fleet under sir J. Duckworth had, on the 20th February, 1807, appeared before Constantinople, and continued there for ten days, without doing any thing. And that it was the opinion of the house, that arrangements had not been made by the then ministry, adequate to the occasion." subject, and all of them agreed that a considerably smaller force than what was dispatched, was considerably more than adequate to the undertaking. They were fully justified, too, in expecting co-operation and assistance from the Russians, by whose fleet our squadron was joined four days afterwards. The situation, however, was such, and so capable of defence, that instead of three sail of the line, which admiral Lewis had at first declared to be sufficient, the same gallant admiral had estimated the force necessary to succeed, at ten sail of the line. Troops were also talked of as being necessary to the success of such an expedition. But he asked the house if it was at all likely that such a body of troops could have been sent as would have been equal to encounter 200,000 men, who had appeared in arms along the coast previously to our ships leaving the Dardanelles? With regard to the expedition and occupation of Alexandria, this was a post of the utmost importance: for though not intended to be used as the first step towards the conquest of Egypt, the capture of it, was in this point of view, an object of the highest importauce. Let it not be forgotten, of what moment it was regarded by Buonaparte, no bad judge in those matters. While matters were grow ing daily and hourly worse and worse at Constantinople, nothing seemed more to be dreaded, than that Alexandria, and probably, in consequence, Egypt, should fall into the hands of the French. The sole object of the expedition was Alexandria, and this was accomplished in a creditable, not a disgraceful manner. If attempts were made to carry the conquest farther, Mr. Grenville expressed great satisfaction that the accusations against the late ministers, had at length been made in a manner that rendered them tangible. It was impossible, he said, for any one to read the papers on the table, and to say that either the justice or the policy of interfering in the dispute between Russia and the Porte, was questionable. This right of interference was not founded on the triple alliance of the 5th January only. This treaty respected a long course of negotiation for peace and alliance between Great Britain, the Porte, and Russia. With this object in view, the peace of Jassy had been concluded between Russia and the Porte, under the influence of Great Britain. We had, therefore, a right to support Russia, and the late ministry had exercised it in pursuance of that wise policy that had been adopted both by their predecessors and successors, viz. the maintenance of a connection between Russia, the Porte, and this country. They saw the growing influence of France, and the decreased influence of this country and Russia with the Porte, and wished to give a check to so unfortunate a change of sentiment. As to the quantum of force sent to the Dardanelles, it was suggested by lord Collingwood. The late ministers took the opinion of some of the first naval characters on the that that was done without any instructions from government. There was no scarcity of provisions in Alexandria. One thing only seemed disastrous and unaccountable, namely, the gratuitous abandonment of the place by the présent government. They found it taken, and why did they give it up? While the whole military force of the enemy did not exceed 6000, and the garrison of Alexandria was fully equal to that number, there could be nothing that could render that step a measure of imperious necessity, unless, indeed, it could be said that this was a great waste of the public force, and that it was proper that part of it should be let loose. At the very time when government was treating with the Porte for a state of neutrality, to lay the possession of so important a place at the feet of their opponent, seemed to be an unaccountable mode of proceeding. But what had become of the troops so set at liberty? He believed that, from that moment to the present, they had not been engaged in any enterprize of advantage to the country, and that they had scarcely been heard of. Mr. secretary Canning, in reply to Mr. Grenville, said, if any gens tleman would but look into the treaty of triple alliance in 1798, he would perceive that the argument of the right honourable gentleman could not be sustained. It referred to the situation and existing circumstances of the contracting parties, all equally at that period at war with France. The treaty contained a stipulation, limiting its operation to eight years; after which it was to undergo a revision, and such alteration as the respective situations of the different countries It might then render necessary. was so understood in this country; and the circumstances to which it was applied, were mentioned in the preamble. Could it be asserted, that a treaty negotiated with a view to existing hostilities, in which all the parties were engaged, and followed, not by a joint peace, but by separate pacifications, must necessarily survive? Or that, if it did not, it was necessary to be viewed on the renewal of another war, into which any of the parties might afterwards enter? But this had never been the understanding of any of the parties, nor had the treaty been so acted upon. It had been asserted, that the refusal of the pas sage of the Dardanelles to the Russians, had given us a right to assume an armed mediation. But as the passage was granted by a subsequent convention, to which this country was not a party, we had no right, in virtue of an anterior treaty, to insist on the fulfilment of that convention, to which we were not a party. The interference at Copenhagen was not more decisive in principle than the forcing the passage of the Dardanelles, and appearing, in a hostile attitude, before Constantinople. Here a force was sent to bombard the capital, not of a neutral, but of a triple ally. If the late ministers could lay upon the table a copy of a treaty of defensive alliance with Denmark, the cases would be parallel, except that the Danish expedition was crowned with success, while the other was attended with defeat and disgrace. It was impossible that the Turkish fleet, passing the Dardanelles, and the Streights of Gibraltar, should attack any of the [F 4] British British possessions. On the other hand, the Danish fleet, if once launched with a hostile view, might be on our shores without a moment's notice. An intervention to procure, by pacific means, the arrangement desired by Russia, he did