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Cave replies that this may argue a variety of authors, but not necessarily a variety of authors of very different dates. He asserts that " critics of all schools are agreed, that linguistic evidence is insufficient of itself to show different authors in these books, separated from each other, and from the events they describe, by centuries ? " Moreover, the Journal Theory allows that Moses may have employed secretaries ; its chief point being the “contemporaneousness of the record with the events." Dr. Cave examines the list of variations given, and firmly asserts that he can find nothing answering to the variations on which this view of the composite character of Genesis is based.

Dr. Cave then deals with the argument from the contents of the books. Dr. Driver takes three positions—(1) The Levitical Code (see above Priests' Code) belongs to a widely different age from the Law of the Covenant (see above Prophetical Code). (2) The Law of the Covenant, and not the Levitical Law, is the basis of Deuteronomy. For there are fundamental institutions of the Levitical Code unknown to the author of Deuteronomy. Examining carefully the instances given as proof of this position, Dr. Cave comes to the following conclusions : “ The Deuteronomic Code expands the Law of the Covenant, but it also expands the Levitical Law. If there are many parts of the Levitical Law not referred to in Deuteronomy, these are the parts which refer to the erection and cultus of the Tabernacle, which were addressed to a class, whether of artificers or ministrants, and were not of special interest to the whole people. Where the Deuteronomic Code differs from the Levitical, itself an expansion of the Law of the Covenant, the differences are explicable on two principles—either by the prospective change of circumstances from the nomad to the settled life, or by a relaxation of severity possible after some years' experience of the harder law. Where the Deuteronomic Code has laws which are without parallels, either in the Law of the Covenant or in the Levitical Code, these laws are wholly explicable by the change of circumstances which it was the duty of the departing legislator to forecast and to provide for.” Dr. Cave elaborates one illustrative case: the requirement, during the wilderness-time, that all animals should be killed at the tabernacle, and the relax&tion of this law when the people were scattered in Canaan.

Dr. Driver's third position is-Deuteronomy belongs to the age of Manasseh. This Dr. Cave restates with a running criticism, which is a doubtfully wise method, as the effort to be sharp is a temptation to be unfair. Dr. Driver supports his position by showing that the differences between Deuteronomy and Exodus xx.-xxiii. imply a changed social condition of the people, that the law of the kingdom is coloured by reminiscences of the Solomonic age, that the forms of idolatry alluded to seem to point to the middle period of the monarchy, the language and style suits the age of Jeremiah, &c.

According to Dr. Driver, the Levitical Law is later than the Deuteronomic. Dr. Cave replies that the differences in the character of the books account for all that Dr. Driver urges.

Leviticus is a code. Deuteronomy is a serinon. Dr. Driver suggests that Leviticus may be later than Ezekiel, later even than the Exile. His idea being that the older Mosaic system was elaborated at that late date, and the system so elaborated is what we now have. Dr. Cave replies that the known books of the postExilic period, such as the Maccabees, in no way suggest such elaboration, as a requirement or as an existing fact. As to Joshua, Dr. Cave also finds the standpoint and style like the Pentateuch, and unlike Judges, Samuel, and Kings; but he asks for evidence that the Pentateuch is not Mosaic, and that Joshua is not post-Mosaic in the strictest sense of the word, allowing in both cases for a subsequent conservative revision. Dr. Cave concludes by suggesting that the example of Wellhausen should

be followed for a while, and attention be concentrated, not upon minutiæ of language, but upon the relations and age of the three Pentateuchal Codes, viz., the Law of the Covenant, the Levitical Code, and the Deuteronomic Code.

