ppp]), that "This section shall not be construed to affect the rules of law now existing in regard to (2) laches in the enforcement * of liens upon vessels," does not apply to pre ferred mortgages, not then known. 2. Admiralty - Court of admiralty is governed by equitable principles. A court of admiralty, while not a court of equity, is governed by equitable principles. 3. Maritime liens 40-Right to prove entire claim, or only proportionate part, against barge, held to depend on whether prior liens on other barges would have prevented recovery in prior suits. Where holder of preferred mortgage on six barges permitted five to be sold in admiralty proceedings without presenting his claim, whether or not he is entitled to prove his entire claim, or only a proportionate part, against the proceeds of the sixth, depends on whether the existence of prior liens would have prevented recovery of any part in the prior suits. CAMPBELL, District Judge. This is a suit in admiralty under the Ship Mortgage Act (chapter 25, title 46, U. S. C. [46 USCA §§ 911-984 (Comp. St. §§ 81464jjj81464)]) for the foreclosure of an alleged preferred mortgage on the barge Red Lion. The barge Red Lion was sold by the United States marshal of this district in the suit of Russell Dry Docks, Inc., against the boat Red Lion for the sum of $8,700 on March 17, 1927, and this sum, less the marshal's and clerk's fees and expenses, is now in the registry of this court. The bond and mortgage for $25,000, which was received in evidence, was given by McWilliams Bros., Inc., on the express understanding that it was to secure the $15,000 cash received by it at the time and the bill due the libelant, in all not to exceed $25,000. The bill of the libelant was fixed at $8,685.27, and therefore the amount secured by the mortgage was $23,685.27. The bond and mortgage was made to Bolton D. Meliss, a clerk in the office of the libelant, for conven ience, because the libelant was to be temporarily absent from the country. assigned by said Bolton D. Meliss to the libelThe bond and mortgage was thereafter ant, who is now the lawful owner and holder thereof for value. The sum of $4,000 has been paid on account of the principal of said bond and mortgage, together with interest on $11,000 to December 15, 1926, and there remains due and owing to the libelant on said bond and mortgage the sum of $19,685.27 principal, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum on $11,000 from December 15, 1926, and on $8,685.27 from January 21, 1924. The fact that a part of the consideration was an antecedent debt due libelant is not a defense, nor would it be in a court of equity, because the libelant was not shown to have been insolvent at the time of the delivery of the bond and mortgage, and the debt which was paid by said bond and mortgage was a valuable consideration. The validity of the mortgage was not affected by the failure to provide therein for the separate discharge of each ship on the payment of a fixed sum, as that was not required by the act. The defense of laches was not sustained by showing the failure of the libelant to foreclose the said mortgage when it became due. [1] Section 974, chapter 25, title 46, U. S. C. (46 USCA § 974 [Comp. St. § 81461⁄4ppp]), provides for the waiving of the right to a lien by a mortgagee, or, in the case of a preferred mortgagee, of his preferred status, by agreement or otherwise; but the portion of such section reading, "and this chapter shall not be construed to affect the rules of law existing on June 5, 1920, in regard to (2) laches in the enforcement of liens upon vessels, ⚫ does not apply in the instant suit, but was intended to apply generally to maritime liens of the character theretofore known, and not to preferred mortgages, as there were no such rules of law with reference to preferred mortgages at that time. The defense of champerty was not sustained, because it clearly appeared that the libelant did not secure the bond and mortgage for the purpose of bringing an action, but because the money was due to him, and he was not prevented from attempting a recovery thereof simply because he was a lawyer. The provisions of section 922, chapter 25, title 46, U. S. C. (46 USCA § 922 [Comp. St. § 81461⁄4kkk]), were complied with, in that the mortgage was in the form required, contained all of the recitals required, was prop 22 F.(2d) 331 erly recorded as provided in section 921 (46 amount against the other vessels, and made USCA § 921 [Comp. St. § 81461⁄4kk]), in- no effort to recover against them, or either dorsed on the vessel's documents, and a cer- of them, he must to that extent be considered tified copy placed on board each vessel to have waived his preference and relieved named in the mortgage. the Red Lion accordingly, leaving her proceeds liable only for the proportionate share of the whole amount due, which the net amount of her proceeds would be as to whole value of so much of the proceeds of all of the five vessels against which the mortgage was a preferred lien. The mortgage in question covered five barges in all, to wit, Red Lion, Red Hawk, Red Devil, Red Ribbon, and Red Indian. All of these vessels have been sold by the United States marshal in admiralty suits, but none of the proceeds of the sale of the other four barges have been paid to the libelant, nor has he brought any proceedings against the proceeds of the sale of the said barges, or either of them, and he now seeks to recover the whole of the principal sum and interest remaining unpaid from the proceeds of the sale of the