rule of right and wrong. By comparing our affections and actions with a self evident duty, or with the moral law, we ascertain what is duty. Then duty, or our hearts and conduct with their qualities, are the objects which conscience takes into view. This will clearly show, that the operations of conscience are perceptions. For there are no other operations of the mind, by which objects can be seen, or known. We do not learn the nature of hearts and conduct by feelings, or affections, or volitions. It is solely by our perceptions. A perception of an object & its moral quality, is a knowledge of what ought,or ought not, to be. Then perceptions are the operations of conscience. These perceptions produce pleasure or pain. These sensations are the effects of conscience on the heart; and they are as different from perceptions, as effects are from their causes. For we have already shown, that sensations are not the operations, but the effects, of conscience. And they ought to be viewed wholly different in their nature, and to be carefully distinguished from them.

Then our conclusion is this: that those perceptions of the understanding, which have the right or wrong of our hearts and conduct, or in a word our duty, for their object, are classed together, and called conscience. Or conscience may be thus defined it is the understanding itself, when it takes cognizance of our own motives and actions, compares them with the standard of duty, and then acquits or condemns.

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ESSAY VII.

Recapitulation.

The object of this essay is to recapitulate the principal ideas contained in the preceding essays, in a brief manner, that the reader may see them in a narrow compass. And

1. The understanding is a faculty of the mind. This faculty is a property of the mind. Understanding, heart, will, are words, which express different properties of the mind.

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2. A faculty is a preparedness, a fitness, an adaptedness of the mind, to be the subject of definite operations. The same property does not prepare the mind to see, feel, and choose. There is no way to account for operations so different in their nature, but by supposing the mind to be possessed of different properties, or faculties. Hence the different operations of the mind have led philosophers to consider it as having distinct faculties, or properties.

3. A faculty is as distinct from its operations, as a body is distinct from its motions. Hence à faculty is antecedent to its operations, and the foundation of them.

4. The construction of all languages is a direct proof of the existence of faculties. All languages have verbs; and every verb has a nominative case. The nominative case is the agent; and the verb expresses the action of the agent. I perceive. It is certain the mind does not perceive objects by the same faculty, by which it feels; nor by that, by which it prefers one thing to another. It is by the understanding only that the mind perceives. Accordingly we say, the understanding is à perceiving faculty. That mankind have,from time immemorial, considered the mind possessed of this faculty, is evident from the construction of all languages. Indeed it is a truth so evident, the words we use in talking and writing prove we have ideas of faculties, and believe in the real existence of such properties. It is a self-evident truth. If any deny it, they must be left to themselves. For it is vain to reason with persons, to convince them of the truth of self-evident propositions.

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5. The word perception is used to signify all the operations of the understanding. I use this word in this sense, because I know of no other, which will more aptly express the operations of this faculty. Perception is an act of the understanding. The acts of the understanding may be, and often are, called ideas, thoughts, notions, and the like; but perception appears to me to be as proper a name of every act or operation of this faculty, as any that can be used. And perception is the name I give to every operation of the understanding.

6. Perceptions, which are operations of the understanding, are very numerous. Simple apprehension as an act of the mind, or the perception of an object. Conception is an act of the understanding. Memory, reason, judgment, and conscience, as we have shown, are operations of this faculty. This is true with respect to imagination; which is a perception of

objects combined in such a manner as to answer the design of the agent. Apprehension, conception, judgment, reason, memory, conscience, imagination, fancy, which are words abundantly used by philosophers who treat upon the intellectual powers of the mind, are names by which the acts or operations of the understanding are designated. For the understanding is the only intellectual faculty belonging to the mind. And when we attend to the meaning of these words, as applied to acts of the mind, it is obvious they cannot designate any other operations,th n those which I call perceptions. If persons will take the trouble of attending to the meaning of the above words, he will find they differ very much from the words feelings, sensations, affections, or volitions. They are, then,nothing more or less, than those acts called perceptions, thoughts, or ideas. An act of the mind is a simple operation. It cannot be defined. Seeing, thinking, apprehending, conceiving, remembering, reasoning, judging and the like, express acts of the understanding. These acts are not affections, desires, or volitions. These acts are perceptions. Seeing an object, conceiving of an object, remembering an object, and so on, is perceiving it. When perceptions are considered as acts of the mind, though called by different names, yet they are alike. It is not possible to point out any difference between one perception and another, considered as acts or operations of the mind. Being similar, of the same kind, they constitute one general class of operations. As all creatures, who have life, are classed together and called animals, so all those individual operations of the same kind are classed together, and called perceptions. But

