Each State may also, in the exercise of this right, determine by law what are "incendiary" publications, tending to incite servile or other insurrections, and adopt such measures, not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, as it may think proper to prevent their introduction or circulation. This was assumed, or conceded, by Calhoun, Clay, Webster, and by every other Senator in the debate upon this question in 1836. But, admitting all this, I suggest that an abuse, in his official capacity, by an officer of the Federal Government, of authority derived from a State law acting upon him as a citizen of the State, though the law be strictly constitutional and necessary, is clearly remediable by the power whence he derives his appointment. If "under the If "under the responsibilities resting upon him as an officer and a citizen," he is to "determine whether the books, pamphlets, newspapers, &c., received by him for distribution are of the incendiary character described in the Statute," does it not follow, that an appeal lies from the subordinate to his superior, to review the decision and, subject to final adjudication by the State and Federal courts, to interpret the State law under which he acts? If not, then the most flagrant abuses and usurpations of authority may, with impunity, be committed by inferior, and it may be, irresponsible officers, in the discharge of official duties under the General Government, and these usurpations and abuses not be confined to the mail service alone. Under cover of executing State police regulations and State laws, guarding against insurrection and mischief of any sort, would it not be in the power of any other Federal officers to disregard the laws of the United States in other respects? If the Federal Executive cannot intervene to supervise or control the action of its own subordinate officials, may they not be used by the States as instruments whereby to nullify the laws and expel the authority of the Federal Government itself? If subject exclusively to State control in the delivery, by postmasters, of mail matter, why not also in the transportation of the mail by mail-carriers? and if in both these particulars, or in either, why not also in the rendition of fugitive slaves, by controlling, under pretext of preventing kidnapping, the United States marshals in the several States? Is not this a doctrine fraught with danger to the peace and harmony of the Confederacy?

But surely the Government of the United States has a right and is bound to see that its officers, in the exercise of official powers conferred upon them by the Federal Constitution and laws, shall not in the least be permitted to abuse even the just and constitutional duties required of them as citizens of States, by State laws and regulations. By act of Congress in 1796, collectors and other revenue officers of the United States, masters and crews of revenue cutters, and military officers commanding upon the sea-coast, are authorized and required to aid in executing the quarantine

and health laws of the several States; but "as they shall be directed from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury." Congress has passed no similar statute in the case of publications prohibited by any of the States; but if postmasters act without such law, and under State regulations alone, still their action must, in my judgment, be subject equally to the supervision and control of the Post-Office Department or of the President. The State authorities and officials are subject of course to no control by the Federal Government in this particular, except by due course of law through the State Courts and Courts of the United States.

I ask, therefore, on behalf of the gentleman above referred to, who represents a large class of the most orderly, peace-loving, and law-abiding of my constituents, that such instructions may be issued to the Postmaster at Luney's Creek, as in the discharge of his duties under the laws of Virginia, will nevertheless prevent "unreasonable searches and seizures," and compel a wise and just discretion and discrimination on his part, as a Federal officer, in executing the laws and regulations which that State has found it necessary to enact, for protection against murderous and incendiary efforts and combinations in other States to stir up civil dissensions or excite servile insurrections in her midst. They, at least, whom I have the honor to represent, have always obeyed and respected, and ever will respect and obey, every requirement and obligation of the Constitutional compact. The vast majority of them, certainly, regard none of its obligations and requirements as either odious or onerous, and they ask only that their rights also under that compact, shall be in like manner and fully protected and enjoyed.

REMARKS ON THE DEATH OF THE HON. WILLIAM O. GOODE, OF VIRGINIA.

In the House of Representatives, February 20, 1860.

THE act which we perform to-day, in memory of the deceased Representative from Virginia, is an ancient and befitting observance. It does honor to the dead; it reminds us of our own mortality. No more impressive scene is ever witnessed in this Chamber. Envy holds her breath; partisan bitterness is hushed for a moment, and even SILENCE, that rafe visitant here, extends her tranquillizing wings for a little while över us. In this spirit let us approach this last solemn office of fellowship, and with the sobered earnestness which becomes these sad ceremonies, and the chastened moderation due to historic truth, let us

discharge it. Exaggerated eulogy, however pardonable in mere partial friendship, has long since been exhausted upon these occasions, and we but too often repeat the folly of the barbarians, who, worshipping a fly, offered up an ox in sacrifice. Honoring the dead, let us who yet live, learn at the same time to be wiser and to do better for the rest of our lives, from the study of his character and example.

My acquaintance with the deceased member from Virginia was but limited. I knew him personally as a Representative in the Thirty-fifth Congress; but I had from boyhood known him by name as one among the most eminent of the public men of the Ancient Dominion. His life and public services I do not propose to rehearse. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. MILES) has anticipated me in saying that they have already been exhibited in fitting terms by the eloquent gentleman (Mr. PRYOR) who succeeds to his seat.

