defendant herself. There seems to have been some understanding between Captain Virtue and Bishop that a brother of the former should have the option of taking ten of the shares at a future period. But, in the meantime, the agreed price for the thirty-two shares was paid to Robertson, partly in cash and partly by a bill of exchange for 1000l. drawn by Virtue and accepted by Bishop; and in September, 1840, a bill of sale of the defendant's shares was executed to Bishop in pursuance of the original contract. The ratification of the contract by the defendant is evidenced by her having received the money under it. From the month of June, therefore, the defendant had parted with her beneficial ownership of these ten shares. The case seems to me to fall precisely within the principle laid down by Abbott, C. J., in Jennings v. Griffiths, R. & M. 42, where, speaking of the ships' registry acts, he says: "Soon after the passing of those acts, the leaning of the Courts of law in the construction of them, was, to say that the registered owners of ships should at all events be liable for the repairs. But, the subject having become more accurately understood, a better and more correct principle now prevails; and the recent cases have decided that the true question in matters of this description is, upon whose credit was the work done? That question would in most cases be decided by the fact of legal ownership, the repairs being generally done for the legal owner. But it may so happen that the name of a person may be retained on the registry after he has ceased to be beneficially interested in the ship, or to interfere with its concerns." I think there ought to be no rule. COLTMAN, J.—I am of the same opinion. Briggs v. Wilkinson, 7 B. & C. 35, 9 D. & R. 871, seems to me to be very nearly in point. There, the managing owner of a ship mortgaged his shares, and the transfer was duly indorsed on the certificate of registry: he continued to manage as 1844. CURLING v. ROBERTSON. 1844. CURLING V. ROBERTSON, before, and the mortgagee never took possession of or interfered with the ship: and it was held that the mortgagee was not liable for goods supplied to the ship by order of the mortgagor. And Bayley, J., said that "the mere legal ownership does not make any person liable for the ship's debts." In the present case, Bishop, as managing owner, would primâ facie have a right to pledge the credit of all who were beneficially interested jointly with him. But, when the defendant parted with her beneficial interest, he ceased to have any implied authority to bind her. The circumstance of the defendant's name remaining on the register until after these repairs were done makes no difference in this respect, inasmuch as Bishop was aware that she had ceased to be beneficially interested in the ship. ERSKINE, J.-I am also of opinion that there should be no rule in this case. In order to make out a title to recover in this action, the plaintiffs were bound to shew that the repairs in question were done upon the credit of the defendant, and that the order for them was given with her authority, express or implied. It appears that Bishop was the managing owner of the Fergusson. If there had been no other evidence in the cause, it might have been assumed that he had authority to bind his co-owners by contracts that were necessary for the whole concern. But it further appeared, that, before the repairs in question were commenced, the defendant, with the knowledge of Bishop, had entered into a contract, through the agency of her brother, under which she ceased to have any beneficial interest in the ship. How can it under these circumstances be said that Bishop had any implied authority to bind the defendant by his contract? One may conceive a state of things that would estop a party from setting up a private arrangement of this sort; as, where he had actively interfered in the matter, and was known to the plaintiffs as a part-owner. But here it did not appear that the plaintiffs had any knowledge whatever of the defendant: they simply gave credit to Bishop. CRESSWELL, J.—I am of the same opinion. It does not appear to me that Bishop had any authority express or implied to bind the defendant: nor does it appear that the defendant ever allowed herself to be held out to the plaintiffs as a part-owner: and, though her name appeared on the ship's register at the time the repairs were done, there is no suggestion that the plaintiffs were aware of that fact. Rule refused. 