north, aiming to reach Charlotte in North Carolina. At the same time Georgetown, a seaport north of Charleston, was evacuated, and occupied by a naval force sent by Admiral Dahlgren. The force of Gen. Hood's army which had been sent eastward, having passed Augusta, was moving toward Charlotte, where Gen. Beauregard was in command. As the danger became more critical, the enemy sent Gen. Johnston to take the command, and he was again in a position to confront Gen. Sherman.

Meanwhile Gen. Sherman continued his march. The left wing and cavalry crossed the Saluda and Broad Rivers, and broke up the railroad about Alston and as high as the bridge across Broad River on the road to Spartansburg. Meanwhile the main body moved directly to Winnsboro, which Gen. Slocum reached on the 21st. Here the railroad was destroyed up to Blackstake's station, a distance of fifteen miles. The railroad runs from Columbia to Charlotte, N. C., one hundred and nine miles, thence to Greensboro, and branches to Lynchburg, Va., and Raleigh, N. C. The distance from Columbia to Winnsboro is thirty-nine miles. Gen. Slocum next turned to Rocky Mount, on the Catawba River, in a northeast direction. The 20th corps reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, and laid a pontoon bridge over the Catawba, and crossed on the 23d. The cavalry under Gen. Kilpatrick followed during the night ensuing, and moved up to Lancaster with instructions to keep up the feint of a general march on Charlotte, N. C., to which place Gen. Beauregard and the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. The real aim of Gen. Sherman was to reach Cheraw and Goldsboro, N, C., where he could communicate with the naval forces. As has been already stated, a portion of Hood's army, consisting of Cheatham's corps, was aiming to make a junction with Gen. Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by the rapid movement of Sherman on Columbia and Winnsboro. For three days, from the 23d to the 26th, the rains were heavy and the rivers became quite swollen, and the roads almost impassable. The 20th corps reached Hanging Rock on the 26th, and waited there for the 14th corps to get across the Catawba. The river had so swollen that the pontoon bridge broke, and was with difficulty restored by Gen. Davis.

Meanwhile the right wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsboro, and turned from thence to Peay's Ferry, where it crossed the Catawba before the heavy rain commenced. The 17th corps moved straight on Cheraw by the way of Young's bridge; and the 15th corps by Tiller's and Kelly's bridges. From the latter corps detachments were sent to Camden, to burn the bridge over the Wateree and the railroad depot, stores, &c. This was successfully done.

Several of the foragers, who, as a body, generally kept in advance of the troops, having been very cruelly treated by the enemy, Gen. Sherman wrote the following letter to Gen. W. Hampton:

GENERAL: It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after capture, and labelled "Death to all, foragers." One instance of a lieutenant and seven men, near Chesterfield, and another of twenty, "near a ravine eighty rods from the main road," about three miles from Feasterville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

I hold about one thousand prisoners captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you; but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large, that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your confed

erates.

Of course you cannot question my right to forage on the country; it is a war right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions, and therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men; but I cannot permit an enemy to judge or punish with wholesale murder.

by this war; but they were to be expected, and I Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered simply allege that those who struck the first blow and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our war right to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life. I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. To which Gen. Hampton replied as follows: HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, Feb. 27, 1865.

Major-Gen. W. T. Sherman, U. S. Army. GENERAL: Your communication of the 24th instant reached me to-day. In it you state that it has been officially reported that your foraging parties were "murdered" after capture, and you go on to say that you had "ordered a similar number of prisoners in your hands to be disposed of in like manner." That is to say, you have ordered a number of Confederate soldiers to be "murdered."

You characterize your order in proper terms, for the public voice, even in your own country, where it seldom dares to express itself in vindication of truth, honor, or justice, will surely agree with you in pronouncing you guilty of murder, if your order is carried out.

Before dismissing this portion of your letter, I beg to assure you for every soldier of mine "murdered" by you I shall have executed at once two of yours, giving, in all cases, preference to any officers who may be in my hands.

In reference to the statement you make regarding the death of your foragers, I have only to say that I know nothing of it; that no orders given by me authorized the killing of prisoners after capture, and that I do not believe that my men killed any of yours, except under circumstances in which it was perfectly legitimate and proper they should kill them.