Although I may not say that Mr. GooDE was one of those great historic characters who mark the eras in a nation's annals, yet he unquestionably possessed more than one of those high and rare qualities without which no man and no statesman can be truly great. Born in Virginia, and soon after the Revolution, reared in "the honestest and most virgin times" of the Republic, and among the great and good men of an age and a State full of great men and patriots, certainly without these qualities he could not have commanded the confidence of the people for nearly forty years, in so many and such distinguished public stations.

WILLIAM O. GOODE was an honest man in public and in private life. Sincere in his convictions, earnest in his purposes, he meant always to be and to do right. He was neither a demagogue nor a mere partisan. While he had wisdom enough and consistency enough to respect party habitudes, he obeyed not blindly the behests of party. He scorned that vulgar and polluting partisan school of ethics which would lay down one rule of conduct for private, and another for public life, and which proclaims in execrable cant that "all is fair in politics." Far higher and nobler were the political philosophy and morals which he had learned and which he practised. He recognized in theory and in action, that great modern fact, so slowly acknowledged and so continually ignored, that there is a code of ethics in political life, as well defined, as firmly settled, as pure and elevated, and as obligatory upon the citizen and upon the public man alike, as the sublime doctrines of Socrates and of Cicero, or the holier and sublimer precepts still of the Sermon upon the Mount.

But Mr. GOODE was something more than honest: he was JUST. Many an honest man is yet unjust; and justice in public life and in the private political relation is rarer than honesty. Honesty springs from

the heart, and is, in some degree, an impulse: justice belongs to the head, and is a fixed principle of conduct. It renders to every man his due. Honest himself, he was just enough to concede honesty of purpose and rectitude in action to other men and parties in antagonism to him. He acted continually, too, under a sense of duty, and he acted, therefore, always well. A German writer has said, delicately, that there are two things supremely beautiful in this world-the starry sky above our heads and the sense of duty in our hearts. This sense of duty seemed ever present in his heart to whom we pay now these honors. And he had, also, that firmness of purpose without which every virtue loses more than half its worth. Thus he united in himself the justus et tenar which filled the measure of poetic eulogy, even in the declining age of the Roman commonwealth. And to all this I may add that though not of brilliant genius, he was yet a wise, prudent, and sagacious public man.

Mr. GOODE was also a pure man-pure in private morals and in public morals; pure in spirit and pure in speech. He was a quiet man, too, and did the business of this House quietly. He was a pious man, in the ancient and nobler sense of the word-pious in his relations to the Supreme Being, to his family, to his friends, his country, and the world åt large. Moreover he was a man of honor, and a gentleman in his manners and in his instincts. Without all these, duly blended and combined into one, no man, however eminent his abilities, can be a truly great statesman. The ancient rhetoricians had a maxim that no one could be an orator except he were a good man. Far more strictly ought this rule to be applied to him who would mould the manners, habits, opinions, and the laws, and control the destinies of a whole people.

Combining thus within himself these several excellencies, in a degree which I have not exaggerated, of WILLIAM O. GOODE it may be justly said: In him was virtus Scipiada et mitis sapientia Læli—the virtue of the Scipios and the mild wisdom of Lælius.

REMARKS ON HIS BILL FOR ARMING THE MILITIA OF THE STATES. In the House of Representatives, March 13, 1860.

I Do not know, Mr. Speaker, whether it is strictly in order here to discuss any thing but the issues of Democracy and Republicanism, or the vexed question of slavery; but at the hazard of being deemed singular, if not disorderly, I propose to depart now, for a little while, from the beaten pathway of debate. This motion, sir, to reconsider opens up the general merits of the proposed measure, and I ask the attention of the House for about fifteen minutes, while I explain it; I will not detain you longer, and, that I may not, I desire to speak without interruption.

Mr. Speaker, if there was any one sentiment more deeply fixed in the minds of those who founded this Republic than any other, it was jealousy of standing armies. It passed into a maxim among them that large military establishments in time of peace, were dangerous to liberty. That maxim remains to this day in the bill of rights in many of our State constitutions. It has left its impress also upon the policy and legislation' of this Government to the present time, when, with twelve thousand miles of land and water frontier, encircling three millions of square miles, we have a standing army numbering less than twelve thousand effective men. And yet no statesmen were more sensitive to national honor, or more awake to the necessity of national defence. Hostile to standing armies, but zealous to provide for the public safety, they looked to the MILITIA of the several States for protection against foreign and domestic enemies; and it stands a part, though a forgotten part of the Constitution of the United States, that “ a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State." Though that maxim, sir, was not a part originally of that instrument, yet it is impliedly acknowledged, in all its force, in the several clauses relating to that subject. Congress has power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, and repel invasion. Congress is also specially empowered "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the system prescribed by Congress."

No subject, sir, engrossed the attention of the earlier Presidents of the Republic more than this very power, thus amply, but cautiously, conferred. General Washington, in every formal communication to Con