PRINCIPAL CAVE ON THE HEXATEUCH. By DR. DRIVER (Contemporary Review).While greatly preferring constructive work, Dr. Driver thinks Principal Cave's article requires an answer and explanation from him. He deals, however, with only a portion of that article, and reaffirms, and fully illustrates, his position that “ Whatever grounds exist in Principal Cave's judgment) for believing in the composite structure of Genesis, grounds of equal cogency exist for believing in the composite structure of the books from Exodus to Joshua.” After following Dr. Cave's reasons for believing in the composite origin of Genesis, which all belong to literary usage, Dr. Driver finds it an easy task to present answering instances to each peculiarity in the later books. But he carefully remarks that “ neither these nor other literary usages would be evidence of the compilatory structure of the books in which they occur, provided they occurred in them indiscriminately; in point of fact, however, they are found aggregated in particular sections, to which, in consequence, they impart a character, or colouring, so distinct from that of the neighbouring sections as only to be explicable by the supposition of different authorship.” It is this feature which Dr. Cave does not seem to have adequately appraised. Dr. Driver shows that Dr. Cave has placed himself in a dilemma. Either he must go back and abandon the composite origin of Genesis, or he must go forward and accept the composite origin of the rest of the Hexateuch, which he has not less strenuously denied; for his own arguments in relation to Genesis can be effectively used against him in relation to the rest of the Hexateuch.

Dr. Driver reasonably complains that Dr. Cave has not mastered what he has written. Dr. Cave represents Dr. Driver as cautiously saying that the Levitical Code is later than Ezekiel, and than the Exile; but this is an imperfect representation of Dr. Driver's views, and omits all recognition of his most careful qualifications. As this brings to view the conservative element in Dr. Driver's valuable work, we give his quotation from the book which Dr. Cave somewhat imperfectly apprehends.

Dr. Driver wrote thus : “ These arguments are cogent, and combine to make it probable that the completed Priests' Code is the work of the age subsequent to Ezekiel. When, however this is said, it is very far from being implied that all the institutions of the (Priests' Code) are the creation of this age. The contradiction of the pre-Exilic literature does not extend to the whole of the Priests' Code indis. criminately. The Priests' Code embodies some elements with which the earlier literature is in harmony, and which, indeed, it presupposes; it embodies other elements with which the same literature is in conflict, and the existence of which it even seems to preclude. This double aspect of the Priests' Code is reconciled by the supposition that the chief ceremonial institutions of Israel are in their origin of great antiquity; but that the laws respecting them were gradually developed and elaborated, and in the shape in which they are formulated in the Priests' Code that they belong to the Exilic or early post-Exilic period. In its main stock, the legislation of P was thus not (as the critical view of it is sometimes represented by its opponents as teaching) ' manufactured' by the priests during the Exile: it is based upon pre-existing Temple usage, and exhibits the form which that finally assumed.

... Institutions or usages, such as the distinction of clean and unclean, the prohibition to eat with the blood, sacrifices to be without blemish, regulations determining the treatment of leprosy, vows, the avenger of blood, &c., were ancient in Israel, and as such are alluded to in the earlier literature, though the allusions do


not show that the laws respecting them had yet been codified precisely as they now appear

in P." If Dr. Driver's qualifications are estimated at their full value there is surely very little left to dispute about.

CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK THOUGHT (London Quarterly Review).—This is a review of the Hibbert Lectures, 1888, by the late Dr. Hatch, which were left by him in an incomplete state, and have been recently edited for the press by DR. A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

Much is now made of the “historic method” in the consideration of religious questions. It is assumed that to trace out the history of a doctrine, an institution, or a form of thought, is to explain it, and that to furnish an outline of its growth and development is to account for its existence, and set it in its right place in the general order of things. But the application of historical analysis in matters theological requires especial care. The historical theologian must be careful to secure all the facts, and to see that they are simple facts, free from personal or sectional bias; and he must ensure that his deductions are drawn without prepossessions. And the religious historian often finds that the materials essential to a safe conclusion are lacking.

Dr. Hatch had dealt with the “Organization of the Early Christian Churches " in a former volume ; in this the doctrine of those Churches is treated. Dr. Fairbairn says, “It is a study in historical development, an analysis of some of the formal factors that conditioned a given process and determined a given result.” “ As an attempt at the scientific treatment of the growth and formulation of ideas, of the evolution and establishment of usages within the Christian Church, it ought to be studied and criticized.”

