way of Port Republic, for the purpose of destroying the railroad depot, track, and bridge, at that place, and to seize Gen. Jackson's train and throw his force upon Gen. Jackson's flank. Col. Carroll marched in obedience to these orders, on Saturday afternoon. His infantry, cavalry, and artillery had in the mean time come up, and he started for Conrad's Store with less than a thousand of the former, with one hundred and fifty cavalry, and with a single battery of six guns.

Halting, in the night, six miles before reaching Port Republic, Col. Carroll sent forward a party of scouts, who returned with the information that Gen. Jackson's train was parked near Port Republic, with a drove of beef cattle herded near by, and the whole guarded by about two or three hundred cavalry. On learning this he pushed forward, with the design of capturing the train and cattle, as his orders directed. He halted some two miles from the town, made a reconnoissance, and received further information confirming the report of his scouts, and then dashed into the town with his cavalry and two pieces of artillery, driving the enemy's cavalry out and taking possession of the bridge. He halted there for his infantry to come up, and disposed his pieces and little force to prevent a repulse from the train guard, when, before he had occupied the village any length of time, he was attacked by a force of the enemy superior to his own, and forced to retire and abandon his further march to Waynesborough. Thus the enemy recovered possession of the bridge and held it.

Col. Carroll brought his forces to a stand at the first defensible position, about two miles north of the town. At this time the conflict was going on between Gens. Fremont and Jackson at Cross Keys, several miles distant, and it was over this bridge that Gen. Jackson must retreat or be placed between the forces of Gens. Fremont and Shields. At two o'clock in the afternoon Gen. Tyler arrived to the aid of Col. Carrol.. As commanding one of the brigades of Gen. Shields's division, he had also been ordered to proceed to Waynesborough. He left Columbia Bridge on the 7th, and reached Naked Creek on the same day, and went into camp under orders to march at four A.M. When within six miles of Port Republic he learned of the engagement of Col. (acting brig.gen.) Carroll, and pressed forward immediately with infantry and artillery to his support, and reached him at two P. M.

Gen. Tyler in his report thus explains his proceedings: "From Col. Daum I learned the enemy had eighteen pieces of artillery, planted SO as to completely command all the approaches to the town, and from the engagement with Gen. Carroll that morning, had obtained the range of the different points. Immediately on the arrival of my command, Col. Daum urged an attack with the combined force of infantry and artillery, to which I so far consented as to order the infantry into position

under cover of a thick wood which skirted the road, and commenced observing the enemy's position myself, which appeared to me one to defy an army of 50,000 men. I at once sent for Col. Carroll, Lieut.-Col. Schriber, Capts. Clark and Robinson, who had been over the ground; they all agreed in the opinion that an attack would result in the destruction of our little force."

The infantry was ordered back to bivouac for the night, and early in the morning Gen. Tyler was informed that the enemy were advancing evidently with the intention of outflanking him on his left. Forces were ordered up to counteract this movement, which was sucessfully done. The enemy retired into the woods, and a part crossed over and joined the forces attacking the right wing. The engagement now became very heavy on the right, additional troops having been brought up on both sides. Under cover of this conflict, the enemy threw another force into the woods, pressed down upon the battery on the left, and with a sudden dash captured it. The contest con tinued until Gen. Tyler, perceiving additional reënforcements for the enemy approaching, about ten o'clock ordered his troops to fall back, with a view of retreating until he should meet reënforcements. The retreat, he says, "save the stampede of those who ran before the fight, was as orderly as the advance." The number of his force is stated at three thousand, and that of the enemy much larger. This was evidently the rear guard of Gen. Jackson's army, which had been engaged, and some reenforcements were sent back to it. Gen Jackson retired from before Gen. Fremont on Sunday night, and on Monday morning crossed the bridge at Port Republic, and while the main body continued to retreat, Gen. Tyler was thus held in check.

Meanwhile Gen. Fremont, as has been stated, commenced his march for Port Republic that morning, with his army in battle array. Dur ing the afternoon his whole army reached the river opposite the town, and he learned that a portion of Gen. Shields's division had engaged the enemy on both Sunday and Monday on the other side of the river. During the march of Gen. Fremont's forces from the battle field of the preceding day to the river, they could hear brisk cannonading, and see the heavy volumes of smoke arising from the valley where the contest was going on. When they arrived the Confederate force was gone. Thus closed the pursuit of Gen. Jackson with a portion of the forces of four major-generals of the U. S. army on his line of retreat, beside those of Brig.-Gen. Shields. The loss of men on both sides occasioned by this expedition was not very great either in killed, wounded, or prisoners. No accurate details are at present accessible; but the destruction of Federal stores was vast.

