of choice liquors, consisting of Jamaica rum, French brandy, Holland gin, &c, hereby respectfully and earnestly recommends to all his former customers and others, to refrain from any farther purchase of intoxicating liquors, as he is fully convinced that the use of these liquors is most pernicious, and leads to numerous and complicated evils." I suppose our rum-advertising newspapers would insert such an advertisement for their usual price. And in this way, not only would our merchants and others, who do not wish to sell, be saved the pain of numerous applications, but they will also serve the cause of temperance, by a word of caution to a portion of the community who most need it, and who, perhaps, would never read any thing on the subject in any other form. Does the dealer hesitate to advertise in this way? Then it is because he wishes to sell. But he says, perhaps, this would place him in a ridiculous light before the public. It would indeed; but no more ridiculous than he makes himself when he says he does not wish to sell, and yet buys, advertises, &c, for that very purpose. But, perhaps, the vender will say, he does not wish to sell, but he is obliged to deal some in this article, in order to keep his trade good in other articles; for unless his customers can obtain their spirits of him, they will go elsewhere for other things. On this account, therefore, he keeps a little, but does not offer it until asked for, nor advertise it on his sign, or in the public prints. This is encouraging, for it shows that conscience is at work, and will probably carry the question in favor of correct principle before long. But to be plain with such a dealer, we must say, that however we respect the workings of moral principle, which has led him to this expedient, he has, it is believed, done very little yet to ease his conscience. His plea, reduced to plain and con-. cise English, is simply this: "I would not sell ardent spirits if I could make as much money by refraining!" How far moneymaking will justify him, in a business which he himself acknowledges to be of pernicious tendency, I leaye, for the present, to be settled by the decisions of his conscience, which seems to be disturbed already; and pass to notice some other expedients for evading the force of our argument. The dealer may tell us, perhaps, that a wish to sell does not imply a wish for the consumption of ardent spirits. That it is no concern of his what becomes of them after they pass out of his hands and he gets his pay. Now it is well known that the sale implies the use, and when we know that two or more things are inseparably connected, it is perfectly absurd to say, we will have the one, and yet we do not, on the whole, desire the other. Though we may not desire the other, in itself considered, yet on the whole we do desire it, whenever we determine at any rate to have its inseparable attendant-as then there can be no market, and of course no sale, without the consumption,-so a determination to sell, necessarily involves an approbation of the use. But the dealer may hope to avoid the responsibility of intemperance still, by saying, that, though he does desire the use of ardent spirits, he does not thereby favor drunkenness, for he does not wish to furnish any for the drunkard; and if he could have his will, the drunkard should not be furnished with it at all. But, in the first place, it is well known, if the traffic is generally sanctioned, the drunkard will have it. According to the principles of human society, it is impossible to carry into operation one law for the drunkard, and another for the temperate: and, farther, if a man will sell, and it is practicable to make a distinction in the purchasers, it should, by every consideration of public good, be the other way. He who would sell with the least injury to community, should sell only to the drunkard and drunken. To sell to these, is only to give the finishing stroke for the destruction of those already in ruins; but to sell to the temperate, is to take measures to lead the respectable and useful to profligacy and ruin. If it would shock the feelings of the dealer to present another cup to him who is now reeling, and by which, he who is clamorous and troublesome, and perhaps dangerous, is put to sleep, how much more ought it to shock his feelings, to present the cup to a respectable and intelligent citizen, by which he may become a drunkard. But we will hear all that the dealer can urge for himself. He tells us again, that though he may be considered favorable to the use of intoxicating liquors, yet the conclusion is not just, that "he is favorable to intemperance, and that he knowingly takes measures to produce it." For he does not wish any man to become intemperate, and it greatly afflicts him to know that any one ruins himself in this way. He does not sell for the purpose of producing drunkenness, and therefore he is not responsible. But, for what purpose does he sell? For the gain, undoubtedly. And does he not sell with the certain knowledge, that drunkenness will follow? He knows that the use