7. This general class is subdivided into several distinct classes, to each of which a name is given. Though all the operations of the understanding are of the same kind, for which reason they constitute but one class; yet their objects differ. Where there is a perception, there is something perceived. This something, whether it be a substance, a property, a quality, a mode, or relation, is the object of perception. And the individual objects are as numerous as the perceptions. The objects are not of the same kind; they differ from each other in a variety of respects and circumstances. These differences among the objects, is the ground and reason of dividing our perceptions into several classes. Some objects have been seen, and are past; when seen again, they are recollected. These

perceptions constitute a class by themselves; and this class of perceptions is called memory.

Truth and falsehood constitute another class of objects. These are objects of perception. For we know what truth is, when we perceive it. Those perceptions, therefore, which have truth and falsehood for their object, constitute another class, which is known by the name of reason, and judgment. Right and wrong, good and evil, form another class of objects. And those perceptions, which have the right and wrong of our own conduct for their object, constitute another class, which is called conscience.

All the operations of the understanding form one general class called perceptions. This general class of operations is divided into several specific classes. And each specific class has some name given it, by which it is known; as simple perception, memory, judgment, reason and conscience. And the difference among the objects of perception, is the reason why our perceptions are formed into distinct classes. As those divisions are necessary in order to have a clear, distinct, and systematic view of the mind, so to facilitate the communication of our knowledge of the mind to others, it is necessary to give those several classes distinct names.

This mode of attending to the operations of the mind, appears to me far preferable to that generally adopted by metaphysicians. They generally begin by dividing the mind into two faculties, understanding and will; and say, those are the only faculties belonging to it. Then they proceed to. talk about the memory, judgment, reason, and conscience; and frequently call each of these a faculty. Then the reader is confused; he asks himself, does the writer mean, as he first said, that the mind has but two faculties; or that it has six or seven? For he calls judgment, reason, memory, conscience, imagination, and the like, faculties also. What does he mean? Then when they write concerning the operations of these faculties, are these only one kind, or very different kinds of operations? This he cannot determine from their manner of writing. Of course, he is left in the dark respecting the nature of the operations of these several faculties, as they are pleased to call them.

And after he has gone through a long treatise of philosophy on the human mind, though he has acquired many useful ideas, yet he has obtained no systematic knowledge of the mind. The

ideas he has acquired have no proper arrangement; neither does he see their connexion with first principles. Hence the reader has acquired only an indistinct and confused notion of the mind, and its operations. One great object here is, to give the reader a clear, and systematic view of the mind. Whether I have done it, as far as I have proceeded, he must judge.

I would observe one thing more, and close this essay. If any one should prefer considering memory, reason and conscience different powers of the understanding, I will not contend with him. If he says the understanding has a power of perceiving, or recollecting past objects; and a power of perceiving truth, and inferring one truth from another; and a power of perceiving the right and wrong of actions; still all the operations of these powers are perceptions. And of course, these several powers only designate the several classes into which the operations of the understanding are divided. One power denotes one class, and another power another class of operations. Hence, whether we consider memory, for instance, as a power of the understanding, or as the name given to one class of perceptions; still it is either the perception of past objects, or the power of perceiving them. So we consider all the operations of the understanding as similar in their nature; and divisible into as many classes, if no more, as are above enumerated and specifi

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ESSAY VIII.
Of Taste.

Taste is another faculty of the mind, distinct from the understanding, and also from the will. There are several considerations, to which our attention must be directed for the elucidation of this subject. The reader who wishes to examine it impartially, is requested to suspend his judgment, till he has weighed the considerations here presented, and seen the relation and connexion of the several parts with each other.