Red Lion, regardless of the fact that there are claimants to a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the Red Lion, who had no claim to any of the proceeds of the sale of the other vessels. [2,3] A court of admiralty, while not a court of equity, is governed by equitable principles, and if the libelant had a good and valid lien, which it could have enforced as against the other vessels in admiralty, and has failed so to do, then as to the approximate value of his lien as to each of those ships he waived his preferred status, and should recover as against the proceeds of the Red Lion only the proportionate part of the mortgage which represented the value of his lien on the Red Lion. Subdivision (f), section 922, does not apply, because the time to make that apportionment was before the sale of the Red Lion by the marshal. In any event, the costs taxed in the suit in which the Red Lion was sold are to be paid before any distribution be made to libelant. I thereforé find that there is due to the libelant on said bond and mortgage the sum of $19,685.27, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum on $11,000 from December 15, 1926, and on $8,685.27 from January 21, 1924, and that the said mortgage is a preferred mortgage on the proceeds of the Red Lion, but to what extent, whether the whole or a proportionate part thereof, under the rules herein before laid down, will be referred to a special commissioner to hear and report. An interlocutory decree, with order of reference, may be entered in accordance herewith, the question of costs to be reserved for determination by the final decree. If, however, because of the provision of section 981 (46 USCA § 981 [Comp. St. § 8146499]), the libelant did not have a preferred lien against the other vessels, because BASSICK MFG. CO. v. READY AUTO SUPthey were covered by an existing mortgage at 1. Patents PLY CO., Inc. 1927. No. 2905. 202(1)—That assignments of patents were subject to certain conditions subsequent in prior agreements held not to qualify assignee's title. the time of the delivery of the mortgage in District Court, E. D. New York. October 28, question, which has not been discharged, and could not recover any of those proceeds, then he is entitled to a full recovery as to the proceeds of sale of the Red Lion. This libelant has alleged in the sixth article of his libel in the instant suit, but the Russell Dry Docks, Inc., denied any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to that article, and there was no evidence offered by the libelant in the trial to prove that allegation. The mere allegation of the amended answer as to the prices for which the other barges were sold and the amounts claimed against them was not of itself sufficient evidence on which to determine whether the whole or proportionate part of the principal and interest of the mortgage sought to be foreclosed herein should be found to be a preferred lien on the proceeds of sale of the Red Lion. If the libelant had a valid preferred lien in any That assignments of patents were made subject to certain prior agreements between assignor and third persons held not to qualify character of assignee's title, where right to obtain reassignment of the legal title given thereby under certain conditions was a condition subsequent, and plaintiff's title could therefore not be assailed, except by showing that reassign ment had been made. 2. Corporations 316(5)-Corporation's assignment of patent to its officers could not be collaterally attacked by defendant in patent infringement suit. Assignment of patent by corporation through its officers to themselves and others could not be collaterally attacked by defendant in patent in 5. Names 18-There is rebuttable presumption that patent assignment to assignee of same name as plaintiff suing for infringement is to plaintiff. In patent infringement suit, defendant's contention that there was no evidence that assignee named in the assignment of the patent was the same corporation as plaintiff was not sustained, since identity of names presumes identity of person; presumption being rebuttable. 6. Courts 96(1)—Though district court is not bound to follow decisions in other circuits, such decisions are persuasive. Though federal District Court is not compelled by comity to follow decisions of courts in other circuits, those decisions are persuasive. 7. Patents 328-1,307,733, claims 3, 4, and 5, for high-pressure lubricating system, held valid and infringed. Gullborg patent, No. 1,307,733, claims 3, 4, and 5, for high-pressure lubricating system, held valid, as showing invention, and infringed. 8. Patents 328-1,307,734, claims 14 and 15, for high-pressure lubricating system, held valid and infringed. Gullborg patent, No. 1,307,734, claims 14 and 15, for high-pressure lubricating system, held valid, as showing invention, and infringed. 9. Patents 328-1,475,980, for high-pressure lubricating system, held valid and infringed. Zerk patent, No. 1,475,980, for high-pressure lubricating system, held valid, as showing invention, and infringed. 10. Patents 177-That certain claims of combination patent covered one feature of invention, while others covered another, did not invalidate patent, as being for two independent inventions (35 USCA § 31). That certain claims of patent for high-pressure lubricating system covered combination of pump, flexible discharge conduit, couplings, and grease cup, or pin fitting, while other claims specifically covered grease cup or pin fitting embodied as an element in the other claims as a part of the combination thereof, did not make patent invalid, under Rev. St. § 4886 (35 USCA § 31 [Comp. St. § 9430]), as being for two independent inventions. II. Patents 165(5)-Each claim embodies complete invention, and is in effect an independent patent. Each claim of a patent embodies a complete invention, and in effect is an independent patent for the device it covers. 