but it was the means of their acquaintance with Joseph, The forgetfulness of the chief butler was in itself an evil; but it was the means of Joseph's enlargement at the most favorable time, and under the most favorable circumstances. And these things together were the means of Joseph's advancement, and the preservation of the chosen seed during the seven years of famine. Hence Joseph says to his brethren, "As for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good."

The hardness of heart and wicked obstinacy of Pharaoh were in themselves evils; but they were the means of making known the power and the justice of God in his destruction. Hence God says to him, "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth.”

The pride of Vashti and the wickedness of Haman were in themselves evils; but they were the means of the advancement of Esther and Mordecai, which was the means of great good to the church of God at that time. The opposition of the enemies of the Jews, in the days of Ezra, to the rebuilding of the temple, and their application to Darius to stop the work, were in themselves evils; but they were the means of procuring from him a decree that the work should go on, and that those very men should give their assistance in promoting it.

The manner in which our Lord was treated, his being despised and rejected of men, his being abused in every form which malice could invent, was in itself an evil; but it was the means of exhibiting his true character to the study and imitation of his followers. His patience, his meekness, his forbearance, and resignation, could not have been seen, if he had not had these opportunities of exhibiting them. The death of Christ was in itself an evil; but it was the means of accomplishing great good. Without it no atonement had been made, and all mankind must have been lost forever. The good of which this great evil was the means, is so much greater than the evil, that it has always been considered matter of thanksgiving and praise that the Father sent the Son, and that the Son freely gave up himself to be a propitiation for the sins of the world. The persecutions and sufferings of

the early Christians were in themselves great evils; but they always resulted in the enlargement of the church. And so uniformly has this result followed the persecution of Christ's disciples, that it is an established maxim, that, “the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church."

Many examples of this kind might be cited. They show that good has been brought out of evil, and so much good as greatly to overbalance the evil, and render it on the whole for the best that those events have taken place. And this is sufficient to render it highly probable that it is so in all cases.

But this is not all. The perfections of God render it certain that every event which takes place is for the best. God is infinite in knowledge, infinite in goodness, and infinite in power. No one will deny that he has these perfections. He could not be God, if he were deficient in any of them. But, if he is infinite in knowledge, he knows what is for the best; 'if he is infinite in goodness, he chooses that what is for the best should take place; and if he is infinite in power, nothing can prevent his bringing to pass whatever he chooses should come to pass. It is certain, then, that whatever takes place is for the best.

To state the argument more at large. God is infinite in knowledge. He looks through all space and all duration with a single glance. He perceives all the consequences of things, and all the bearings of each event, before it takes place as well as after. If any event will mar the system, and render it less good on the whole, he knows it perfectly. Of all possible systems, he must have known from the beginning which was the best. And if the present system is not the best, and if all its parts are not the best adapted to promote the great end of the whole, and arranged in the best possible manner, it cannot be for the want of knowledge in God. He knew it as well before he created the world, as it ever can be known.

God is also infinite in goodness. And this must prompt him to choose what is best. To say that God is infinitely good, and yet prefers a less good to a greater good, is a contradiction. When, therefore, he perceived among all

possible systems, which was the best, he must have chosen it, in preference to all others. If he chooses that the greatest sum of good should be brought into existence, he must choose that those events should take place which are best adapted to secure this great end. Hence, if the present system is not the best, it is not that which God prefers. He has seen that a different system would be better, and set his heart upon it, and exerted himself to the utmost to carry it into effect, but has failed in the attempt. He has done all he could to prevent the existence of such events as he saw to be not for the best, but has found himself unable!

But this cannot be for God is infinite in power. He is the Almighty. None can stay his hand, or resist his will. If he sees that a certain system is the best, containing the greatest possible amount of good, he is able to carry it into complete effect. Every event which is on the whole for the best, he is able to bring to pass. And every event which is not for the best, he is able to prevent. No event, then, comes into existence, but what is for the best.

