BLOODWORTH V. GRAY. 1844. Friday, April 19th. To say of a man that he has the venereal disease, is actionproof of special damage, though it is able without otherwise if the THIS was was an action of slander. The first count of the declaration stated that the defendant, contriving and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure and aggrieve the plaintiff, and to cause it to be suspected and believed that the plaintiff, at the time of the committing of the grievances next thereinafter mentioned, was infected with the French words are pox, otherwise called the venereal disease, before the com- spoken in the past tense. mencement of the suit, to wit, on &c., in a certain discourse which the defendant then had with divers subjects of this realm, of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning the said French pox, otherwise called the venereal disease, in the presence and hearing of the said subjects, falsely, wickedly, and maliciously spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning the said French pox, otherwise called the venereal disease, the false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words following of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning the said French pox, otherwise called the venereal disease, that is to say, to say, "He (meaning the plaintiff) has got that damned pox (meaning the said French pox, otherwise called the venereal disease) from going to that woman on the Derby road." In the second count the words charged to have been spoken were "Ah! That damned fellow Bloodworth! I am creditably informed that he has got the pox:" and in the third count-"He has got it," meaning &c. By means of the speaking and publishing of which false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words respectively by the defendant as aforesaid, the plaintiff had been and was greatly damaged in his good name, fame, and credit, and brought into public scandal, infamy, and disgrace with and amongst all his neighbours and other subjects of this realm, who had by reason of the committing of the said grievances by the defendant as aforesaid thence 1844. BLOODWORTH v. GRAY. hitherto refused to have transactions, acquaintance, or discourse with the plaintiff as they were before used and accustomed to have, and otherwise would have had and also by reason of the speaking and publishing of the words aforesaid the plaintiff had been specially endamaged in this, to wit, that one George Palmer, who until and at the time of the speaking and publishing of the said false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words by the defendant as aforesaid, had been and was surety for the plaintiff, and as such surety had become and was responsible for the rent of a certain farm then held by the plaintiff at and under the yearly rent, to wit, of 250l., did, after the speaking and publishing of the said words, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 25th of January, 1844, on account and in consequence thereof decline and refuse to be any longer surety for the plaintiff as aforesaid, and did wholly withdraw from his said suretyship, and did then wholly cease to be such surety as aforesaid: and also by reason of the premises the plaintiff had been greatly distressed in his mind: and by means of the premises the wife of the plaintiff died before the commencement of the suit, whereby the plaintiff had lost and been deprived of her comfort, assistance, and services: and, by reason of the premises, the plaintiff, before the commencement of the suit, fell sick and underwent great pain of body, &c. Plea-not guilty. The cause was tried before Gurney, B., at the last Assizes at Leicester. It appeared that the plaintiff was a farmer and miller residing in the neighbourhood of Loughborough, and the defendant a major general on half-pay, whose only daughter the plaintiff had married without the consent of her parents. The words charged in the declaration to have been spoken by the defendant were substantially proved; but the proof of special damage altogether failed, whereupon it was submitted, on the part of the defendant, that the action was not maintainable. The learned Baron, however, after conferring with Tindal, C. J., ruled the contrary. The jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 507 Channell, Serjeant, now moved to enter a nonsuit.-The words charged are not actionable per se. In Comyns's Digest, Action upon the Case for Defamation (D. 29), several cases are referred to, in which similar words were held to be actionable: but, in Carslake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473, these words spoken of a woman, "I have kept her common these seven years; she hath given me the bad disorder, and three or four other gentleman," were held not to be actionable. TINDAL, C. J.