free to insure with stock companies, mutual companies, state insurance funds, or, if he so desires, to carry no insurance. Under other Acts insurance is restricted to the state accident fund. Apparently it is yet to be demonstrated by experience which is the better method. The Oregon Industrial Accident Commission, after calling attention to the fact that a large proportion of the premiums is required by stock companies to cover expenses and profits, contends, in its first annual report, that a state compensation fund administered with efficiency and reasonable economy will best stand the test of experience.28 The 1915 session of the Legislature of Oregon amended the Act of that state in several important particulars. Where formerly there had been but two insurance rates for the employer, the law as amended contains a differential classification of rates. In adopting the new schedule it was the purpose to provide rates that would closely correspond to the hazard of the various employments. The principle embodied in the original Act, recognizing the right of the individual employer to a reduction in the cost of his insurance for a favorable accident experience, is retained in the amended law, and, apparently, is potent in lessening the number of preventable accidents. In substance, the amendment makes possible a reduction in rate of 10 per cent. to the individual employer, during each of the second and third years he is subject to the Act, where the Commission pays out on account of accidents occurring to his workmen, not to exceed 50 per cent. of his contribution to the fund during the preceding year. As a result, a very large proportion of the employers subject to the law since July 1, 1914, enjoyed this reduction in payment for the second year.20 Strong claims are made for the efficiency and economy of the plan of the Acts of Washington and Oregon and for the stability of the protection afforded by these Acts.30

28 First Annual Rep. Or. Indus. Acc. Com. June 30, 1915, p. 6.

29 Id. p. 22.

30 "Aside from the attitude maintained in the settlement of claims, an important phase of the compensation system is the cost of administration. A

tabulation of the experience of all companies writing compensation insurance in the state of Wisconsin during the year 1914 has been prepared by the commission of that state. It shows employers insuring with stock companies were required to pay an average of $2.07 to provide the injured workmen with $1 benefits. The experience of the insurance company which, through its agents, has been most effective in opposition to the Oregon Act, charged the employers of Wisconsin $2.63 for every $1 paid out in 1914 on account of benefits to injured workmen. The tables contained in another part of this report will show that in Oregon during the first 12 months the law has been in oper ation, only $1.13% has been required to place $1 in benefits in the hands of injured workmen. This difference in cost is emphasized when it is recalled that Wisconsin has an area of but 56,066 square miles, a population of 2,333,860, and an average of 42.2 people to the square mile, while Oregon, with its 96,699 square miles of territory, 672,765 of population, and an average of 7 people to the square mile, presents conditions under which the cost might properly be expected to be much greater." Id. p. 7. "Of vital importance to every citizen of the state is the method provided for insuring the deferred monthly payments in event of injury. Some Compensation Acts place directly upon the employer the obligation to pay compensation to his injured workmen. He is free to insure against this liability or to carry his own risk. If he be a man of limited means, injured workmen or their dependents are left without recourse in the event of his insolvency. This has resulted in a demand for a method which will with greater certainty insure these future payments, and in a number of states, including Oregon, this has been met by the creation of an insurance fund, administered by a Commission, and with the state treasurer as custodian. Under the Oregon law the future payments to workmen who are permanently disabled and to dependents in fatal cases are provided for by setting aside in each case a sum which, together with interest earnings estimated at 4 per cent. per annum, will be sufficient to meet these deferred payments." Id. p. 10.

Where any other construction is reasonably possible, a Compensation Act should not be given a construction which will make it unconstitutional, or cast doubt on its constitutionality.31 It should, if possible, be so construed as to give effect to every portion. of it.32 Where two sections are so inconsistent that they cannot be reconciled, the one must stand which best conforms to the intent and policy of the statute, and where one section so conforms it is not to be rendered nugatory by an inconsistent provision, though found in a later section, which does not so conform.33 Con

31 Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. (Iowa) 154 N. W. 1037; Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173; Behringer v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 17 Ariz. 232, 149 Pac. 1065; Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack, 15 Ariz. 3S2, 139 Pac. 465.

Where the constitutionality of a law is involved, every presumption must be indulged and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its validity. It is a familiar doctrine that laws will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the requirements of the organic law have not been observed. People v. Brady, 268 Ill. 192, 108 N. E. 1009; People v. Henning Co., 260 Ill. 554, 103 N. E. 530, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206; Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653; Evanhoff v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 78 Or. 503, 154 Pac. 106. This same rule applies to the constitutionality of a law when any defect is claimed in its passage. Dragovish v. Iroquois Iron Co., 269 Ill. 478, 109 N. E. 999.

32 State ex rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. District Court (Minn.) 158 N. W. 798.

34

trary to the rule of strict construction prescribed by the Supreme Court of Michigan for the construction of the Act of that state, Compensation Acts, being highly remedial in character, though in derogation of the common law, should generally be liberally and broadly construed to effectuate their beneficent purposes.35 They

84 This statute, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed, though it is remedial and provides a remedy against a person who otherwise would not be liable. Andrejwski v. Wolverine Co., 182 Mich. 298, 148 N. W. 684, 6 N. C. C. A. 807.