12. Patents 25-That elements, when in combination, function simultaneously to produce desired result, makes patentable combination, rather than mere aggregation. That elements may usefully function separately, when not in combination, does not show mere aggregation, rather than patentable combination, where all the elements, when in combination, function simultaneously to produce the desired result. 13. Patents 109-Supplemental oath held not required, where claims allowed in one application were by amendment transferred to another application. Where claims which had been found allowable in application for one patent were transferred by amendment from one application to another in compliance with rules and requirements of Patent Office and of the law relating to double patenting, defense that supplemental oath was required on such transfer was not sustained. 14. Patents 312(3)-Testimony of one witness was sufficient to show patent infringement, where plaintiff waived answer under oath. Rule requiring two corroborating witnesses, or one witness and circumstances equal to the testimony of one witness, was abrogated by Supreme Court by equity rules promulgated in 1912, and effective February 1, 1913 (198 F. xix); hence where plaintiff in patent infringeoath, the testimony of one witness was suffiment suit specifically waived an answer under cient to show infringement. 15. Patents 312(3)-Rule requiring corroborating witnesses does not apply in patent infringement suit, where bill waived oath, unless case was heard on bill and answer only. Even if there is a rule in equity requiring two corroborating witnesses, or one witness and circumstances equal to testimony of one witness, it does not apply in a patent infringement case, where plaintiff in its bill waived oath, unless case was heard on bill and answer only. 16. Patents 178-Patent for an advance in the art is entitled to range of equivalents protecting invention. Even if patent is not a pioneer, but only for an advance in the art, it is entitled to such a range of equivalents as will protect the invention of the patent. 17. Patents 240-That defendant is manufacturing under an improvement patent would not relieve it from infringement of plaintiff's patent. That defendant is manufacturing device accomplishing same results by same principles as 22 F.(2d) 331 plaintiff's patent under an improvement patent would not relieve it from infringement of plaintiff's patent. 18. Patents 243(1), 259(1)-Sale of parts suitable and intended for use in patented combination held direct and contributory infringement. Sale of parts suitable and intended for eventual use as part of a patented lubricating system to complete patented combination held to constitute both direct and contributory infringement, without showing that vendee actually carried out vendor's intention, and though sales were made to one purchasing for purpose of procuring evidence of infringement. 19. Patents 255-Durable parts of patented device may be mended or repaired, but not replaced, and perishable elements may be replaced. Durable parts and elements of a patented combination may be mended or repaired, but not replaced, and quickly perishable or consumed elements may be replaced. In Equity. Patent infringement suit by the Bassick Manufacturing Company against the Ready Auto Supply Company, Inc. Decree for plaintiff. Lynn A. Williams, of Chicago, Ill., and Stephen H. Philbin, of New York City, for plaintiff. Charles McC. Chapman, of New York City, for defendant. CAMPBELL, District Judge. This is an action in equity, in which plaintiff seeks relief by injunction and damages for the alleged infringement by the defendant of three patents issued by the United States Patent Office, viz.: No. 1,307,733, granted June 24, 1919, to Arthur V. Gullborg, for lubricating apparatus, on application filed February 11, 1918; No. 1,307,734, granted June 24, 1919, to Arthur V. Gullborg, for lubricating means, on application filed December 21, 1918; and No. 1,475,980, to Oscar Zerk, assignor to the Allyne-Zerk Company, of Cleveland, Ohio, for lubricating apparatus, on application filed November 21, 1922. The defendant not only interposed the defenses of invalidity and noninfringement, but also tendered an issue as to the title of the plaintiff to each of the patents on which this suit is based, and moved to dismiss the bill for the alleged failure of plaintiff's title. The plaintiff claims title to each of said patents as assignee, and I will first consider the issue of title, because a determination of that issue, if in favor of the defendant, would terminate the suit. The originals of the assignments, to copies of which defendant raised objections in its motion to dismiss, were produced by the plaintiff, and an inspection thereof by the de- [1] The fact that some of the assignments Gullborg, C. M. Hedman, H. R. Hedman et [3] The objection of the defendant to the assignment made by the Alleyne-Zerk Company to the Bassick Manufacturing Company, that patent No. 1,475,980 states that the inventor was Oscar Zerk, while the assignment states that the name of the inventor was Oscar U. Zerk, is not sustained, because the patent is correctly described by number, date of issue, and title in the assignment, and the addition of a middle initial in the inventor's name is mere surplusage. That Oscar Zerk and Oscar U. Zerk are one and the same person seems to be beyond question, because, when called as a witness in the instant suit, he gave his name as Oscar U. Zerk, and swore that he was the inventor named in the patent in question.. [4] The contention of the defendant that any of the corporate assignments were invalid because of lack of the corporate seal was not sustained. Assignments of patents are not required to be under seal; therefore they are not invalid or void for want of a corporate seal. Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U. S. 521, 527, 26 L. Ed. 851; Westinghouse Co. v. Formica Co., 266 U. S. 342, 348, 45 S. Ct. 117, 69 L. Ed. 316. son. [5] The contention of the defendant that there was no evidence to show that the assignee named in the assignment to "the Bassick Manufacturing Company" was the same corporation as the plaintiff was not sustained. Identity of names presumes identity of perStebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 32, 47, 2 S. Ct. 313, 27 L. Ed. 641; Fowler v. Stebbins (C. C. A.) 136 F. 365, 367; Campbell & Zell Co. v. American Surety Co. (C. C.) 129 F. 491, affirmed (C. C. A.) 138 F. 531, certiorari denied 199 U. S. 607, 26 S. Ct. 747, 50 L. Ed. 331. The presumption is rebuttable, but no evidence was offered to rebut it, and plaintiff was entitled to rely on the presumption. There is no necessity for any extended consideration of the assignment, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5f, because that assignment antedated the granting of the patent which was issued to the grantee, and thereby the assignee was vested with the legal title. The motion to dismiss the bill of complaint on the alleged ground of defects in the assignments, alteration in the title deeds, and because the chain of title to the plaintiff herein is clearly defective, is denied. The patents in suit cover the Alemite and Alemite-Zerk lubricating equipment of the Bassick Manufacturing Company. The equipment in question is what is called highpressure lubricating equipment and is of two different kinds. The Alemite equipment in question in the instant suit consists of the pin fittings in and of themselves covered by claims 3, 4, and 5 of Gullborg patent, No. 1,307,733, and the combination of compressor, coupler, and pin fitting, covered by claims 14 and 15 of Gullborg patent, No. 1,307,734; the pin fitting being screwed into an opening leading to each of the bearings to be lubricated, the conduit attached to the compressor connected to the pin fitting by the coupler adapted for that purpose, and by operating the compressor the grease is forced through the conduit and coupler into the pin fitting, and thence to the bearing to be greased. The Alemite-Zerk equipment in question in the instant suit consists of the Zerk type of fittings or nipples and a grease gun or compressor, terminating in a nozzle adapted to be connected with any one of the nipples by simply pressing the nozzle against the exposed end of the nipple; the metal to metal contact surfaces being so formed that a grease-tight connection is established and insured by a slight pressure of the nozzle against the end of the nipple. With the exception of claims 3, 4, and 5 of patent No. 1,307,733, which cover the pin fitting in and of itself, the combinations covered by the claims of the patents in suit, on which the suit is based, are never completely assembled, except by the ultimate user of the lubricating equipment. The plaintiff does not make up and assemble any complete combination of compressor, coupler, and pin fitting, but separately catalogues prices, and sells the pin fittings, couplers, and compressors to make up the combinations claimed in the patents in suit. This character of combination was sustained in the phonograph cases. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U. S. 301, 29 S. Ct. 495, 53 L. Ed. 805; Id., 213 U. S. 325, 29 S. Ct. 503, 53 L. Ed. 816. The patents in suit have uniformly been held valid in many actions in District Courts in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and in the Circuit Court of Appeals in both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, as well as on a motion for preliminary injunction in at least one in this circuit. The prior art offered in the instant suit does not seem to differ from that which has been considered in other actions on these patents. [6] Recognizing the right of this court to reach conclusions at variance with those of all the other federal courts who have considered and decided the questions raised by the defendant herein, I have given those questions careful consideration; but, while this court is not compelled by comity to follow the decisions of other courts, those decisions are persuasive. While I have considered it with care, I find no necessity for going at length into an analysis of all of the prior art, because on the issue of validity the only question presented is whether the introduction of the claimed novel element in the combination evidenced inventive genius, or mere mechanical skill, and I will therefore confine myself, on this point, to such of the prior art patents as were most strongly urged by the defendant, and will consider at length the defenses urged by the defendant. I see nothing disclosed in the Wilson patent, No. 988,422, circulars, or devices, that teaches high-pressure lubrication, nor did the |