-The distinction taken in that, as in all the older cases, is this-that words imputing to another that he is at the present time afflicted with a disgusting and contagious disease are actionable in themselves, inasmuch as they import a present unfitness to be admitted into society; but the same reason for avoiding the company of one who has had a contagious disorder does not exist. Here, the words directly charge that the plaintiff was at the time of speaking the words in the condition described; and therefore they are clearly actionable without proof of special damage. The rest of the Court concurring Rule refused. 1844. BLOODWORTH v. GRAY. 1844. Friday, April 19th. In order to charge a party by reason of his name appearing on a ship's register as a partowner, for repairs done to the ship, it CURLING and Others v. ROBERTSON. THIS was an action of debt. The declaration stated that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiffs in 20007. for work then done and materials for the same provided by the plaintiffs for the defendant at her request; and for money then paid by the plaintiffs for the use of the defendant at her request; and for the use and occupation of a certain dock and premises, with the appurtenances of the plaintiff, held, used, and enjoyed by the defendant at her request, and with the sufferance and permission of the given with his plaintiffs, whilst a certain ship or vessel of the defendant was undergoing repair therein: And in 20007. for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiffs on an account stated, &c. Plea-nunquam indebitatus. must distinctly appear that they were done upon his credit, and that the order for them was authority express or implied. The defend ant, part-owner of a ship, by an agreement 1840, contract ed for the sale of her interest therein to one The cause was tried before Tindal, C. J., at the Admade in June, journed Sittings at Guildhall after the last term. The facts that appeared in evidence and by admissions were as follow: The plaintiffs are ship-builders at Limehouse: Virtue, and re- the defendant a lady resident at Tweedmouth. The action ceived the price by bill at six was brought to recover a sum of 13981. 14s. for repairs months, dated the 13th of done to the ship Fergusson between the 11th of July and the 5th of August, 1840. July, drawn by Virtue on one Bishop, who was also a part owner, and who acted as ship's husband. By arrangement between Virtue and Bishop, the bill of sale, ich was dated the 18th of August, was made to Bis hop, by whom the acceptance was afterwards paid. The On the 21st of November, 1837, the registered owners of the Fergusson were, George Bishop and William Robertson, each for thirty-two sixty-fourths. By indorsements on the register it appeared that, on the 30th of March, 1839, William Robertson, by bill of sale dated the 19th of March, 1839, transferred ten sixty-fourth shares to the defendant; that, on the 9th of September, 1840, William Robertson, by bill of sale dated the 13th of July, 1840, transferred twenty-two sixty-fourth shares to John Virtue; jury having found that the bill of sale was bonâ fide executed in pursuance of the prior contract: -Held, that the defendant was not responsible for repairs done to the ship upon the order of Bishop between the 11th of June and the 5th of August. and that, on the 9th of September, 1840, the defendant, by bill of sale dated the 18th of August, 1840, transferred ten sixty-fourth shares to George Bishop. 1844. CURLING บ. ROBERTSON. Order for re The order for the repairs was given by George Bishop, who acted as the managing owner or ship's husband. The pairs. defendant was not known to the plaintiffs as a part-owner at the time, nor had she ever interfered. The defence was, that, although the bill of sale by which Defence. the defendant conveyed her ten shares to Bishop was dated the 9th of September, 1840, yet that that bill of sale was executed in furtherance of a prior contract entered into by William Robertson as the agent of the defendant, before the commencement of the repairs, under the circumstances. disclosed in the examination of William Robertson upon interrogatories under a writ directed to the Supreme Court of Judicature at Ceylon. The material answers to the interrogatories were as follow: dence. To the third-" I, the defendant, and George Bishop, William Rowere joint owners of the Fergusson previous to the month bertson's eviof June, 1840. The defendant held ten sixty-fourth shares thereof; Bishop thirty-two sixty-fourths; and I held twentytwo sixty-fourths." To the fourth-" I acted as agent for and on behalf of the defendant in certain matters connected with the defendant's interest in the vessel, viz. I acted as her agent for the sale of her interest, which was ten sixty-fourth shares of the said vessel, to John Virtue. I also, on the defendant's behalf, received the price of the said ten sixty-fourths from the said John Virtue. I also made the agreement with Virtue for the sale of the said ten sixty-fourths on behalf of the defendant. I also by the same agreement, but by a separate bill of sale, sold to Virtue my own twenty-two sixty-fourths of the same ship, thus selling to Virtue half of the whole ship; and, save as above, I did not act in any manner as agent of the defendant in matters relating to the ship. Bishop made out the bill of sale |