1844. CURLING v. ROBERTSON. THIS GOSLIN v. CORRY. was an action for a libel published in the Police Gazette at the request of the defendant. The libel was as follows:-" Absconded from Fleetwood, Lancashire. James Goslin, charged with fraud. He is about five feet ten inches high, of bony make: has a singular countenance; very long white face, thickly marked with the small pox: has a cast in his eyes, and has rough grey hair: was formerly a bricklayer in the employ of Mr. Jackson, builder, of Pimlico, and is supposed to be in the neighbourhood of his works. Information to be given at the Police Office, or to Mr. Noble, attorney, Preston, by whom a reward of 21. and all reasonable expenses will be paid on his apprehension. Bow Street, March 29th, 1843." The declaration, after setting out the libel with proper innuendos, alleged by way of damage, that, by means of the said several grievances by the defendant as aforesaid, the plaintiff had been and was greatly injured in his good name, fame, and credit, and brought into public scandal, infamy, take the subsequent arrest into their consideration in estimating the damages for the libel. 1844. GOSLIN D. CORRY. and disgrace with and amongst all his neighbours and other good and worthy subjects of this realm, insomuch that divers of those neighbours and subjects to whom the innocence and integrity of the plaintiff in the premises were unknown, had on account of the committing of the said grievances by the said defendant as aforesaid from thence hitherto suspected and believed, and still did suspect and believe the plaintiff to have been and to be a person guilty of fraud, and had by reason of the committing of the said grievances by the said defendant as aforesaid from thence hitherto wholly refused and still did refuse to have any transaction, acquaintance, or discourse with the plaintiff, as they were before used and accustomed to have, and Special damage. otherwise would have had; and also, by reason thereof, a certain police constable, to wit, one William Flaxman, having notice of the publication of the said libel, and believing the same to be true, after the time of the committing of the said grievances, to wit, on the 18th of April, in the year aforesaid, and in order to obtain the reward offered by the said libel, apprehended the plaintiff and imprisoned him for a long time, to wit, three hours then next following, in order that the plaintiff might be dealt with according to law upon the charge against the plaintiff contained in the said libel, and thereby the plaintiff was exposed to public scandal, shame, and disgrace; and the plaintiff had been and was by means of the premises otherwise greatly injured and damnified, &c. The defendant pleaded not guilty only. The cause was tried before Tindal, C. J., at the Sittings at Westminster after the last term. It was proved that the libel was transmitted to Mr. Burnaby, the editor of the Police Gazette, inclosed in a letter signed by the defendant, requesting him to insert it in the next Gazette. The letter bore date at Preston, the 28th of March, 1843, and was received by Mr. Burnaby on the 29th. The action was commenced on the 19th of April, 1843. The libel appeared twice in the Hue and Cry, viz. on the 31st of March, and the 5th of April. In consequence of these notices the plaintiff was apprehended by a police serjeant named Flaxman on the 25th of April, 1843, and carried to a police-station and there locked up, and afterwards taken to the Mary-le-bone Police Office. The transaction was thus detailed in the charge-sheet:-" Hour brought to station, 10 A.M. Age, 33. James Goslin, on suspicion of being the party described in Police Hue and Cry of 31 March, 1843, for committing a fraud. Taken before Mr. Rawlinson, who, after hearing police serjeant, sent Goslin in custody to Mr. Burnaby at Bow Street, to know if any charge against Goslin. Mr. Burnaby said not, and he was then discharged a little after twelve at Noon." The plaintiff was arrested a second time in consequence of the publication of the libel, on the 13th of May, at Hook, in Surrey, and was compelled to give bail in order to obtain his release. The evidence as to these two arrests was given with the consent of the defendant's counsel, notwithstanding they took place subsequently to the commencement of the action. 1844. GOSLIN v. CORRY. In submitting the case to the jury, his lordship told Summing up. them that the two arrests, being both subsequent to the commencement of the action, were in strictness not evidence in the cause, but that the natural tendency of the advertisement was to procure the arrest of the plaintiff upon the charge of fraud therein contained, and that the evidence was received with the consent of the defendant's counsel and he directed them to take all the circumstances into their consideration, and, if they thought the defendant was the author of the publication, to give the plaintiff such just, temperate, and reasonable damages as the facts in their judgment entitled him to. : The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 501. |