It is a part of the system of the thieves whom you designate as your foragers, to fire the dwellings of those citizens whom they have robbed.

To check this inhuman system, which is justly execrated by every civilized nation, I have directed my men to shoot down all of your men who are caught burning houses. This order shall remain in force as long as you disgrace the profession of arms by allow ing your men to destroy private dwellings.

You say that I cannot, of course, question your right to forage on the country. "It is a right as old

as history." I do not, sir, question this right. But there is a right older even than this, and one more inalienable the right that every man has to defend his home and to protect those who are dependent upon him; and from my heart I wish that every old man and boy in my country who can fire a gun, would shoot down, as he would a wild beast, the men who are desolating their land, burning their houses, and insulting their women.

You are particular in defining and claiming "war rights." May I ask if you enumerate among them the right to fire upon a defenceless city without notice; to burn that city to the ground after it had Deen surrendered by the authorities, who claimed, though in vain, that protection which is always accorded in civilized warfare to non-combatants; to fire the dwelling houses of citizens, after robbing them, and to perpetrate even darker crimes than these-crimes too black to be mentioned? You have permitted, if you have not ordered, the commission of these offences against humanity and the rules of war. You fired into the city of Columbia without a word of warning. After its surrender by the Mayor, who demanded protection to private property, you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amid its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the lurid light of burning houses, and in more than one household there is an agony far more

bitter than that of death.

The Indian scalped his victim regardless of sex or age, but with all his barbarity he always respected the persons of his female captives. Your soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.

In conclusion, I have only to request, that whenever you have any of my men "disposed of," or "murdered," for the terms appear to be synonymous with you, you will let me hear of it, in order that I may know what action to take in the matter. In the mean time I shall hold fifty-six of your men as hostages for those whom you have ordered to be executed. I am, yours, &c.,

WADE HAMPTON, Lieut.-Gen.

A small force of mounted men, under Capt. Duncan, was sent by Gen. Sherman to break up the railroad between Charleston and Florence, but were met by a division of cavalry under Gen. Butler, and after a sharp skirmish on Mount Elon, they were compelled to return without success.

Cheraw, to which Gen. Sherman was aiming, is a town on the right bank of the Great Pedee River, at the head of steam navigation. It had been a place of importance as a depot for cotton, and had about one thousand inhabitants. It is the termination of the northern railroad from Charleston through Florence, being distant from the latter forty miles, and from the former one hundred and forty-two miles.

On March 2d the advanced division of the 20th corps entered Chesterfield, a little northwest of Cheraw, encountering on the way the cavalry of the enemy under Gen. Butler, with whom skirmishing was kept up. On the next day, about noon, the 17th corps entered Cheraw. The force of the enemy in the place retreated across the Pedee, and burned the bridge. A considerable quantity of ammunition was captured in the town, and a number of guns which had been brought from Charleston on the evacuation of that city. These were de

stroyed, and also the trestles and bridges of the railroad as far down as Darlington, ten miles. An expedition of mounted infantry was sent to Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry, and returned after doing no other damage than breaking up in part the road between the two places.

a

After a brief delay the march was resumed for Fayetteville, in North Carolina. The right wing crossed the Pedee at Cheraw, and the left wing at Sneedsboro. Fayetteville is the capital of Cumberland County, and was flourishing town before the war, having a population exceeding seven thousand. It is on the left bank of Cape Fear River, at the head of navigation, and sixty miles south of Raleigh, the capital of the State, and one hundred miles northwest of Wilmington. It contained an arsenal, distilleries of turpentine, and cotton and flour mills. The 14th corps moved by Love's bridge, for the purpose of entering Fayetteville in advance, but the weather and road continuing bad it reached that place on March 11th, together with the 17th corps. They approached skirmishing with Gen. Wade Hampton's cavalry, which covered the rear of Gen. Hardee's army, as it retreated. It crossed the Cape Fear River and burned the bridge. The cavalry during the march had kept well of March 9th his three brigades were divided on the left and exposed flank; but on the night to picket the railroad. This was discovered by Gen. Hampton, who, early in the morning, dashed in and gained possession of the camp of Col. Spencer's brigade, and the house in which Gen. Kilpatrick and Col. Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but Gen. Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near at hand, and by a prompt attack, well followed up, he regained his artillery, horses, camp, and every thing except some prisoners. The enemy retired, leaving their dead behind.

