and faithful allies. It was remarkable that while the application of force at Copenhagen was condemned by the gentlemen opposite, the non-application of it at Lisbon was censured no less severely. But so it would have been if the force had been applied at Lisbon and negotiation at Copenhagen. The Danish navy would have been lost by foolish confidence, and Portugal outraged by unprincipled and impolitic violence.

With respect to the late supposed negotiation for peace, Mr. C.declared that no tangible overture had been made either by the French or Austrian government. With respect to the late orders of council retaliating the restrictions of the French government on our commerce, he maintained our right to go as far as France, and make France feel, in the effects of her own injustice, that we could hope to bring her to more reasonable conduct. The vigour of the British navy, when put forth with a determination which the moderate spirit of our government had hitherto restrained, would prove equal to cope with the power that the tyrant of France had established at land. It would appear, that if he combined all the powers of the continent to oppress us, the combination would but encrease our strength and energy, and make us triumph under our oppression.

Lord H. Petty contended, that the principles of right and wrong were to be considered in politics as well as philosophy, and on these men were to reason in general till a particular case was made out. It was a singular instance to be in a state of war with a power against which there were no documents to

prove a hostile act. Lord Petty regretted very much that there should be so little in the speech about the temporary policy respecting Denmark, and nothing at all about the permanent policy respecting Ireland.

Mr. Bathurst contended, that all the danger that would arise from a communication of the particulars of the intelligence required, had been incurred already. He was prized that those who had examined whether Portugal could be defended against France, had not also enquired into the practicability of defeuding Zealand, and whether the Danes were able and disposed to defend themselves.

Mr. Windham put the question if it was reasonable to call upon the country to approve of a proceeding in its nature involving the national character, without alledging one instance in proof of either the justice or policy of the measure? As to the question of right, he was willing to wait for the justification of ministers, and should, for the sake of the country, be most happy to find it satisfactory. But as to the policy, he could only say, that he would rather Buonaparte were now in possession of the Danish fleet by the means to which he must have resorted in the seizure of it, than that England should have got it in the way she did. The ships would be rotten when the effervescence of national feeling would live in the remembrance of national injury.To this observation,

The chancellor of the exchequer replied, that certainly the captured ships would be rotten some time or other, but not in the ensuing spring; not at a period

when

when they might be employed in conveying French troops to Ireland, not when they were to be employed in excluding us from the Baltic, and furthering the designs of the enemy. Colonel Montague Matthew expressed, in strong terms, his mistrust of a set of ministers who had come into office with an avowed hostility against four millions of his majesty's subjects in Ireland.

The question was then carried without a division, and the house adjourned.

House of Commons, Friday, Jan. 22,-Lord Hamilton brought up the report of the address to his majesty.

Mr. Macdonald said, that the armament of the Danes could not be considered as hostile, because the preparations in their harbours could not have been begun in, the interval between the treaty of Tilsit and the sailing of the expedition; and as to the dispositions of the Danes, their arming exhibited rather a jealousy of the designs of France than of those of Great Britain.

Mr. Fuller was only sorry that ministers had not seized every bird that hovered about the transactions at Tilsit. Whatever the other side of the house might say about the allegations of crown princes, or half crown princes, we ought to believe our own ministers.

Mr. Herbert was of opinion, that the present ministers had, by their expedition, disgraced the country, without either necessity or ability. Yet he would not oppose the address, though he would not promise his support of the measures to which it related.

Mr. Eden required an explanation

of one part of the speech. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 7th of July; intelligence, and a copy of it reached this country on the 8th of August only, and yet, on the 26th of July, the orders had been given to admiral Gambier to sail from the Downs.

Mr. Pym expressed his opinion that our advantages from peace would be equal to, if not greater, than that of our enemies. It was impossible for him, on the evidence before the house, to approve of the expedition to Denmark.

Mr. York said, that he would ask any man acquainted with public business, whether the nature of our government was not such that the government of the country could not proceed if it did not act upon grounds which could not, consistently with the interests of the country, be made public? He was old enough to remember the American war, and he could state from opportunities which he had had of personally knowing the fact, that in consequence of the production of the papers, relative to the sailing of the Toulon fleet, on the motion of a gentleman of very high talents, now no more, (Mr. Fox) the French had been enabled to cut off a source of intelligence which this country had possessed in Holland since the days of queen Anne. He would give credit to government for their having received intelligence of the secret articles of Tilsit. There was enough on the face of such papers to enable the enemy to trace the source from whence they might have been received. On the secret articles of Tilsit he would rest his foot, and give his approbation to the measure

in question. As to the collusion of Denmark, he must confess that as an Englishman, he thought and felt that the Danish government (for he would not speak with disrespect of the prince so nearly connected with our own family) had acted with collusion. It ought not to be forgotten that before force was employed, an alternative had been offered to the Danish government, and when that alternative was rejected he thought we were right in employing force to secure the fleet: a conduct that was justifiable on the first principles of human nature, self-preservation. Abstract principles of right he respected as much as any man; but in our respect for these we should not suffer ourselves to become the victims of abstract principles of wrong. With regard to the dates which had been adverted to, gentlemen seemed to draw their whole argument from the rapidity with which the expedition had been fitted out and dispatched; a rapidity which they had not lately been accustomed to witness. And if the crown prince, or rather (for ministers often governed princes and kings) the Bernstoffs had formed their estimates of the expedition, from the specimens they had lately seen, they would not have expected that Zealand would be so soon surrounded: they therefore thought it expedient to keep their army in Holstein, to keep up appearances. As to the question of peace, it was involved in difficulty and delicacy. He had supported the peace of Amiens, as au expériment; yet as the experiment had been made, he was not disposed to repeat it. Whilst Buonaparte continued at the head of the French nation, and should continue to goVOL. L.

vern by military measures, from the moment we should make peace with him our danger would begin. ' He trusted, however, that ministers would not reject any offers of negotiation on terms of equality, and the point of honour should be never given up.

Mr. Windham thought that ho nour in any peace that might now be concluded, was totally out of the question; safety was all we could now look for, and this was all be would ask. The honourable gentleman appeared to treat anciently received principles with as little ceremony as the famous French committee of safety had done. Mr.W. however, would still venture to profess an attachment to the old maxim of 'honesty being the best policy;' a maxim, which was just as true when applied to the conduct of nations as that of individuals. Nor did he think it sufficient merely to profess it; it was equally essential to act upon it. But an open and public renunciation of this principle was an alarming symptom indeed, and infinitely more fatal to the cause of public morals than many practical deviations from it. It was a state of most hopeless depravity when people began to adapt their theory to their practice. He advised ministers to stop short in this new career, for he assured them they would cut but a poor figure when compared with the enemy, who from long practice, was become a rival too formidable for us to encounter. It never had been disputed that government might have received information which it would be imprudent in them to publish. But there was another question, Whether or not they should have acted on such information? Mr. W. C suspected,