35 Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436; Appeal of Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245; Coakley's Case, 216 Mass. 71, 102 N. E. 930, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 867, 4 N. C. C. A. 508; Bentley's Case, 217 Mass. 79, 104 N. E. 432; Panasuk's Case, 217 Mass. 589, 105 N. E. 368; State ex rel. Northfield v. Dist. Court, 131 Minn. 352, 155 N. W. 103; State ex rel. Splady v. Dist. Court, 128 Minn. 338, 151 N. W. 123; State ex rel. Virginia & R. L. Co. v. Dist. Court, 128 Minn. 43, 150 N. W. 211, 7 N. C. C. A. 1076; Lindebauer v. Weiner, 94 Misc. Rep. 612, 159 N. Y. Supp. 987; In re Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, 109 N. E. 549; McQueeney v. Sutphen, 167 App. Div. 528, 153 N. Y. Supp. 554; Zappala v. Indus. Ins. Com., 82 Wash. 314, 144 Pac. 54, L. R. A. 1916A, 295; Wendt v. Industrial Ins. Com., 80 Wash. 111, 141 Pac. 311, 5 N. C. C. A. 790; Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685, L. R. A. 1916A, 358, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 154, 4 N. C. C. A. 786; 36 Cyc. 1173; (Wk. Comp. Law, St. 1915, §§ 2394-1 to 2394–96) Village of Kiel v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (Wis.) 158 N. W. 68; Lesh v. Illinois Steel Co. (Wis.) 157 N. W. 539; Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 341, 156 N. W. 143; Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co., 157 Wis. 443, 146 N. W. 770.

The Act is in a very large sense remedial, and the Legislature intended to fix upon the employer a liability which, though sounding in contract, need not depend at all upon the breach of any duty by the employer. Bayon v. Beckley, 89 Conn. 154, 161, 93 Atl. 139; Mann v. Glastonbury Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 96 Atl. 368.

In Vaughn v. American Coal Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 617, it was held that the Connecticut Act is remedial, and that the principles of equity govern.

The statute being highly remedial in character, the courts ought to guard against a narrow construction, and not exclude a servant from the benefits thereof, unless constrained by unambiguous language or the clear intent as gathered from the entire act. State ex rel. Duluth B. & M. Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 176, 151 N. W. 912.

The Act is to be construed liberally to protect the injured employé, whose rights to compensation otherwise it has taken away. In re Meley, 219 Mass. 136, 106 N. E. 559. It is to be construed broadly to carry out its manifest purpose. In re Sullivan, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N. E. 463, L. R. A. 1916A, 378.

should not, however, be given a strained construction to include accidents not within their terms.36 It has been held that the Wash

It is to be interpreted in the light of its purpose and so far as reasonably may be to accomplish its beneficent design. Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1.

The Act should be construed liberally, and not strictly, as a statute in derogation of the common law, and should receive as broad an interpretation as can fairly be given it. Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp. 620. It has been and should be construed fairly, indeed liberally, in favor of the employé. In re Heitz, 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750, affirming 155 N. Y. Supp. 1112. The statute should be given a broad and liberal construction to carry out the beneficent purpose for which it was enacted. Winfield v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 168 App. Div. 351, 153 N. Y. Supp. 499; Smith v. Price, 168 App. Div. 421, 153 N. Y. S. 221. The statute must have a broad and liberal construction to protect the employé for all injuries received in the course of his employment, and to charge upon the fund or the insurer the loss which otherwise must fall upon the master. Spratt V. Sweeney & Gray Co., 168 App. Div. 403, 153 N. Y. S. 505. "It is a fundamental canon of the proper construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act that it must be construed remediably and beneficially, with a view of carrying out fairly and fully the legislative purpose and bringing within the operation of the act all workers whose accidental injuries are inherent occupational risks, rather than with a view to excluding from the operation and protection of the act persons whose claim to its benefits falls fairly within the principle that disabilities to workers through trade mishaps should not be left to hang burdensomely on individuals who might thereby be forced into the class of dependents on public or private charity." In re Rheinwald, 168 App. Div. 425, 153 N. Y. S. 598.

"The consensus of writers on the subject of workmen's compensation legislation is that such statutes are beneficial and remedial; that such laws should be interpreted broadly and with elasticity, and that equity rather than the strict letter of the law should govern same. The purpose, spirit, and intent of the law should at all times be considered, and the language of the law taken in its obvious sense and as intended to be addressed to administrative officers." Rep. Nev. Indus. Com. 1913-14, p. 19; Clements v. Columbus Sawmill Co., Vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio Indus. Com. p. 161.

In construing a statute which is referable to the police power and was originated to promote the common welfare, supposed to be seriously jeopardized by the infirmities of an existing system, the conditions giving rise to the law, the faults to be remedied, the aspirations evidently intended to be embodied

36 Hillestad v. Indus. Ins. Com., 80 Wash. 426, 141 Pac. 913, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 789, 6 N. C. C. A. 763; De Voe v. New York State R. Co., 169 App. Div. 472, 155 N. Y. Supp. 12.