isting at the date of injury or the date of death is reserved for consideration in a subsequent section."

§ 8. Territorial operation

Except as to seamen, for whom express provision is made, the English Act applies only within the territorial limits of the United Kingdom,58 but by the acts of several foreign countries definite and careful provision is made as to accidents occurring outside their territory.5" In many of the state Acts no such provision is made, though several exempt persons engaged in interstate commerce where the federal laws shall be construed to furnish exclusive remedies, while some expressly limit the operation to employment within the state. 60 It is well settled, however, that a state has power to extend the privileges of a Compensation Act to employers and employés outside the state. In recognition of

57 See $ 80, post.

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58 (English Wk. Comp. Act, § 7) Tomalin v. Pearson & Son (1909) 2 B. W. C. C. 1, 2 K. B. 61, 7 L. J. K. B. N. S. 863, 100 L. T. N. S. 685, 25 Times L. R. 477; Hicks v. Maxton (1907, C. C.) 124 L. T. Jo. 135, 1 B. W. C. C. 150. Where a workman, not a seaman, was lost at sea while on his way abroad for his employers, his employment was not within the Act. Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha & Telegraph Works Co., Ltd. (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 390, 2 K. B. 299 (1912) W. M. 98, 28 Times L. R. 331, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 780, (1912) W. C. R. E. P. 190, 106 L. T. N. S. 706. The employment of a British subject under a contract entered into in England, the execution of which took him abroad, where he was killed, was not within the Act. Tomalin v. Pearson & Son, Ltd. (1910) supra.

59 France, Acts of 1898, 1902, 1905, 1906, title 3; Austria, Law of 1894, art. 2; Belgium, Act of 1903, art. 26; Germany, Law of 1900(a), art. 4; German Insurance Code of 1911, art. 157. See 24 Annual Report of U. S. Com. of Labor, vol. 2 (1909) pp. 2501, 2456, 2457, 2464, 2517, 2596.

60 See Kansas, Laws 1911, c. 218, § 7; Michigan, Laws Extra Sess. 1912, No. 3, pt. 6, § 4; Washington, Laws 1911, c. 74, § 18; Nevada, Laws 1911, c. 183, § 3; Washington, Laws 1911, c. 74, § 2; Wisconsin, Laws 1911, c. 50, § 1; and acts of other states.

61 Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A. 934, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309; In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D,

this power, state courts have frequently given effect to the compensation laws of other states and countries, where they were not contrary to the laws or policy of the state of the forum.62 In view of the conflict of authority and differences between the various Acts, it is difficult to formulate a precise rule relative to the extraterritorial operation of these laws; but it may be stated on the weight of authority that Acts not construed to be contractual in character do not, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, apply where the injury occurs outside the state, while, on the other hand, Acts construed to be contractual protect one injured outside the state, where the contract of employment was made within the state and is governed by the laws of the state. However, to this

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372; Gooding v. Ott (W. Va.) 87 S. E. 863; Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 158.

While the statute itself may have no extraterritorial effect, it can require a contract to be made by two parties to a hiring, which shall have an extraterritorial effect. Op. Sp. Counsel to Iowa Indus. Com. (1915) p. 22.

*2 Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 158.

The New York courts have recognized the compensation laws of other states and countries, and given effect to them unless they were contrary to the laws or policy of New York. Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Am. Line, 149 App. Div. 900, 134 N. Y. Supp. 812; Id. 78 Misc. Rep. 448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944; Albanese v. Stewart, 78 Misc. Rep. 581, 138 N. Y. Supp. 942; Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., 87 Misc. Rep. 156, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1035; Wooden v. Western N. Y. & P. R. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E. 1050, 13 L. R. A. 458, 22 Am. St. Rep. 803.

63 In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, it is not to be presumed that statutes respecting this matter are designed to control conduct or fix the rights of parties beyond the territorial limits of the state. In re American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693. This rule is also supported by Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229, 23 N. E. 829; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 572, 56 N. E. 888, 49 L. R. A. 301; Young v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 219, 46 N. E. 624; Stone v. Old Colony St. Ry., 212 Mass. 459-464, 99 N. E. 218; Merrill v. Boston & Lowell, 63 N. H. 256, 260.

Where the statute compels submission by the employer and employé, there is no contract, as a general rule, enforceable outside of the state. But where, as in New Jersey and West Virginia, the statute makes acceptance opHON.COMP.-3

or any rule formulated there appear to be exceptions. The Acts of Michigan, Nevada, and Minnesota have been held inapplicable

tional, and the parties freely contract with reference to the statute, the statute should be read into the employment contract as an integral part thereof, enforceable in any jurisdiction, the same as any other contract. Gooding v. Ott (W. Va.) 87 S. E. 863.

When a suit is brought in New Jersey for a liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the contract of employment is a New Jersey contract, the fact that the accident happened in another state is irrelevant. The place where the accident occurs is of no more relevance than is the place of accident to the assured, in an action on a contract of accident insurance, or the place of death of the assured in an action on a contract of life insurance. Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 371, 94 Atl. 392.

The New York Act applied where an injury was received by a sheet metal worker while engaged in performing hazardous services for his employer outside the state. Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67); Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 158. An award of compensation to a captain of lighters was confirmed, where both employer and employé resided in New York, though the injury occurred in New Jersey while the employé was engaged in delivering bags of beans from a lighter to trucks. Edwardson v. Jarvis Lighterage Co., 168 App. Div. 368, 153 N. Y. Supp. 391. The Act may apply to an accident happening in a foreign country. Kennedy v. Kennedy Mfg. Co., The Bulletin, N. Y., Vol.. 1, No. 5, p. 12. An employé of a domestic corporation, who was a resident of New York, and who was injured in Connecticut while on a short trip into that state in the course of his employment, was entitled to compensation under the New York Act. Valentine v. Smith-Angevine Co., 2 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 460, affirmed in 168 App. Div. 403, 153 N. Y. Supp. 505; Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 158.

