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distinction is personal, in the other it is not. If there is any contradiction here, it is chargeable on the Bible itself.

But it may still be said that we must frame a definition of person which shall not involve the affirmation and denial of the same proposition; we cannot say separate intelligent agency constitutes or evinces personality, and then ascribe such agency to the human nature of Christ, while we deny it to be a person. Very true. We do not deny that theologians often fail in their definitions; we should be satisfied with saying, that the distinctions in the Godhead are such as to lay an adequate foundation for the reciprocal use of the pronouns, I, Thou, He; and that the distinction between the two natures in Christ does not. If asked, where lies the difference, since in both cases there is separate activity? We answer, no one can tell. We may say indeed, that distinct subsistence is essential to personality, and that such subsistence cannot be predicated of the human nature of Christ, but is predicable of the distinctions in the Godhead. It is not, therefore, all kinds of separate activity which implies personality, but only such as involves distinct subsistence, showing that the source of the activity is an agent, and not merely a power.*

The following illustration of this subject is not designed to explain it a mystery is not capable of explanation. It is designed merely to show how much of the same obscurity overhangs other subjects about which we give ourselves very little trouble. We may, for the sake of illustration, assume the truth of the Platonic doctrine which ascribes to man a body, an animal soul, and an immortal spirit. This is not a scriptural distinction, though it is not obviously absurd, and, if a matter of revelation, would be cheerfully admitted. What, however, is involved in this doctrine? There is an unity of person in man, and yet three distinct activities: that of the body, in the processes of respiration and digestion; that of the animal soul, in all mere sensations and instincts; and that of the spirit, in all intellectual and moral action. The animal soul is not a person, it has no distinct subsistence, though it may have its activity and even its own consciousness, as in the case of brutes. Now, if there is no contradiction involved in this view of the nature of man; if the animal soul may have its activity and life in personal union with the intelligent spirit, and yet that soul not be a person, then the human nature of Christ may have its activity in personal union with the Logos, and yet not be a person. We place little stress, however, on any such illustrations. Our faith rests on the plain declarations

* Dr Bushnell has no great right to make a wry face at Trinitarians for asserting that separate intelligence and will does not necessarily infer personality, since he has begun to swallow a philosophy which asserts the single personality of the human race, though each man has his own intelligence, will, and consciousness.

of Scripture. God is infinite, omniscient, and almighty, and therefore of him no limitation can be predicated, whether ignorance or weakness; of Christ is predicated all the perfections of God and all the attributes of man, and therefore there is in him both a divine and human nature; and notwithstanding the possession of this twofold nature, he is but one person. It is not necessary to our faith that we should understand this. We can understand it, just as well as we understand the teries of our own nature or the attributes of God. After all, the difficulty is not in the doctrines of the Trinity or the Incarnation, but in Theism,-the most certain and essential, and yet the most incomprehensible of all truths.

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But if we insist on acknowledging only one nature in Christ, how are we to conceive of his person? The following would seem to be the only possible modes in which he can be regarded:-1. That his one nature is human, and that he was a mere man. 2. That his one nature was divine; then it may be assumed, with the Docetæ, that his human appearance was but a phantasm; or, with the Apollinarians, that he had a real body, but not a rational soul. 3. That his one nature was neither divine nor human, but theanthropical, the two united into one, according to the Eutychean notion. 4. That the human and divine are identical, which is the doctrine of the new philosophy. Every one of these views, incompatible as they obviously are, Dr Bushnell adopts by turns, except the first.

He adopts, or at least dallies with, the doctrine of the Docetæ, that the whole manifestation of Christ was a mere theophany. To assert the union of two natures in the Redeemer, or to attempt any precise statement of the constitution of his person, he says, is as though Abraham, "after he had entertained as a guest the Jehovah angel, or angel of the Lord, instead of receiving his message, had fallen to inquiring into the digestive process of the angel;" or, "as if Moses, when he saw the burning bush, had fallen to speculating about the fire." Thus those who "live in their logic" exclaim, "See Christ obeys and suffers; how can the subject be supreme-the suffering man the impassible God?" And then, in one of those exquisite illustrations, which, as our Saviour says of another kind of lying wonders, would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect, he adds: "Indeed you may figure this whole tribe of sophisters as a man standing before that most beautiful and wondrous work of art, the Beatified Spirit of Guido, and there commencing a quarrel with the artist, that he should be so absurd as to think of making a beatified spirit out of mere linseed, ochres, and oxides! Would it not be more dignified to let the pigments go, and take the

expression of the canvass? Just so (!) are the human personality, the obedient, subject, suffering state of Jesus, all to be taken as colours of the divine, and we are not to fool ourselves in practising our logic on the colours, but to seize at once upon the divine import and significance thereof; ascending thus to the heart of God, there to rest, in the vision of his beatific glory.” (P. 160.) The meaning of this is, that as the value and power of a picture is in "the expression of the so the power of Christ is in "what he expresses." In order to this expression, however, there is no need of a true body and a reasonable soul; a theophany, as in the case of the Jehovah angel, is all that is necessary. We accept this illustration as to one point. There is all the difference between the Christ of the Bible and the Christ of Dr Bushnell, that there is between an "Ecce Homo" and the living incarnate God.

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In a few pages further on, the author rejects this view of the subject, and says: "Christ is no such theophany, no such casual unhistorical being as the Jehovah Angel who visited Abraham."-(P. 165.) So unsteady, however, is his tread, that in a few more steps he falls again into the same mode of representation. On p. 172, he says: "Just as the Logos is incarnated in the flesh, so the Spirit makes his advent under physical signs, appropriate to his office, coming in a rushing mighty wind, tipping the heads of an assembly with lambent flames, &c. &c." The Logos, therefore, was no more really incarnate than the Spirit was incorporate in the dove, the wind, or the tongues of fire-all is appearance, expression.