On the night of the arrival of Gen. Fremont's forces at the river, an alarm was raised in camp. Horses were harnessed, and men placed

in a condition for an immediate movement, but affairs finally became quiet, and a part of a night's rest was obtained. On the next morning, the 10th, orders to march were issued, and the army was soon in motion back to Harrisonburg, a distance of twelve miles, which it reached in a pitiless storm during the afternoon. On Wednesday it moved eighteen miles to New Market, and on Thursday reached Mt. Jackson, seven miles, and encamped for rest. Some forces of Gen. Jackson's army returned to Harrisonburg almost as soon as the Federal troops had left it. The division of Gen. Shields also fell back to New Market.

The force of Gen. Jackson was estimated by his opponents at twenty-five thousand men. The force of Gen. Fremont, on leaving Franklin, was stated to be about twenty thousand men. It should be stated in this connection, that on the very day on which Gen. Jackson attacked the 1st Maryland, under Col. Kenly, at Front Royal, the 23d of May, the Confederate General, Heath, in the western part of the Mountain Department, advanced rapidly and boldly with nearly three thousand men and attacked Col. Crook, acting brigadier-general, at Greenbrier Bridge, thirty-five miles from McDowell, and nine miles from Camp Alleghany. The command of Col. Crook consisted of the

36th and 44th Ohio and some batteries. The advance of Gen. Heath was met with so much vigor and promptness, that his forces were soon defeated, with the loss of his four pieces of artillery, and one hundred and fifty killed and wounded, and three hundred stand of arms, and a number taken prisoners. On his retreat, the Greenbrier bridge was burned to check or prevent pursuit. This affair occurred on the day previous to the reception of the order by Gen. Fremont to march to the aid of Gen. Banks. The ill success of this enterprise was such that it failed to cause any diversion from Gen. Fremont's command.

This exploit of Gen. Jackson, undoubtedly one of the most brilliant and successful thus far of the war, if its objects are considered, introduced into the whole campaign in Virginia a disturbing element of considerable magnitude. It diverted large masses of men from movements designed to accelerate events on the peninsula, delayed the advance of Gen. McClellan, and deprived him of the reënforcements he expected. The time required for the transfer of troops in the South and Southwest, where the Confederate campaign had been a failure, to Richmond, was thus gained, and when Gen. McClellan was next prepared to move, he found the enemy in accumulating force in front of him.

On the 25th of May Gen. McClellan issued a general order, which was read throughout the camps, directing the troops, as they advanced beyond the Chickahominy, to be prepared for battle at a moment's notice, and to be entirely unencumbered, with the exception of ambulances; to carry three days' rations in their haversacks, leaving their knapsacks with their wagons, which were on the eastern side of the river, carefully parked. Besides practical directions as to conduct, this order says to officers and soldiers: "Let them bear in mind that the Army of the Potomac has never yet been checked, and let them preserve in battle perfect coolness and confidence, the sure forerunners of suc

cess."

The divisions from the corps of Gens. Heintzelman and Keyes were among the first to cross the Chickahominy. They took a position on the right bank somewhat advanced therefrom. The right wing rested near New Bridge, the centre at Seven Pines, and the left flank on the White Oak Swamp. Gen. Sumner's corps remained on the east side of the river. On the

30th the Confederate Gen. Johnston made arrangements for an attack upon the Federal army, for the purpose of cutting off, if possible, the corps of Gens. Heintzelman and Keyes before they could be joined by Gen. Sumner. He selected the divisions of Gens. Longstreet, Huger, G. W. Smith, D. H. Hill, and Whiting, His plan was that Gens. Hill and Longstreet should advance by the road to Williamsburg and make the attack in front, and that Gen. Huger should move on the road to Charles City and attack in flank the troops assailed by Gens. Hill and Longstreet. Gen. Smith was ordered to the junction of the New Bridge Road and the Nine Mile Road, and to be in readiness to fall on the right flank of Gen. Keyes and to cover the left of Gen. Longstreet. The forces of Gens. Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in position early on the morning of Saturday, May 31, and waited until afternoon for Gen. Huger to get into position. Prince de Joinville, who was a competent spectator, thus describes the scenes which followed this attack: "At the moment it was thus attacked the

