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absolute abstract ideas absurd angles answer apparent magnitude appear Aristotle Atheism believe Berkeley Berkeley's bodies cause ceived colour common conceive conscious consider corporeal substance demonstrated Dioptrics distance distinct doctrine doth edition effect Essay evident existence experience external farther figure finite follows geometry GEORGE BERKELEY greater hath Human Knowledge Hylas ideas of sight imagination immediate objects immediately perceived infer infinitely divisible J. S. Mill language Malebranche manner material substance Matter meaning metaphysical mind motion nature necessary connexion objects of sight observed Omitted opinion optic particular perceived by sense perceived by sight perception percipient phenomena Phil Philonous philosophers plain Principles of Human rays reason retina rience Scepticism sect seems sensations sensible qualities sensible things shew shewn sight and touch signified signs spirit substratum suggest suppose term Theory of Vision thought tion Treatise true truth understanding unperceived visible objects visual wherein whereof words
Стр. 151 - write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it ; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it 8 . There was an odour, that is, it was smelt
Стр. 411 - see how this agrees with what has been above quoted [out of the same authour], viz. the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.] It is observable
Стр. 354 - at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose : its ascent as well as descent proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just so, the same principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense. THE END.
Стр. 159 - it is impossible we should ever come to know it ; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose—what no one can deny possible—an intelligence without the help of external bodies ", to be affected with the same train of
Стр. 163 - but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit. 27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being—as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the
Стр. 422 - by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. [ 4 Further], the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly suppos'd. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action 5 . To which the former
Стр. 159 - and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said ; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced
Стр. 319 - Phil. I can ; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind ; since I find them by experience to be independent of it
Стр. 150 - is what everybody will allow. And to me it is no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects 6 they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind?
Стр. 161 - Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words, we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or