But if Dr Bushnell teaches the doctrine of the Docetæ, he still more distinctly avows that of the Apollinarians. The main point in their theory on this subject is, that Christ had a human body, but not a human soul; the Logos in him taking the place of the intelligent Spirit. The nature of our author's view of the constitution of Christ's person, is best learned from the answers which he gives to the objections which he sees will be made against it. The first objection is, that "the infinite God is represented as dwelling in a finite human person, subject to its limitations, and even to its evils; and this is ineredible, an insult to reason.”—(P. 148.) His answer is: "It no more follows that a human body measures God, when revealed through it, than that a star, a tree, or an insect, measures him, when he is revealed through that."—(P. 152.) A second objection is, Christ grew in wisdom and knowledge. This he answers by saying: I. "That the language may well enough be taken as language of external description merely." Or, 2. “If the divine was manifested in the ways of a child, it creates no difficulty which does not exist when it is manifested

in the ways of a man or a world." It is as repugnant, he says, to Christ's proper deity to reason and think, as to say he learns or grows in knowledge.-(P.153.) A third objection is, that Christ obeys, worships, and suffers. He says, the Trinitarian answer to this objection-viz., that these things are to be understood of the human soul of Christ-is an affront to the Scriptures, which assert that "the real divinity came into the finite, and was subject to human conditions.”—(P. 154.) When we see the Absolute Being "under the conditions of increase, obedience, worship, suffering, we have nothing to do but to ask what is here expressed, and, as long as we do that, we shall have no difficulty."—(P. 156.) All is a mockery and show,— even the agony in the garden, the calling on God in Gethsemane and on the cross, was, we tremble as we write, a pantomine, in which the infinite God was the actor. To such depths does a man sink, when, inflated with self-conceit, he pretends to be wise above that which is written! "Of what so great consequence to us," he asks, "are the humanities of a mere human soul? The very thing we want is to find God is moved by such humanities, touched with a feeling of our infirmities." (P. 165.)

These passages teach distinctly the Apollinarian doctrine. They deny that there are two distinct natures in Christ; and they affirm that ignorance, weakness, obedience, worshipping, and suffering, are to be predicated of the Logos, the Deity, the divine nature as such. Thus far the doctrine taught in this book is little more than the reintroduction, with great pomp and circumstance, of an effete and half-forgotten heresy. It is the bringing back a dead Napoleon to the Invalides.

Dr Bushnell next teaches the Eutychean doctrine. Eutyches taught that the divine and human were so united in Christ as to become one nature as well as one person. He thought, as Dr Bushnell does, that two natures imply two persons. Before the union there were two natures; after it, only one. He acknowledged, therefore, in Christ, but one life, intelligence, and will. This, after all, appears to be the doctrine which Dr Bushnell is really aiming at. We have Eutycheanism distinctly asserted, for example, on p. 154. The common doctrine, he says, "virtually denies any real unity between the human and divine, and substitutes collocation, copartnership for unity." 'Instead of a person whose nature is the unity of the divine and the human, we have," he adds, "two distinct persons, between whom our thoughts are constantly alternating; referring this to one, and that to the other, and imagining, all the while, not a union of the two, in which our possible union with God is signified and sealed for ever, but a practical historical assertion of his incom

municability thrust upon our notice." In these, among other passages, we have the doctrine, not that the divine nature or Logos, was in the place of the human soul, but that the divine and human natures were so united as to make one, neither human nor divine, but, as our author calls it, "the divinehuman."

All these forms of doctrine respecting the person of Christ, sprang up in the church. They all suppose the doctrine of a personal God distinct from the world. They take for granted a real creation in time. They assume a distinction between God and man, as two different natures, and between matter and mind as two substances. In men, therefore, there are two substances or subjects, spirit and body, united in one person. It was at a later period the heathen doctrine found its way into the church that there is but one substance, intelligence, and life in the universe,-a doctrine which identifies God and the world; which denies any extramundane deity, any proper creation, any real distinction between God and man. This is the Atheistic doctrine which has been revived in our day, and which has been, and still is, taught by deceivers and the deceived, in the church, as the doctrine of the Bible, or at least as consistent with it? The new philosophy teaches, as before stated, that the absolute God is nothing; he exists only as he is reavealed. He produces himself in the world; or, in the world he becomes objective to himself, and thus self-conscious. The human race is the highest form of the world, and consequently the highest development of God. Men are God as self-conscious. What the Bible says of the Son as being God, one with the Father, his image, &c., is to be understood of the race. God is but the substance or power of which all phenomena are the manifestations. All life is

God's life, all action is his acting; there is no liberty, no sin, no immortality. The race is immortal, but not the individuals; they succeed each other as the waves of the sea, or the leaves of the forest. This is the worst form of Atheism; for it not only denies God, but deifies man, and destroys all morality in its very principle.

Schleiermacher, in his later writings, does not go all these lengths. His system, however, is founded on the real identity of God and the world, the human and divine.* It makes creation eternal and necessary. It destroys entirely human

* Dorner, the disciple of Schleiermacher, gives as his reason for associating him with Schelling and Hegel, that "he undoubtedly proceeds on the assumption of the essential unity of God and man, though he did not hold that substantial Pantheism in which subjectivity is a mere accident."-(See his Christologie, p. 487.) Schleiermacher was educated a Moravian. His philosophy was pantheistical; with his philosophy his early religious convictions kept up a continual struggle, and, as it is hoped, ultimately gained the victory. This, however, does not alter the nature of his system.

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