not condemn; but to interfere, first by threats, and afterwards by violence, violence inadequate to its object and unsuccessful, was what he did condemn. It was known that the passage of the Dardanelles would be regarded as an act of hostility; at least, it was quite as natural to suppose, that the approach to Copenhagen, the landing of troops, and the investment of that capital, would be received without resistance or a feeling of hostility, as that the appearance in a menacing posture before Constantinople, would be viewed with calmness and indifference. But the estimate of the strength of the castle, and the appointment of the British force, shewed clearly that there was an idea that the object of the expedition was likely to be regarded as hostile, and to be met with resistance. But it was said, the expedition appeared before Constantinople purely for Russian objects. The restoration of the Hospodars was, indeed, a Russian object. But how was this demanded by the British commander? With the alternative of giving up the Turkish fleet! If the fleet had been given up, could the restoration of the Hospodars have been still insisted on? If not, where war our attention to the interests of Russia? As to the policy of the expedition, Russia ought to have been induced by all means to concentrate her whole force against the most dangerous enemy, Buonaparte. This ought to have been our policy also. Then, as to the force, it was so inadequate to its object, that if sir Thomas Lewis had not come away with the utmost expedition, his passage would have been totally cut off. It was asked, what 5 or 6000 troops, required by the naval commanders, could have done, when Constantinople had 200,000 men of military age among its inhabitants? They might have destroyed the castle of Abydos by a coup de main, and they might have held the castle of Sestos, where the 200,000 men from Constantinople could not have got at them. But the troops were sent to Alexandria to commit a double breach of alliance, and to incur a double failure". He did not think that 5000 men could achieve miracles. He could hardly conceive that 5000 men could open a communication from Chili to Buenos Ayres, over the highest and most impracticable mountains in the world; but he did think they might have destroyed one small castle by a coup de main, and taken and held another in which no attack could have been made upon them. With regard to the troops that had been ordered to evacuate Alexandria, they had set *For an account of the expeditions to Copenhagen, the Dardanelles, and Alexandria, with reflections, see last volume of this work, being the 49th, Chap. XI. and Chap. XIV. Alluding, in his usual style of sarcasm and recrimination, to the instructions given by Mr. Windham, as secretary for the colonies and for war, to brigadier-general Craufurd, who was sent with a force from 4 to 5000 men to Chili, October, 1806,-See last volume Hist. Europe, p. 214. set free a part of the force in Sicily, which was brought to Gibraltar with a view to co-operate in securing the retreat of the royal family of Portugal from Lisbon, though that object was happily effected Wabout the necessity of employing them. Neither he nor his colleagues, he observed, had been forward to take a part in the present discussion. He did not see what practical benefit could result from a censure on persons who were no longer in his majesty's councils. And he thought it would be injurious to have on the journals a resolution reflecting on the honour of the country. He thought, there fore, he should best do his duty by moving the order of the day. Mr. Windham considered a treaty as binding only with respect to what was in the purview of that treaty. A friend might become our very worst enemy. Col. Mark Wood endeavoured to proceed in a speech against the expedition; but the question was so loudly called for, that he was obliged to sit down. The house, however, gave way to the reply of Mr. William Taylor.-After which, the question that the other orders be now read, was put and carried without a division. CHAP. CHAP. IV. Commercial Warfare.-Orders of Council, a Subject of unusual keenness and pertinacity of Debate.-Motion for referring the Orders in Council respecting Neutral Trade to the Committee of Ways and Means.-Reiterated Debates in both Houses concerning both the Justice and Legality, and the Policy of the Measure.-Charges in the House of Commons of Injustice, Oppression, and Cruelty in the Conduct of the Marquis of Wellesley towards the Nabobs of Oude and Arcott, declared to be unfounded; and the Thanks of the House to the Marquis. THE HE commercial warfare, or the war of passivity and privation (a novelty in the history of the world) in which Great Britain and France were now engaged, was traced in our last volume*, to the decrees of the emperor of the French, declaring the whole island of Great Britain to be in a state of blockade. A protecting and selfdefensive system was interposed by our orders in council; and trade began again to flourish: yet there was no measure of administration discussed in the present session that occupied so great a portion of the time and attention of parliament, or occasioned such keen and pertinacious debate, the Baltic expedition alone, perhaps excepted. On both these subjects the members in opposition had the ad"vantage of standing not only on what they maintained to be political expediency, but the plausible ground of justice and the law of nations; though there was not now in fact, any law of nations; or at least any such law in force. Buonaparte, who swayed a sceptre of iron on the continent, acknowledged no law but that of superior force. It was very generally remarked, that during the present session the opposition to ministry was unusually keen, vigilant, and persevering. The present ministers were not supposed to possess much ability—on the whole, there was allowed to be a superiority of powers, of both reasoning and oratory among their opponents: who, fully sensible of this, seized every opportunity of hanging on the skirts of ministers, and distracting and worrying them with incessant debates. Those concerning orders of council possessed very little interest, were universally accounted dry, and at length became tiresome at the time. They cannot appear more interesting now. The great question to which they refer is to be decided not by arguments, but by facts. Though, therefore, there was scarcely a week when there was not some debate or conversation about French decrees, British orders in council, foreign licences, or American treaties of commerce, it will not be expected that our account of those proceedings HIST. EUR. Chap. XII. |