of intoxicating liquors, which is implied in the sale, always was, and doubtless always will be, followed by intemperance. Here let us refer to a principle already laid down--that where two things are known to be inseparable, whoever takes measures to introduce the one, does, by that very course, favor the introduction of the other. He does not desire the other, in itself considered, but he actually prefers the introduction of both, rather than forego that which is the direct object of his desire. In the case before us, the dealer does not directly, and for its own sake, desire drunkenness, but he desires the gains of the traffic, and he will sooner aid in introducing intemperance and all its woes, than forego these gains. The question then comes to this:-Is a man free from responsibility, for a known wrong done by himself, on the ground that he did the act, not for the sake of the wrong, but in view of his own personal advantage? Or, in other words, to make the case still plainer, is it, or is it not, a moral offence to injure another for a reward, when the injurious act was not done on account of ill-will to the injured person, but solely for the sake of the reward! A child would be casuist enough to solve this question. Apply it to some cases in point. In the well-known murder of Mr. White, of Salem, Mass., the murderer had no malice against the murdered victim of his cupidity, he only wanted the thousand dollars that was offered him for the deed. Was he innocent? Judas had no wish to take the life of his Master, he doubtless hoped he would escape, though he should be betrayed into the hands of his enemies at any rate, the betrayer wanted the thirty pieces of silver. Was Judas justified? If not, how shall the plea of justification be available, on a similar ground, in the case before us? In one respect, indeed, the case of Judas appears less unfavorable than that of those engaged in the rum trade. Judas had very good ground to hope, that his Master, as he had done before, would convey himself away by miraculous power, and thus he himself would get the bribe, and no evil would ensue. But no such hope can encourage the heart of the dealer in intoxicating liquors. He knows, when he pockets the gains, that it is the price of blood. As the destructive poison leaves his store, he understands its destiny and the fatal result. He needs no second sight, no supernatural spirit of prophecy, to predict, that, through this traffic, a thousand masters will be betrayed, that the sacred obligations of religion will be violated in uncounted instances; that it will turn men to demons, and excite them to obscenity, and blasphemy, and murder; that it will lay trains for the circulation of the cholera and other diseases to spread over the land, and riot upon human life-that it will fill the air with groans, cover the earth with blood, and plunge thousands of souls into the pit of wo. All this he knows, and yet because he does not sell for the sake of these evils, but only does it for the sake of the gain, he hopes to free himself from responsibility. Alas! how easy does the heart that "loves the wages of unrighteousness," impose upon itself But, there is still another way by which the dealer endeavors to exculpate himself. He tells you that intemperance is not a necessary result of the sale and consequent use of intoxicating liquors. Many use them without injury, and others might if they would. The responsibility, therefore, it is maintained, belongs exclusively to each individual agent, who thus voluntarily becomes ensnared and ruined. In order to test a question of morals, in any specific case, it sometimes becomes necessary to see what general principle of morality is involved in that case, and then decide the question in view of this general principle-otherwise, our prejudices, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, may mislead our judgments. The general principle in the case before us, must be this:-No man is accountable for becoming the occasion of another's sin, because the sinner, as a free agent, might have refrained from the sinful act if he would. Now, will this principle bear? Let us try it. Here is a man who keeps a store of books and prints, of most pernicious moral tendency-got up, however, in a most fascinating style, and by their wit and elegance directly calculated to captivate and ensnare the minds of the young. Upon the principle laid down, this man is not responsible for the mischief he does, though scores of youths are drawn in and ruined. He may plead, they are free moral agents-it is not necessary they should be corrupted-if they would only do as they might, they might improve their taste and their style, and experience no injury. Would this satisfy the parent, whose child had been ruined by these pernicious books? But is the bookseller worse than the rum-seller? Are bad books more demoralizing and ruinous than intoxicating liquors? Let facts decide. Indeed the principle of morality involved in this plea of the dealer, is as wide from the morality of the Gospel, as the poles from each