Federal army occupied a position having the form of a V. The base of the V is at Bottom Bidge, where the railroad crosses the Chickahominy. The left arm stretches toward Richmond, with this railroad and the road from that city to Williamsburg. There stood the left wing, composed of four divisions echeloned, one behind the other, between Fair Oaks and Savage stations, and encamped in the woods on both sides of the road. The other arm of the V, the right, follows the left bank of the river; that is the right wing. There are these five divisions and the reserve. Should one desire to communicate from one extremity to the other of those two wings, going by Bottom's Bridge, the way is very long, not less than 12 or 15 miles. In an air line the distance, on the contrary, is very trifling, but between the two arms of the V flows the Chickahominy. It was to connect both arms, in the space between them, that the construction of 3 or 4 bridges had been undertaken, only one of which was serviceable on the 31st of May. It had been built by Gen. Sumner, nearly halfway between Bottom's Bridge and the most advanced point of the Federal lines. It saved the army that day from a disaster." The other bridges were not ready. They were structures of logs, and time was required to build them. The approaches were always bad, and the tedious labor of corduroying long distances was ne

cessary.

"It was against the left wing of the army that every effort of the enemy was directed. That wing had its outposts at Fair Oaks station, on the York river railroad, and at a place called Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg road. There the Federals had thrown up a redoubt in a clearing, where a few houses were to be seen, and constructed abatis, to increase the field for sharpshooting of the troops posted there. The rest of the country was completely covered with woods. The previous day there had been a frightful storm, with torrents of rain, and the roads were frightful.

"All at once, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the weather being dark and gloomy, a very spirited fusilade is heard. The pickets and sentries are violently driven in; the woods which surround Fair Oaks and Seven Pines are filled with clouds of the enemy's sharpshooters. The troops rush to arms and fight in desperation; but their adversaries' forces constantly increase, and their losses do not stop them. The redoubt of the Seven Pines is surrounded, and its defenders die bravely. Col. Bailey, of the artillery, among others, there upon his pieces finds a glorious death. In vain Gens. Keyes and Naglee exhaust themselves in a thousand efforts to keep their soldiers together: they are not listened to. In this moment of confusion they perceive a little French battalion, known as the Garde Lafayette, which has remained in good order. They rush to it, place themselves at its head, charge the enemy and retake a battery. The battalion loses a

fourth of its men in this charge; but, like true Frenchmen, always and everywhere the same, they cry, "They can call us the Garde Lafourchette now?" alluding to an offensive nickname that had been given them.

"Meanwhile Heintzelman rushes to the rescue with his two divisions. As at Williamsburg, Kearney arrives in good time to reestablish the fight. Berry's brigade, of this division, composed of Michigan regiments and an Irish battalion, advances firm as a wall into the midst of the disordered mass which wanders over the battle field, and does more by its example than the most powerful reenforcements. About a mile of ground has been lost, fifteen pieces of cannon, the camp of the division of the advanced guard, that of Gen. Casey; but now we hold our own. A sort of line of battle is formed across the woods, perpendicularly to the road and the railroad, and there the repeated assaults of the enemy's masses are resisted. The left cannot be turned, where is the White Oak Swamp, an impassable morass; but the right may be surrounded. At this very moment, in fact, a strong column of Confederates has been directed against that side. If it succeeds in interposing between Bottom's Bridge and the Federal troops, which hold beyond Savage's Station, the entire left wing is lost. It will have no retreat, and is doomed to yield to numbers; but precisely at this momentthat is to say, at 6 o'clock in the evening-new actors appear on the scene. Gen. Sumner, who has succeeded in passing the Chickahominy, with Sedgwick's division, over the bridge constructed by his troops, and who, like a brave soldier, has marched straight through the woods to the sound of the cannon, arrived suddenly on the left flank of the column with which the enemy is endeavoring to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes.

*

"He plants in the clearing a battery which he has succeeded in bringing with him. They are not those rifled cannon, the objects of extravagant admiration of late, good for cool firing and long range in an open country: these are the true guns for a fight-twelve-pound howitzers, the old pattern, throwing either a round projectile, which ricochets and rolls, or a heavy package of grape. The simple and rapid discharging of these pieces makes terrible havoc in the opposing ranks. In vain Johnston sends against this battery his best troops, those of South Carolina-the Hampton Legion among others. In vain he rushes on it himself; nothing can shake the Federals, who, at nightfall, valiantly led by Gen. Sumner in person, throw themselves upon the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and drive him furiously, with frightful slaughter and fear, back as far as Fair Oaks Station.