The cause of action of a person injured outside of the state of Iowa is ex contractu. The lex loci contractus governs the construction of the contract and determines the legal obligations arising from it. Op. Sp. Counsel to Iowa Indus. Com. (1915) p. 22; 9 Cyc. 664.

Where an employé of an Ohio employer is sent in the course of his employer's business to a foreign state and is there injured in the course of his employment, he is entitled to compensation for the consequential disability. In re Shmidt, Vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 21.

Where parties to an employment contract made in California are residents thereof, the employer is liable for an accident in such employment, although the work was to be performed wholly outside the state, and the term of employment commenced upon leaving the state and ended upon arrival within the state, and the employment was nonmaritime. Polin v. Bristol Bay Packing Co., 3 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 12.

In Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R.

where the injury was received in a foreign jurisdiction. In this connection, in substantiation of the soundness of its ruling, the

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A. 1916A, 436, it was held that the Connecticut Act applies to persons hired in the state, whose employment contracts are to be employed partly within and partly without the state; the court saying: "In a sense the injury may be said to have been sustained in the place of the contract, and if appeal is taken, in cases of injury occurring without the state, to the county of the contract, the terms of the act will be reasonably satisfied. The precise question 65 A traveling salesman, injured in Buffalo, N. Y., while in the active discharge of his duties, was not entitled to compensation; the provisions of the Compensation Act not covering accidents occurring outside of the state of Michigan, even though both parties are residents of this state. Keyes-Davis Co. v. Alderdyce, Op. Mich. Indus. Acc. Bd., Bul. No. 3, p. 19.

In the absence of evidence in the law itself that it is intended to have extraterritorial operation, the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is operative and effective only within the boundaries of the state of Nevada. Rep. Nev. Indus. Com. 1913-14, p. 25. There is nothing in the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act which expressly states that the law is operative beyond the boundaries of the state, nor is there anything in the Act which indicates a purpose to make it operative or applicable beyond the boundaries of the state. Id. The rights and remedies provided by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act are statutory rights and remedies, created by the statute, and existing only by force of the statute. If the statute is inoperative at the place the accident happened, the happening of the accident gives neither rights nor remedies. Id.

Where a workman employed by a St. Paul firm is insured while working in the state of Washington, and the employer is under the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act with respect to his employés, the employé must proceed under the Compensation Act of Washington (Workmen's Compensation Act, Gen. Laws Wash. 1911, c. 74); it being an old and established rule that the laws of the state have no extraterritorial force or effect outside the limits of the state. Op. Atty. Gen. on Minn. Wk. Comp. Act, Bul. 9, p. 15. In an employé's action, brought in Minnesota for injuries caused by the negligence of his employer, it appeared that plaintiff entered defendant's employ on railroad construction work on April 2, and worked at two different places within the state; that on June 26 of the same year he complied with defendant's request that he go to Wisconsin on similar work being done there by defendant; and that he was injured four days later. His original hiring was for no definite time and no particular place. On June 10 defendant elected to accept the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act. The court held that plaintiff's right to damages or compensation depended on the law of Wisconsin, where the injury was received, and not on the law of Minnesota. Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620.

Minnesota Supreme Court laid down the proposition that, although an employé's action for injuries is predicated on his relation as serv

we are considering has been the subject of discussion in two cases: One under the New Jersey Act, a contractual optional act very similar to our own, where the trial court, in Deeny v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 36 N. J. Law J. 121, construed the contract under the New Jersey Act as we construe these contracts; the other under the Massachusetts Act, where the Supreme Court construed their act as confined to accidents within the state. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372. We must accept the construction accorded the Massachusetts Act by its Supreme Court. It may be well, however, to point out that the court does not state that its act is contractual in character. That, as we have indicated, is of final importance in the conclusion we reach concerning our own act. Then, too, under the Massachusetts Act, the employé is merely the beneficiary under a contract between the employer and the insured; with us the employer and employé enter into a contract relation. In its reference to and comment upon certain sections of their Act the court says that these must be found within the act from ‘unequivocal language,' or 'plain and unmistakable words,' that the Act was intended to relate to injuries without the commonwealth. We have adopted a broader rule. We read our Act in the light of the purpose, subject-matter, and history of the Act, to determine whether it expressly or by reasonable inference intended to include in its contract injuries without our jurisdiction. This is our ordinary rule in the interpretation of statutes. The court states that: The subject of personal injuries received by a workman in the course of his employment is within the control of the sovereign power where the injury occurs. To subject them to the laws of the many jurisdictions in which they may be engaged will be especially burdensome to them, and involve them probably in greater expense and liability and far greater difficulties than under the old system. Equally hard will it prove to the employé, since he must pursue his remedy in the state of the accident, or the federal court applying that state's law, and thus he may be brought under any one of many different Compensation Acts, with whose provisions he cannot hope to be familiar, some acts contractual in character, some compulsory, some optional, and some ex delicto, and he may find he has forfeited the benefit of the foreign act through failure to comply with its provisions. A reading of the several acts now in force convinces us that these difficulties are not imaginative, but imminent actualities. Is it reasonable to infer that our Legislature, inaugurating a new system, based upon humanitarian and economical considerations, should intentionally frustrate the object of the new system, and cast a multitude of employers and employés into a maelstrom of trouble, uncertainty, and liability? On the other hand, is it not reasonable to infer that the Legislature, having bottomed the right to compensation upon contract, deemed unimportant the place of injury, since it must be presumed