Essays on some of the First Principles of Metaphysicks, Ethicks and Theology

fountain, and sought broken cisterns to satisfy his thirst. In like manner his posterity have lived. These appetites

were now, in their operation, positively wrong or sinful. But this did not constitute his primary depravity. A total want of love to God was that, in which his imperfection, or moral depravity, primarily consisted. As long as love to his Maker governed, all he did was in harmony with the law, authority, and honor of his God. And as soon as this love ceased, all he did terminated in self gratification ultimately, and was sinful.

I know many ridicule the idea of placing any part of our depravity in a mere privation. But is the body perfect, if eyes are wanting? Does not the privation of this sense constitute a great imperfection? If a man as long as he has eyes, would walk in the right way, and would certainly deviate from it, as deprived of this sense, would not all consider eyes to see a great blessing, and the want of them a great evil? So the want of a benevolent appetite is a great moral imperfection and evil; in consequence of which, all the other senses or appetites lead us astray from God, as both facts and experience have abundantly proved, from the day in which man revolted from God.

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The kind and degree of power, necessary to constitute a meral agent, or fit object of praise and blame, has long been a subject of dispute; and there is not much hope of bringing it soon to a satisfactory conclusion. With a view, however, to this end, this note is added. Two ideas are implied in all the actions of a moral agent. One is, that he is governed by motives; and the other, that in all his actions he has some aim and design. That he is a designing agent, and is influenced by motives, all will grant. This implies, that in all his actions he aims at the attainment of some object or end, by such means as, in his view, are adapted to it. The end operates as a motive. If the end is pleasing to his feelings, he is influenced to use every exertion to attain it. If an object is disagreeable or painful, he will be influenced to avoid it. This necessarily implies, that his mind is endued with some property, which is pleased or disgusted by all objects within his view; a property, which is affected antecedent to action, and which gives rise

to every exertion.

This is requisite, in order for him to be influenced by motives, and to act with design.

Some contend for a self-determining power; and some, for an efficiency in men to produce all their voluntary exercises, as essential to praise and blame. According to these theories, man is endued with a power antecedent to volition, a power which is to produce volitions. In order for this power to operate, or exert itself to produce volitions, some object must please or disgust it, and in this way influence it to act. If this be not the fact, the agent, in exerting his power, is not governed by any motive. And if objects are neither pleasant nor painful to this power, it is in a state of indifference; and if a man can exercise his power in this state, he must act without design. For his supposed power is not inclined towards any object, and of course he cannot aim at one object more than another; or, in such a state, he aims at no object, or acts without any design. I see no way to avoid this conclusion. Hence, if moral agents are influenced by motives, and act with design, then this supposed power is of such a nature, that in view of objects it is pleased or disgusted, and in this way influenced to obtain the object, if agreeable, and to avoid it, if painful. Then what is the difference between this power, whether self-determining, or efficient, and what is called by me the faculty of taste, or the heart? The taste, and this supposed power, are each of them pleased or the contrary with all objects in view; and by this means are influenced to act, to seek, or avoid the object, and in the pursuit aim at the possession, or avoidance of it, according to the pleasure or pain the object or end affords.

If this self-determining and efficient power is totally destitute of any feeling, than how is it to be put in motion, or excited to exertions? It certainly cannot be influenced by motives, nor act with design. Power, which has no feeling, does not differ in its nature from those powers we call a lever, or a screw. And if it ever exerts itself, it must be put in motion by some antecedent power. The agent must have in view some pleasing object, and have a desire to obtain it. Then the agreeable object operates as a motive, and influences him to exert this supposed power to reach it, just as we use a screw to raise a weight. And for this antecedent to act, its nature must be the same with the nature of the faculty termed taste. Hence, whatever power may be considered as essential to praise

and blame, on examination it will appear insufficient to answer the end for which it is invented; or else it will be found not to differ in its nature from the faculty of taste, or the heart, as described in these essays.—We must then come to this conclusion, that wherever we behold a created being, who is endued with the faculties of the understanding, taste, and will, and also with liberty, he has all the powers necessary to render him a moral agent, or proper object of praise and blame, and future rewards. Then, to determine whether he is praise or blameworthy, we only have to ascertain his moral character, or the nature of his heart, whether it be holy or sinful. Here we must rest satisfied. For, by the most careful examination we shall find, there is no rational being in the universe, created or uncreated, who is possessed of any other powers, than the faculties which have been described. We know of no others, And we are not conscious of any more, than three distinct classes of operations; perceptions, affections. and volitions. And as the operations of these differ from each other, they necessarily imply three distinct faculties, to one of which they are to be referred.

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