The army remained at Fayetteville during three days, until March 15th. The United States arsenal, and a vast amount of machinery, which had formerly belonged to the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, were destroyed. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery broken up by the 1st Michigan engineers. The position of Gen. Sherman at this time is thus described by himself: "Up to this period I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my superior army between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been reënforced by Cheatham's corps from the West, and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River ahead of me, and could therefore complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke in North Carolina; and the whole, under the command of the skilful and experienced Joe

Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had despatched to Wilmington from Laurel Hill Church two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and on the morning of the 12th of March, the army tug Davidson, Capt. Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day, this tug carried back to Gen. Terry, at Wilmington, and Gen. Schofield at Newbern, my despatches to the effect that on Wednesday, the 15th, we would move for Goldsboro, feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsboro, which I expected to reach about the 20th. The same day, the gunboat Eolus, Capt. Young, United States navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear River, one opposite the town, the other three miles below." While Gen. Sherman had been advancing to Fayetteville, some movements had taken place at Wilmington, N. C., intended to prepare the way for cooperation with him. It was on Jan. 15th that Gen. Schofield, with the 23d corps, left Gen. Thomas, as has been stated, for the Atlantic coast. The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports, to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by railroad to Washington, D. C., and Alexandria, Va. Although it was midwinter and the weather unusually severe, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of the troops. In February an order was issued by the Secretary of War creating the department of North Carolina, and assigning Gen. Schofield to the command. The ultimate object of his operations was to occupy Goldsboro, N. C., and to open railroad communication between that point and the sea-coast, and further to accumulate supplies for Gen. Sherman's army and to join it, in its approach, at or near Goldsboro. Wilmington was made the first point to capture, as it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City in the event of the junction being made at Goldsboro; and also as it would be of great value to Gen. Sherman in case the movement of the main army of the enemy or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of Sherman's army at some point further south than Goldsboro.

With the 3d division of the 23d corps, under Major-Gen. J. D. Cox, Gen. Schofield reached the mouth of Cape Fear River on Feb. 9th, and landed near Fort Fisher. The other troops were to follow. Major-Gen. Terry, with about eight thousand men, then held a line across the peninsula, about two miles above the fort, and

occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear River, and off the coast covering the flanks of Gen. Terry's line. On the west bank, Fort Anderson was occupied by the enemy with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three-fourths of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson, running across the peninsula from Cape Fear River to Masonboro' Sound. This position was impregnable against a direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing the sound above his left, or passing around the swamp which cov vered his right. The first movement of Gen. Schofield consisted in pushing forward Gen. Terry's line on Feb. 11th, supported by Gen. Cox's division, which drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold it in force. Efforts were then made to turn his left by the aid of a fleet of boats to cross the sound, but the weather prevented. Finally Gen. Schofield determined to attempt to turn the enemy's right. Gen. Cox's and Gen. Ames' divisions were crossed over to Smithville and joined by Col. Moore's brigade of Gen. Couch's division, which had just debarked. They advanced along the main Wilmington road until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and the adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while Gen. Cox with the other two brigades and Gen. Ames' division moved around the swamp covering the enemy's right, in order to strike the Wilmington road in the rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, by means of their cavalry, discovering the movement of Gen. Cox, hastily abandoned their works on both sides of the river during the night of Feb. 19th, fell back behind Town Creek on the west, and to a similar position covered with swamps on the east. Thus the main defences of the Cape Fear River and of Wilmington were captured, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammunition.

On the next day Gen. Cox pursued the enemy to Town Creek, behind which he was found intrenched. The only bridge over had been destroyed. Gen. Terry, on the east bank, also encountered the enemy in superior force and Gen. Ames' division was recrossed and joined him during the night. On the 20th Gen. Cox crossed Town Creek, and gaining the flank and rear of the enemy attacked and rout ed them, capturing two guns and three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, besides the killed and wounded. During the night he rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and advanced toward Wilmington without opposition. Meanwhile, Gen. Terry being unable to advance, so occupied the attention of the entire force of Gen. Hoke that he was unable to reenforce those defeated by Gen. Cox. On Feb. 21st Gen. Cox

secured a portion of the enemy's bridge across Brunswick River, and passed a portion of his troops to Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear River above Wilmington. The enemy immediately set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the city. Early the next morning, Feb. 22d, Gen. Cox entered without opposition. The force in front of Gen. Terry fell back, and were pursued by him across Northeast River.