"Night put an end to the combat. On both sides nothing was known of the result of the battle but what each one had seen with his

They were "Napoleon" guns.-[ED.

own eyes. Friends and enemies, lost in woods they were unacquainted with, lay down amid heaps of dead and wounded, wherever darkness overtook them. The fatigue of this obstinate struggle as well as the obscurity of the night had imposed on the combatants one of those tacit truces so frequent in war.

"Evidently Johnston had flattered himself, in throwing all his forces on the four divisions of the left wing, that he could annihilate them before any aid could come to them from the main body of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. For the moment he had recoiled before the energetic resistance of those four divisions, and also before the furious and unforeseen attack of Sumner's troops. No doubt he had counted on the terrible storm of the previous day to have swelled the Chickahominy so as to render the establishment of a bridge impossible, or to sweep away in its overflowing waters those already established; but the capricious river baffled his plans, as it did some hours later those of his adversaries. The effect of the deluge was not immediate; the rise in the water delayed its appearance 24 hours. Was this unhoped-for delay turned to account with all desirable activity on the part of the Federals? That is a question which will remain always in dispute, as are so many others of the same kind, which form one of the necessary chapters of the history of most great battles.

"It was only at one o'clock in the afternoon that the action had commenced. We had waited some time to ascertain if the attack on that side was not a feint, intended to draw the Federal troops to that point while the bulk of the enemy's forces was hastening to debouch on the left bank. We had been promptly relieved of our uncertainty by the violence of the attack and by the reports of the aeronauts, who saw the entire Confederate army marching to the point of attack.

'Then Sumner had received orders to cross the water with his two divisions. He had executed the movement with rapidity, marching at the head of his column, without any other guide than the sound of the cannon, and he arrived at the right moment and at the critical place. But some persons thought then, and still think, that if, at the moment Sumner received the order to cross the river, the same order had been given to all the divisions of the right wing, it would have been practicable. We fancy what might have happened if, in place of throwing 15,000 men on Johnston's flank, 50,000 had been thrown. Sumner's bridge, doubtless, would not have answered for the crossing of so many. At midnight the tail end of his column was still crossing, struggling against all the difficulties which bridges formed of trunks of trees that turn under the feet, muddy sloughs and a dark night-the darkness rendered still deeper by the thickness of the woods-present to horses and artillery. Several bridges were, however, ready to be thrown

across at other points. It was necessary to work without a moment's loss to construct them, and not be disturbed by the obstacles the enemy would not have failed to present to the undertaking. A brigade was displayed for full effect and scarecrow fashion, opposite the points naturally marked out for crossing; but the stake was so large, the result so important, and the occasion itself so unforeseen and so favorable for playing a decisive part, that nothing, in our opinion, should have prevented that operation from being attempted.

"Here, again, was evident that American slowness which belongs much more to the character of the army than that of its chief. It was not until 7 o'clock in the evening that the idea of securing all the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross at daybreak to the right bank of the Chickahominy, was entertained.

"It was now too late. Four hours had been lost, and the opportunity-that moment so fleeting, in war as in other circumstances-had gone. The rise, on which Johnston had vainly counted, and which had not hindered Sumner from crossing, came on during the night. The river rose suddenly from two feet, and continued to swell with rapidity, carrying away the new bridges. tearing up and sweeping off the trees which formed the planking of Sumner's bridges, and covering the entire valley with its overflowing waters. Nothing could cross.

"At the earliest dawn of day the combat was resumed with great fury on the left bank. The enemy came on in a body, but_without order or method, and rushed upon the Federals, who, knowing that they were inferior in numbers and without hope of being supported, did not attempt to do more than resist and hold their ground. They fought with fierce determination on both sides, without any noise, without any cries, and whenever they were too hardly pressed they made a charge with the bayonet. The artillery, placed on the eminences in the rear, fired shell over the combatants. Ah! I could have wished that all those who, forgetful of the past, and impelled by I do not know what kind of egotistical calculation, have lavished their encouragement on the fatal rebellion of slaveowners, could have been present at this fratricidal struggle. I could have wished them, as a punishment, a sight of this terrible battle field, where the dead and dying were piled up by thousands. I wished that they could have seen those temporary ambulances formed around the few habitations found here and there. Oh! what misery-oh! what suffering! The ambulances had something about them particularly horrible. The houses were altogether too few to contain the smallest proportion of the wounded, and they were therefore compelled to lay them outside; but although they did not make any complaints, and bore their fate with the most stoical courage, their exposure in one position beneath the rays of the sun of the middle

of June soon became intolerable. They were then to be seen putting forth all their remaining strength, and crawling to seek a little shade. I will always remember a bed of roses, whose sweet-scented flowers I was admiring while conversing with one of my friends, when he drew my attention to one of these unfortunate men, who had just died beneath its bushes. We looked at each other without saying a word, the heart being oppressed with the most painful emotion. Mournful scenes, from which the pen of the writer, like the eye of the spectator, hastened to turn away.