Dr. Hatch draws a sharp contrast between the Sermon on the Mount and the Nicene Creed. The one is the promulgation of a new law of conduct; the other is a statement made up of metaphysical terms. “The one belongs to a world of Syrian peasants; the other to a world of Greek philosophers.” This change in the centre of gravity of the Christian religion from conduct to belief, Dr. Hatch thinks is coincident with the transference of Christianity from a Semitic to a Greek soil. The presumption then is, that it was the result of Greek influence. The many-sided influence of Greek ideas and usages is illustrated in relation to education, to ethics, and to theology. Stating that dogmas are simply personal convictions, Dr. Hatch says, " the belief that metaphysical theology is more than this is the chief bequest of Greece to religious thought, and it has been a damnosa hæreditas." The assumptions—(1) That metaphysical distinctions are important; (2) That these distinctions which we make in our minds correspond to realities in the world around us; (3) That the idea of perfection which we transfer from ourselves to God really corresponds to the nature of His being—are assumptions only. But they lie at the basis of Greek speculation, and have entered accordingly into the very substance of the Christian religion as we have received it. In his last two lectures Dr. Hatch dwells upon the incorporation of Christian ideas into a body of doctrine, and the transformation of the basis of Christian union, placing doctrine in the room of conduct; both processes being influenced by prevailing Greek ideas.

In criticizing Dr. Hatch's position, the reviewer asks whether primitive Christianity is to be discerned in the Sermon on the Mount. And how far does the Nicene Creed represent a corruption, how far a growth or development of primitive Christian religion ?

The application of the historical method, pure and simple, in theology is

particularly difficult to obtain. We are all prejudiced in favour of that form of Christianity with which we have been familiar from childhood, but Dr. Hatch has not altogether escaped another danger—" that of taking a partial and one-sided view of a complex growth and development, and of reading into the history conclusions which we cannot help thinking were unconsciously present in the writer's mind before his historical analysis was begun.” It is singular that he omits to begin with the New Testament. True, the New Testament propounds no theory of Church government, but a body of doctrine is certainly contained in it, with which every writer on "primitive Christianity” ought to deal. Dr. Hatch looks upon the Sermon on the Mount as embodying primitive Christianity, but why is not our Lord's teaching as a whole taken, at least as given in the Synoptists ? It is impossible to read the acknowledged Epistles of Paul without finding “a statement of great religious verities which cannot be thoroughly understood in their various aspects and bearings without a great deal of metaphysics, Greek or other.” The Christ of Paul, if Paul's acknowledged writings are reduced to minimum, is sufficient to prepare the way for the Christ of the Nicene Creed. John's Gospel is certainly not Greek in thought, though it is Greek in language. Dr. Hatch makes much of the recently discovered “ Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," and points out that " in the way of life' which it sets forth, doctrine has no place.” But neither the date nor the evidential value of that work have yet been definitely fixed.

The reviewer thinks there was much more of doctrinal teaching in the Christianity of the first century, while it was distinctly Semitic in character, than Dr. Hatch has at all admitted. The great central facts of Christianity, as recorded in the New Testament, formed a basis for subsequent metaphysical treatment, but the prevalence and influence of Greek metaphysics in the history of Christianity is greatly exaggerated. There is another side which Dr. Hatch does not treat. Christianity exercised an important influence on Greek philosophy.

The question that Dr. Hatch really raises, but does not settle, is this—“ Did the Greek influence imply additions to the primitive faith, or, as the Nicene fathers continually maintained, did the creeds of those days but reassert what had been believed from the beginning, explicitly defining what had always been implicitly held by the faithful from the first?” That question has yet to be answered.


