69

necessarily preclude recovery that the dependents can furnish no exact account of the workman's contributions to their support. For example, want of evidence of the exact amount of the workman's contributions to the support of his parent will not prevent recovery of compensation, where it conclusively appears that the parent's entire support was received from the workman." In a Wisconsin case, where it appeared that the father and mother had become more or less incapacitated through age and disease, and that without the aid of their children they would not have been able to have managed the farm and provided for their own support in their customary manner of living, the Commission concluded that the deceased son contributed a portion of his earnings to his parents."1

69 Bradford v. Union Hollywood Water Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 792. 70 Dennehy v. Flinn & Tracy, 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 302.

71 Pliska v. Hatton Lumber Co., Bul. Wis. Indus. Com. vol. 1, p. 95.

101-126. Article II.-Arising out of and in course of employment.

101-104.

105-114.

115-125.

126.

Division I.-In general.

Division II.-Arising in the course of employment.

Division III.-Arising out of employment.

Division IV.-Proof.

127-137. Article III.-Cause and result.

138-139. Article IV.-Occupational diseases.

85. Necessity, definition, and characteristics.

86. Unexpected untoward event-Extraneous or not.
87.
Intentional act of another.

DIVISION I.-ACCIDENT

§ 85. Necessity, definition, and characteristics

A comparison of the various American Compensation Acts discloses that some do not make "accident" a condition to the right to recover compensation,1 while others, following the English Act,"

1 The federal Act, and those of West Virginia, Washington, Kentucky, Louisiana, Iowa, Ohio, Massachusetts, Texas, and Connecticut, omit the word "accidental" in modifying "injury." Yume v. Knickerbocker Portland Cement Co., 3 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 353.

Under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act it is not required that the injury be also an accident, differing in this respect from the English Act and being more liberal to the employé. The element of accident was not intended to be imported into the Massachusetts Act. In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, L. R. A. 1916A, 279, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 919. The name "Industrial Accident Board," which is the administrative body created by part 3, is a mere title, and cannot fairly be treated as restrictive of its duties. Id. "The standard established by the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act as the ground for compensation is simply the receiving of 'personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. This standard is materially different from that of the English Act and of the Acts of some of the states of this nation. That standard is 'personal injury by accident,' both in the Act of 1897 and 1906. See 60 & 61 Vict. 1897, c. 37, § 1 (1); 6 Edw. VII, 1906, c. 58, § 1 (1). The difference between the phraseology of our Act and the English Act in this respect cannot be regarded as immaterial or casual. The English Act in its present form was passed several years before ours. It was known to the Legislature which enacted the Massachusetts statute and was followed as to its general frame and in many important particulars. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 486, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 306. This difference must be treated as the result of deliberate design by the General Court, after intelligent comprehension of the

The English Act of 1897 was entitled: "An act to amend the law with respect to compensation to workmen for accidental injuries suffered in the course of their employment." The body of the act provided that: "If in any employment, to which this act applies, personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to any workman, his employer shall be liable."

"It is not enough to say that the injury was caused by the employment, but there must be the further element of accident." Cozens-Hardy, M. R., in Broderick v. London County Council (1909) 1 B. W. C. C. 219, C. A.

prescribe not only that there shall be a personal injury, but that the injury shall be by accident. The word "accident" refers to

limitation expressed by the words of the English Act. The freer and more comprehensive words in the Massachusetts Act must be given their natural construction, with whatever added force may come from the intentional contrast in phraseology with the English Act. The 'personal injury by accident,' which by the English Act is made the prerequisite for the award of financial relief, is narrower in its scope than 'personal injury.'" In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N. E. 379.

It is intended that all injuries shall be compensated for unless willfully incurred; disease only being excluded. (Wk. Comp. Act, § 3) Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission of Washington (Wash.) 158 Pac. 256. The use of the word "accident" in the administrative portions of the Act is for brevity only, and it does not operate to detract from or vary the meaning of the words "fortuitous event." Id. .

In Blackall v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 183, it was held that it is not necessary under the Connecticut Act that the injury arise by accident. The words "by accident," found in the English Act, are omitted from this statute.

Within the language of the federal Act, an employé may be injured without having suffered a definite accident. In re Clark, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 188. 3 As "accident" is the controlling word in the Michigan Act, Massachusetts decisions relative to the element of accident have little, if any, bearing on the Michigan Act. In Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Wks., 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A, 283, the court, in an opinion by Judge Stone, says: "Our attention has been called to the Massachusetts Act, which differs in many respects from our Act. The whole scope of the Act seems to be to provide for compensation for personal injuries received in the course of employment. In many instances where the word 'accident' occurs in our statute the word 'injury' is used in the Massachusetts statute. It is true that the Massachusetts board is termed an 'Industrial Accident Board,' but, aside from the use of the word 'accident' in that title, we are unable to find the word in the body of the act, except in two instances in section 18 of part 3, which provides for the keeping of a record and making a report by the employer in case of accident. This may be said not to be very controlling; but, in our judgment, it has to do with the inquiry as to the Scope of the Act. We are unable to follow those cases as authority under our statute." Followed in Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co. (Mich.) 157 N. W. 437.

Even though an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, there can be no recovery, unless it is an "accident," within the purview of the Act. Walther v. American Paper Co. (N. J. Sup.) 98 Atl. 264.

The benefits of the California Act are limited to cases of injury arising from accident. McDonald v. Dunn, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 71.

the cause of the injury, and is here used in its ordinary and popular sense as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed by the workman himself," a

4 In re Hart, Op. Mich. Indus. Acc. Bd., Bul. No. 3, p. 18; (Rev. St. 1913, § 3693 [b]) Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N. W. 511.

5 Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Wks., 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A, 283; Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., [1900] 1 Q. B. 488; Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co. (Mich.) 157 N. W. 437; Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp. 620; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. Law, 72, 86 Atl. 458; Clayton & Co. v. Hughes [1910] A. C. 242, 26 T. L. R. 359; Fenton v. Thorley & Co. (1903) 5 W. C. C. 6.

The words "accident" and "accidental" in the Compensation Acts are used in their popular and ordinary sense, and mean happening by chance, unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected. Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., supra.

"Accident" means an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. (Wk. Comp. Act [Laws 1913, c. 198] § 52 [b]) Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N. W. 511.

In Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 762 (33 L. Ed. 60), the term "accidental," as used in an accidental insurance policy, is defined as used “in its ordinary popular sense, as meaning 'happening by chance, unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected'; that if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means."

The popular and ordinary definition of the word "accident," and not the • Trim Joint District School v. Kelly (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. 274, H. L., and (1913) 6 B. W. C. C. 921, C. A. "An occurrence, I think, is unexpected, if it is not expected by the man who suffers by it, even though every man of common sense who knew the circumstances would think it certain to happen." Lord Macnaghten, in Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910) 3 B. W. C. C. 275, H. L. For 70 years in England the word "accident" has been publicly and descriptively used as inclusive of occurrences intentionally caused by others. Trim Joint District School v. Kelly, supra.

When the act, as far as the injured employé is concerned, is an unforeseen, unlooked-for mishap, unprovoked and uninvited, the resultant injury is occasioned by an "accident." Walther v. American Paper Co. (N. J. Sup.) 98 Atl. 264.