The Federal losses in these operations were about two hundred officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy was estimated at one thousand killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. Fifteen heavy and fifteen light guns were captured, with a large amount of ammunition.

As Gen. Schofield had no rolling stock at Wilmington, and was nearly destitute of wagons, he was compelled to operate from Newbern for the capture of Goldsboro. He had already sent to that place about 5,000 men, and ordered Gen. J. N. Palmer to move with as little delay as possible upon Kinston, in order to cover the workmen repairing the railroad. Gen. Ruger's division of the 23d corps was sent to reenforce Gen. Palmer, by way of Morehead City. As Gen. Palmer had not moved on the 25th, Gen. Cox was ordered to take the command and push forward at once. At the same time the division of Gen. Couch, which had just arrived at Wilmington, was prepared as rapidly as possible, together with the division of Gen. Cox, then under Brig.-Gen. Reilly, to join the column moving from Newbern by a land march from Wilmington. On March 6th the two divisions were ready to move for Kinston, and proceeded by way of Onslow and Richlands. On the 8th Gen. Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one and a half miles below Southwest Creek, behind which the force of the enemy, consisting of Gen. Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had retired. Meanwhile Gen. Cox sent two regiments, under Col. Upham of the 15th Connecticut, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. But the enemy having been reënforced by a portion of the old Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek above the Dover road, and came down in the rear of Col. Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about seven hundred men. They then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between Gen. Carter's and Gen. Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but were checked by Gen. Ruger's division, which was just arriving on the field. Only light skirmishing took place, from which the loss was small. As the enemy was equally as strong as Gen. Cox, and receiving reenforcements all the time, Gen. Cox intrenched his force to await the arrival of Gen. Couch. On the 9th the enemy pressed his lines strongly without making an assault; and on the 10th, having received further reënforcements, and perhaps heard of the approach of Gen. Couch's

column, they made a heavy attack upon the left and centre of Gen. Cox, but were decisively repulsed with a heavy loss. They retired in confusion, leaving their dead and wounded and a large number of arms and intrenching tools. During the night they fell back across the Neuse and burned the bridge. The loss of Gen. Cox was about 300 in killed and wounded; that of the enemy was estimated at 1,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. During the night the column of Gen. Couch arrived. Gen. Schofield was delayed in crossing the Neuse until the 14th, for want of pontoons, when it was effected without opposition. Meanwhile the enemy had abandoned Kinston and moved rapidly toward Smithfield, to join the force under Gen. Johnston, to resist the advance of Gen. Sherman from Fayetteville. After occupying Kinston and repairing the bridge over the Neuse and the railroad track, Gen. Schofield moved on the 20th toward Goldsboro, which he entered on the evening of the 21st with slight opposition from the enemy.

Meanwhile Gen. Terry, with a portion of the command which had remained at Wilmington, moved from that point on March 15th, reaching Faison's depot on the 20th, and advanced to Cox's bridge, securing the crossing of the Neuse on the 22d.

The columns of Gen. Sherman commenced their march from Fayetteville on Wednesday, March 15th. His plan was, that Gen. Kilpatrick should move up the plank road to and beyond Averysboro, a village on the Cape Fear River, about forty miles south of Raleigh. Four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible, were to follow him; the rest of the train, under the escort of the two remaining divisions of the wing, were to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro. In like manner Gen. Howard was to send his trains well to the right, under a good escort, toward Faison's depot and Goldsboro, and to hold four divisions light and ready to go to the aid of the left wing if it should be attacked while in motion. The weather continued bad, and the roads were almost impassable, requiring repairs at almost every foot to admit the passage of the wagons and artillery.