"Toward midday the fire gradually diminished, then ceased. The enemy retreated; but the Federals were not in a position to pursue them. No one then knew what a loss the Southerners had just suffered in the person of their commander, Gen. Johnston, who was severely wounded. It was to his absence that was owing, in a great measure, the unskilful attacks against the Federal army in the morning. When the firing ceased at midday, the Confederates, tired of the prolonged strife which they had been sustaining, and being no longer commanded, were, it is said (for in the midst of these immense woods one sees nothing, and is compelled to guess everything), in a state of inextricable confusion. Who can say what would have been the result if at this moment the 35,000 fresh troops left on the other side of the Chickahominy had appeared on the flank of this disordered mass after having successfully crossed the bridges?

"Such is the history of this singular battle, which, although complicated by incidents superior to human will, must not be taken otherwise than as a type of American battles. The conflict was a bloody one, for the North had lost 5,000 men, the South at least 8,000; but the results were barren on one side as on the other. Although the losses of the enemy were much greater than those of the Federals, the result was especially distressing to the latter. They had lost a rare opportunity of striking a decisive blow. These occasions did not return, and therefore, in the circumstances in which they were placed, the result was against them."

The crossing of Gen. Sumner's corps commenced about four o'clock in the afternoon. At that time the head of the advance, Gen. Gorman's brigade, turned from the swamps on the left bank of the river to cross by the bridge built by Gen. Sumner,-a battery moved next, then Gen. Burns's brigade, then artillery, and finally Gen. Dana's brigade, all of Gen. Sedgwick's division. In consequence of the morasses, all the batteries except Kirby's were left behind; but all the troops except the 19th Massachusetts, which was detached to assist the artillery, were moved swiftly onward to the scene of action. Gen. Richardson's division was detained until quite late in the evening by the obstructed causeway. At seven o'clock, it was in the position to which it had been assigned. It took no part in the battle on Saturday.

Now was the time to capture the city. The retreat of the army caused great consternation at Richmond. The Confederate force had retired in confusion, and if they had been sharply followed up, the gates of the city would have been reached, if friend and foe had not gone in together. It is useless to speculate on possibilities. The force with which Gen. McClellan commenced his march had been diminished before Yorktown and Williamsburg, and by constant skirmishing. It garrisoned Yorktown and Williamsburg, and occupied the White House, and the line of the railroad. It had received no reenforcements up to this time except the division of Franklin. It was also impossible for him to move the corps of Gens. Porter and Franklin over the Chickahominy at the decisive moment, as even the bridge on which Gen. Sumner had crossed had been so far destroyed by the river, which was swollen by the rains of Friday and Saturday, that it was impassable for a single horseman. The three corps which had been engaged in the battles of Saturday and Sunday were too much cut up and wearied, by their conflict with superior numbers, to be able to pursue the retreating Confederates, particularly as they might probably have been met at the outworks of the city by fresh troops, in numbers fully equal to themselves, and a strong artillery in position. He was in no condition to risk anything. He had fought the enemy in equal or superior numbers, and they had retired in confusion. The corps of Gen. McDowell, if on hand now, might have taken Richmond, but without it the commanding general was not strong enough to risk its immediate attack. There were other considerations to govern his conduct. He was leading an invading army without reserves to fall back upon. A repulse would have ended in serious, if not complete disaster. Such a result to the peninsular campaign would have been fatal to the cause to which the Army of the Potomac was devoted. It would have convinced foreign powers that there was such a degree of military strength in the Confederacy as to render the immediate recognition of its independence both safe and politic. But there was probably one consideration which outweighed all others, and exerted a decisive influence upon the movements. This was the certain and safe reception of sufficient supplies. The single line of railroad was not capable of transporting them. The horses were kept on half forage, and if the distance had been increased, the army itself would have suffered. What hope was there of holding Richmond, even if it had been taken, with a line of transportation not capable of bringing forward sufficient to sustain the army, and one which, from the inadequate force to guard it, was liable at any moment to be broken up? Finally, for many days after the battle, the fields and roads were in such condition as to render it impossible to move any amount of ar tillery over them. To have advanced without