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RECENT WORKS ON NATURAL RELIGION: A Review of Max Müller's Natural Religion' and ` Physical Religion,' Bowden's Natural Religion, Stokes' • Natural Theology,' and Saussaye's 'Manual of the Science of Religion' (Church Quarterly Review).—Butler's title-page contained the words, “ Religion, Natural and Revealed." He was understood to mean by religion, intercourse between man and a supernatural Being. “ Natural Religion meant that portion of this intercourse which takes place by reason of man's natural powers and the circumstances in which he finds himself as an inhabitant of the world; while Revealed Religion meant that intercourse with the supernatural which takes place, or is supposed to take place, by reason of communications made from God to man in the course of history.” In Butler's day these two subjects could be kept distinct. A man might even accept Natural Religion, and reject Revealed; but now it is a contested question whether religion implies any intercourse with the supernatural; and many deny that it does, while they claim to have religion.

The historical method, which is but another name for the method of evolution, often drives out Natural Religion at one end by leading us to doubt whether there is indeed any religion which does not depend on historical influences; and expels NO. III.-VOL. I.-THE THINKER,


Revealed Religion at the other by reducing all historical influences which have been exercised on man's religion to a uniform natural level. “Things are tending to a condition in which some will say, 'All religion is natural,' and some, · All religion is revealed,' while others will refuse to acknowledge the distinction, and will regard all religion as the result of natural forces acting according to inevitable laws impressed upon man's history by the mysterious source of his being."

What will the Church have to say on these matters? We need not refuse to recognize a history divinely guided in the faiths of the heathen world. We admit that religion is the “specific and common property of all mankind,” but not that religion is possessed by all mankind in equal truth and power. For us religion implies belief in a living supernatural agency. M. de la Saussaye says, “ Religion seems to spring from the very essence of man, but under influences and circumstances wherein the activity of God is manifest, even though we cannot determine the form of the conditions under which this activity showed itself.”

To Max Müller words are not merely the records of thought; they are thought, and there is no such thing as thought without them. This absolute identification of words and thought shuts from his observation the vague and unformed, but still real movements of mind, in which words, if they have any phenomenal causes at all, must needs originate. He gives, therefore, much information upon the embodied forms which religion has taken among mankind, but treats lightly the vague but real spiritual impulses which lie behind these forms, and which properly constitute Natural Religion. He discusses the meaning of the term Religion, derives it from relegere, and regards it as originally expressive of general reverence, without any implication of a Divine object to whom reverence is to be paid. It is admitted that it became “ more and more defined as the feeling of awe inspired by thoughts of Divine powers." Max Müller rejects Dr. Martineau's definition of religion as a belief in an ever-living God—that is, a Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe, and holding moral relations with mankind." His objection is that this leaves unexplained those long periods during which the human mind, after many struggles, arrived at last at the abstract and sublime conception of a Divine Mind and Will. Max Müller criticizes the theory ascribed to Cardinal Newman, that conscience is the religious organ of the soul, and the faculty which gives us an immediate knowledge of God. He thinks this may be quite true as a matter of personal experience in the nineteenth century, but fails to remove the historical difficulty how, from the earliest times, the human conscience elaborated the idea of the Godhead, and thus, and thus only, made religion possible. But conscience, to Max Müller, is only consciousness applied to our recollection of acts in our lives which infringed the rule of right as taught us by others, or by some unexplained instinct which tells us that we are doing something disapproved by others or dangerous to ourselves. It is not an inward monitor, the voice of God, the highest witness of His existence, and the arbiter of right and wrong. The reviewer admits that we can hardly regard the word " conscience”

as any more than a convenient expression for the inward power by which the accumulated result of certain influences and experiences is brought to bear upon our lives; but surely the way


for God to speak to us through conscience, and it may truly be called His voice. Conscience is the voice of God, not because it has an independent utterance in itself, but because it has nothing at all to say without His prompting.

According to Max Müller's account of Natural Religion, the religious impulses of mankind, as such, are not taken into account. The creation of religion becomes an intellectual process. His definition of religion is this: “ Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral


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