510. 64 ing, though the workman and his employer have agreed that the workman shall receive one-half his weekly wages, without specifying how long such payments shall continue, and this agreement has been approved by the Board. A finding by the Committee of Arbitration under the Massachusetts Act that compensation should be denied after a fixed date was conclusive, and a bar to further payments where no review was requested within the time limited.65 The provision of this Act that "no party shall as a matter of right be entitled to a second hearing upon any question of fact" means that the introduction of new evidence is a matter of discretion ordinarily. Commonly there should not be a rehearing. Where there has been a full trial, a final decree should be entered." An award under the New Jersey Act is subject to review after one year.67 68 The Industrial Commission of New York held that it would not reverse a decision rendered by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which it succeeded, unless the case is very clear at the rehearing, and shows that a grave injustice has been done. Where the facts show that applicant has not been guilty of injurious practices, or has done nothing to retard his recovery, the Illinois Board on review will not interfere with its former finding. Nor will it disturb its finding where it is not known how long a disability will continue, and recovery is problematical.7° 69 Where a minor, appearing without a guardian, agrees to a stip 64 Foley v. Detroit United Ry. (Mich.) 157 N. W. 45. 65 In re Hunnewell, 220 Mass. 351, 107 N. E. 934. 66 In re Doherty, 222 Mass. 98, 109 N. E. 887; In re Fierro's Case, 223 Mass. 378, 111 N. E. 957. 67 Banister Co. v. Kriger (N. J. Sup.) 89 Atl. 923, denying rehearing in case reported in 84 N. J. Law, 30, 85 Atl. 1027. ("Within" was inadvertently used for "after" in the former opinion.) 68 Adler v. Thomas Hefsky Theater Co., Inc., The Bulletin, N. Y., vol. 1. No. 11, p. 13. 69 Smith v. Israel Bros., Bulletin No. 1, Ill., p. 164. ulation of facts, upon which compensation is awarded by the Wisconsin Commission, and paid, and then later, when he appears by his guardian, it appears that there is error in the stipulation and that the employé has not received as much as he was entitled to, the Commission may award such further compensation as the Act provides.71 The California Act provides that any person aggrieved by any final order, decision, award, rule, or regulation of the Commission. may apply to the Commission for a rehearing in respect to any matters determined or covered by such final order, decision, award, rule, or regulation and specified in the application for rehearing within the time and in the manner provided for in the Act, and not otherwise.72 Where it appears to the Commission that any party has made a bona fide offer of material evidence, which could not reasonably be discovered and presented at a prior hearing, or which the parties did not produce because of lack of opportunity, by failure to receive notice, a rehearing will be granted in the furtherance of justice.73 A rehearing will be denied where the application is not properly verified," or contains a mere general statement that a particular finding is not sustained by the evidence," or 71 Schmidt v. Menominee Bay Shore Lumber Co., Rep. Wis. Indus. Com. 1914-15, p. 22. 72 Wk. Comp. Act, Laws 1913, p. 315, § 81. 73 DeLong v. Krebs, 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 592. 74 Where an application for a rehearing is filed, but is not verified upon oath as required by section 81 (c) of the Act, the request for a rehearing must be denied. Porter v. Anderson, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 67. 75 The requirement that an application for rehearing "shall set forth specifically and in full detail the grounds upon which the applicant considers said final order, decision, award," etc., unjust or unlawful, means that he must do something more than make the general statement that a certain finding is not sustained by the evidence. Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 538, 171 Cal. 52, 151 Pac. 658. |