It may be, however, notwithstanding the certainty of this conclusion, that some will still doubt. They cannot see how certain events can be for the best; and so, they are ready to conclude they cannot be. But, what if we cannot see how ? Could Joseph see how his going into Egypt as a slave, was to be for the best? Yet so it proved. Could Jacob see how the apparent loss of his children, was to be for the best, when he said, "All these things are against me?" Yet, time showed him his mistake. Could the Israelites see how it was for the best for them, in their flight from Egypt, to be hemmed in by the mountains, with the sea before them, and their angry foes in the rear? Yet a short season unfolded the mystery, and turned their murmurs and complaints into songs of triumph. Is there no ground for trust in God? If we cannot see through his designs, if we cannot perceive the wisdom of his purposes, can we repose no confidence in his infinite perfection? Is it reasonable for us to condemn a whole system, when we have seen but a small part of it? Is it not presumption in us to array our ignorance against the perfections of the Almighty; and be

cause we cannot see the wisdom and goodness of his dispensations, to dare tell him he might have done better than he has done? Let us humble ourselves, and be ashamed, if we have indulged so impious a thought.

But, perhaps some may say, they are satisfied with what God has done: they believe what he has done is for the best but they think many events take place, in which he has no hand: and these are the things which they think not for the best. What are these things? Are they the introduction of sin into the world, and the various sins which are committed? These are, in themselves, great evils; but before we conclude they are not for the best, let us consider them carefully.

Take the introduction of sin into the world, in the fall of man. Was it for the best that man should fall? Is the answer, No? Why, then, did not God prevent it? Did he not know whether it would be for the best, or not? Was he not acquainted with all the consequences which would flow from this event? Did he not know whether it would introduce more evil than good into the system? If he saw all the consequences, and knew it would be unspeakably better that they should not take place, why did he not prevent them? Had he no choice about it? Το say that he knew it was not for the best, and yet had no choice whether it should take place, or not, is very highly to impeach his goodness. Did he choose to prevent it, then, but find himself unable? Was man stronger than God? Was Almighty power too weak to control a creature? This cannot be supposed. To say this, is to say that God is not Almighty. The conclusion, then, is, that God did not prevent man from sinning, because he did not, on the whole, choose to prevent him. And he did not choose to prevent him, because it was not best in his view that he should be prevented; that is, it was, on the whole, for the best, in the view of Infinite Wisdom, that man should fall.

But some have intimated, and others have dared to say openly, it was not for the best that man should fall; and God knew it was not, and chose to prevent it, but could not, without destroying the freedom of man as a moral agent; and this is the reason he did not prevent it. This is strange ground to take. Those who say this,

say what they cannot prove; and by saying it, they contradict themselves, change sides, and advocate the conclusion which they profess to oppose. They say what they cannot prove. It was possible for God to prevent the fall of man without touching his moral agency. There is no error in the assumption, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, if he had seen it to be best. It is absurd to suppose an all-wise Being would give existence to creatures whose conduct he knew he could not control; and who would therefore be as likely to defeat as to accomplish the end for which he made them. And it is a dictate of common sense that the Most High God could have governed creatures entirely dependent on him, so as to make them obedient and keep them So. He could have kept them out of the reach of temptation. He could have "put his Spirit within them, and caused them to walk in his statutes." "Not being sufficient of themselves to think any thing, as of themselves,” he could have "worked in them to will and to do," in such a manner as to prevent the entrance of sin into the universe. "Holding in his hand the hearts of all beings, he could have turned them whithersoever he would." The assumption, therefore, is not gratuitous, that God could have prevented all sin among moral agents. And the conclusion is undeniable, that he has not done it, because he saw it was not for the best that it should be done. Furthermore, those who say it was not for the best that man should fall, and that the reason why God did not prevent it, was, that he must thereby have destroyed the freedom of man as a moral agent, in so saying, contradict themselves, change sides, and advocate the conclusion they profess to oppose. For it is the same as to say, it was better, in God's view, that man should fall, than that his moral agency should be destroyed; which is the same as to say, it was, on the whole, for the best that man should fall.

If we take any other event, the result will be the same. If it is not for the best, why is it not prevented? Not for the want of knowledge in God; not for the want of goodness; not for the want of power. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible. The infinite knowledge of God enables him to perceive what events are for the best; his