other. The Gospel not only requires that we should not put "a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall, in our brother's way," but demands, that, as far as in us lies, we should remove from his path the stumbling-blocks that another has placed before, him. "He that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." * But to settle this question for ever, with all believers of the Bible, our Saviour has told us expressly, that though it must needs be that offences come," yet wo to that man, by whom the offence cometh." Such is the weakness of moral principle in man, and such the strength of depravity, that we cannot expect but that men will stumble and fall. There is a kind of necessity in the case—that is, it is the natural result, and what might be expected, especially if occasion is given; therefore, "Wo unto that man by whom the offence cometh." Will the dealer stand up in the face of this denunciation, and claim that he is not guilty, because the transgressor in any individual case, was a free agent, and acted on his own responsibility? He is to blame, it is true, for stumbling-but the man who placed the stumbling-block in his way, is also verily guilty. In short, there is no case in which a man will be justified in doing what he is well assured will prove injurious to another, except where the general tendency of what is done, is known to be advantageous on the whole. Preaching the Gospel, for instance, becomes an occasion of aggravated guilt to those who reject it. But the Gospel, on the whole, is known to be advantageous, and therefore it should be preached, notwithstanding, in some instances, it becomes " a savor of death." So governments founded on the popular will, may often be the occasion of popular tumults and party strife, yet those governments should be sustained, because they are, on the whole advantageous. But here, and in all similar cases, the morality of favoring or opposing these institutions, is tested entirely irrespective of the agency and responsibility of those who make these an occasion of injury to themselves, and purely on the ground of the general tendency of these institutions, in their influence upon human nature as it is, and not as it ought to be. This is a test of moral action which must be conceded to, by every man of common understanding, and of an ingenuous mind-he cannot get rid of it. Let us apply it then, to the rum trade. Is this a business that works well in practice? Are its general tendencies good? We have just heard clearly demonstrated, the pernicious influence of this trade upon national wealth,* and it might be as clearly demonstrated that it leads to bankruptcy in national morals-that it is ruinous to political integrity, to bodily health, to social and domestic enjoyment-in short, we may say, that this trade, in its general bearings upon community, "is evil, and only evil, and that contiuually." In this point of view, it has not a single redeeming feature-in its whole aspect it is dark and threatening-in its entire operation, it is most calamitous. Having examined the premises and conclusion in the argument laid down, and having patiently heard all the arguments the dealer can urge in his own defence, we come, it is believed, fairly to the conclusion,-"That all who continue in the traffic of ardent spirits, stand in an intimate and criminal relation to all the evils of intemperance, and, on moral principles, must be held responsible for those evils." * * II. So long as men, laying any just claim to morality and respectability, maintain the right to sell ardent spirits, it will be considered respectable and moral to use them. But it has been seen already, that so long as the use continues, intemperance will continue. Therefore For these men to maintain the right of traffic, is to throw themselves most effectually, in direct opposition to the cause of temperance. If this argument is sustained, it will follow of course, that the dealers in this article, are the men chiefly responsible for the continuance of the evils of intemperance, not only because they furnish the occasions of these evils, as was seen in the former argument, but also, because they stand directly in the way of those benevolent efforts, that might otherwise remove them. There are evidently two parties in this business, the consumers and the agents. The agents are made up of the manufacturers, and those who, in the way of trade, facilitate the distribution. Now to those who profess to be moral, in both of these parties, we say, You all share in the guilt of drunkenness,-the agent, because, though he does not drink himself, yet he furnishes others with the means of intoxication-the moderate drinker, because, though he does not get intoxicated himself, he encourages others in a course which, in numerous instances, as he well knows, results in intemperance. So far both are responsible, and neither can shift his share of the guilt on to the other-and neither party can accomplish the desired reform alone, unaided by the co-operation of the other. On * Speech of Gerrit Smith, Esq. |