Gen. Kilpatrick advanced, followed by Gen. Slocum, who moved up the river or plank road on the 15th to Kyle's landing. About three miles beyond, at Taylor's Hole Creek, Gen. Kilpatrick encountered the rear-guard of the enemy, with which he skirmished heavily. At his request Gen. Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. On the next morning the column advanced in the same order, and found the enemy in an intrenched position, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry. They were in front of the point where the road branched off toward Goldsboro through Bentonville. It appeared that Gen. Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow and swampy neck between the Cape Fear and South Rivers, in

order to check the progress of Gen. Sherman, that time might be gained for the concentration of Gen. Johnston's forces in the rear at Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro. The force of Gen. Hardee was estimated at 20,000 men. Gen. Sherman found it to be necessary to dislodge him, both to gain possession of the road to Goldsboro and to keep up as long as possible the feint of an advance on Raleigh. The position of the enemy was a difficult one to carry, by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren.

Gen. Williams, with the 20th corps, was ahead, and Gen. Ward's division in the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of heavy artillery armed as infantry, posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery enfilading a clear field over which lay the way of approach. A brigade under Gen. Corse was sent by Gen. Williams to the left to turn this line. By a quick charge it broke the enemy's brigade, which retreated rapidly back to a second line better made and more strongly held. On the retreat the enemy were made to suffer by Winniger's battery of artillery, which had been put in position by Major Reynolds, chief of artillery. On the advance of Gen. Ward's division over the ground, three guns and 217 prisoners were captured. Of the latter 68 were wounded. Of the enemy's dead, 108 were buried by the troops. As the second line was developed, the division of Gen. Jackson was deployed forward on the right of Gen. Ward, and two divisions of Gen. Jefferson C. Davis' 14th corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear River. At the same time Gen. Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert, was ordered to mass his cavalry on the extreme right, and in concert with the right of Gen. Jackson, to feel forward for the Goldsboro road. He succeeded in getting a brigade on the road, but it was attacked so furiously by a division of the enemy under Gen. McLaws, that it fell back to the flank of the infantry. Late in the afternoon the entire line advanced and drove the enemy within his intrenchments, and pressed him so hard that during the night, which was stormy, he retreated. In the morning he was followed by the division of Gen. Ward through and beyond Averysboro, when it became apparent that Gen. Hardee had retreated toward Smithfield instead of Raleigh. The Union loss was 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 wounded. The loss of the enemy is unknown.

The division of Gen. Ward remained to keep up a show of pursuit, and the rest of Gen. Slocum's column turned to the right and built the bridge across the South River and took the road to Goldsboro. At the same time Gen. Kilpatrick crossed the river to the north in the direction of Elevation, and moved eastward, watching the left flank. The right wing of

Gen. Howard was still working its way over the heavy roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro. The cavalry of the enemy crossed in front of Gen. Sherman, to join their infantry at Smithfield, burning the bridges across Mill Creek. Smithfield is 22 miles northwest of Goldsboro, on the railroad leading from the latter place to Raleigh, and on the left bank of the Cape Fear River, 27 miles from Raleigh. Goldsboro is at the junction of the railroad from Raleigh to Newbern and that from Richmond to Wilmington.

On the night of the 18th Gen. Slocum's column encamped on the Goldsboro road, about five miles from Bentonville and twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro. The column of Gen. Howard was two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward, at the junction of the roads leading to Goldsboro. The next movement is thus described by Gen. Sherman :-"All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Gen. Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro road, which goes by way of Falling Creek Church. I also left Slocum and joined Howard's column, with a view to open communication with Gen. Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Gen. Terry from Wilmington. I found Gen. Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek Church, with one regiment forward to the cross-roads near Cor's bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from Gen. Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry (Dibbrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under Gen. Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the 15th corps, still back near Lee's store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive station, and with the three remaining divisions of the 15th corps come up on Gen. Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from both Gens. Schofield and Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro on the 21st, and Gen. Terry was at or near Faison's depot. Orders were at once despatched to Gen. Schofield to push for Goldsboro, and to make dispositions to cross Little River in the direc tion of Smithfield as far as Millard; to Gen. Terry to move to Cox's bridge, lay a pont on bridge, and establish a crossing; and to Gen. Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek