INTRODUCTION.

RELIGION is every thing, or it is nothing. It is the one thing needful, or it is a phantom of the brain. If a being or beings exist, who possess the power, and the disposition, to interfere in the concerns of mortals, and who are perpetually engaged in conferring favours, or inflicting evils, a most important connection, a relationship exists also, which no human being can dissolve, or elude; and it becomes an act of the highest prudence to turn this connection to the best account. Our earnest enquiries should, therefore, be into the reality of such an existence and agency, and in what manner we shall be able to secure the complacency, or avert the displeasure of these beings: and we shall naturally be induced to shape our conduct,

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according to the ideas we may form of their character and requisitions.

That a being, or beings, exist superior to Man, and exert an influence over him, has been the universal opinion in all ages. No country has been totally destitute of some species of religion, or of superstitious rites; which confirms the universality of the opinion. But it is on this point alone that mankind have been unanimous. The notions entertained respecting the number of these deities, their characters, their offices, their demands, the extent of their power, have been infinitely diversified, and most contradictory to each other; and this diversity of opinions has lead to correspondent actions, which have had a momentous influence upon the moral world, and largely contributed to the happiness or misery of the human

race.

We have, upon a former occasion, traced some of the evils arising from absurd and superstitious notions of Religion. We have also combated the inferences which philosophic atheism has drawn from these; and we have endeavoured

to prove, that a total abnegation of Religion would become a source of greater evils, than those which this philosophy professes to dread. We proceeded to show, that there are sentiments entertained respecting Religion, which are most conducive to human happiness; such as perfectly correspond with the state, exigencies, powers, capacities of man, and form the basis of that felicity to which he ardently aspires. We observed that a Religion of this description must be consonant with the reason of all rational beings; that it must exert a similar influence upon all its votaries;-it must cherish the pleasant affections of love, gratitude, admiration, reverence, and hope;-it must be calculated to administer consolation to every sincere worshipper, in every situation of life ;-it must accord with the social character of man ;it must authorize the expectation of more exalted happiness than this world can bestow.

In a subsequent Disquisition, we endeavoured to prove, that rational Religion not only administers personal consolations, but it places before us the most powerful motives to the

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tice of all those moral and social duties upon which social happiness depends. It teaches us to adore one universal sovereign, who loves virtue, has a perfect knowledge of human conduct, is wise and just to punish and reward; and who is the benevolent father of the whole human race.

In the Disquisitions to which a reference is now made, we confined our attention to the natural effects of these principles upon the mind, and their tendency to annihilate human misery! And from the above statements a very important question presents itself, "What are the evidences upon which the above desirable principles are. founded? A deep and permanent conviction of their reality is necessary to give them the ascendency over inferior pursuits. Nothing enervates action so much as the prevalence of doubt; and nothing invigorates equally with hope. But hope, to be continually active, must be inspired by a conviction that has a solid basis: and it is most desirable that doubts should appear to be as opposite to reason as they are inimical to inward tranquillity.

When sensible objects affect the mind, their

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existence is not doubted, and we presume that their qualities are known to us; but, whatever is not the object of our senses, can alone become impressive through the medium of belief. This belief can alone be distinguished from a mere creature of the imagination, by its being founded upon competent evidence, which it is more rational to admit than to reject. The question is, Does such evidence exist? Why may we not suspect, that the most favourable sentiments of Religion are merely opinions, like those entertained by the Pagan world concerning their gods? Why ought they not to be rejected also as creatures of the imagination, which, although they may be more pleasing, are equally delusive? These questions are pertinent, and demand a serious consideration.

But, before we proceed to an immediate answer, it may be proper to ask in return, what degree of evidence will prove satisfactory? In order to be consistent with itself, ought not the mind of the inquirer to be contented with such evidences of the consonance of the above religious sentiments with truth, as are universally