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soothing. When a man suspects that he has acted amiss, and begins to be self-upbraided, how pleasantly does flattery whisper in his ear that he is too scrupulous and sensitive, that he feels too much for others, too little for himself, that in truth he is overconscientious, and had he acted accordingly, would have shown a culpable weakness! Language like this is such balm to a mind torn by remorse, that the giver of the balm may well be looked upon with pleasure, with favour, and with love.

When a man has long been used to flattery, especially when he never hears any thing else, that self-deceit to which all are naturally prone may at last become so confirmed, that he shall know not when he does wrong. This of course is the most hopeless of all conditions, for without a consciousness of wrong how can there be any improvement! It has always been allowed that flattery is the most dangerous enemy to princes, the temptation to it being so great, and the evil consequences inevitable. Without that self-deceit, which is fostered and strengthened by flattery, it would be difficult to account for the monstrous and oft repeated cruelties which have been perpetrated by sanguinary ruffians dignified by the name of King or Emperor. It is probable that in many cases they were totally unconscious of their own wickedness. Nor need we have recourse to Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, or Domitian, or their worthy followers and imitators, in order to see the evil effects of flattery. The same, though on a smaller scale, and happily restrained by law from the last excesses, may be witnessed in private life, where many

a domestic Nero, nursed by doting parents, and surrounded from infancy by a crowd of obsequious dependants, afterwards rules his little circle with a rod of iron, without even being aware that he is a tyrant. With all their imperfections, the public schools of England have at least this grand advantage, that they withdraw the sons of the aristocracy from the spoiling influence of home, from all its menials and sycophants; and place them in a society where their rank and wealth are comparatively disregarded, and where they may find themselves no better, if not worse than other people.

If the expression of moral sentiment be so necessary in private life, it is no less important in public. What is called public opinion is not a mere judgment as to the expediency or inexpediency of any proposed measures, but it also supposes a sentiment of praise or blame towards the actors. On the susceptibility of man to this praise or blame is founded the power of the press, that palladium of a free constitution. Without such susceptibility, nothing but fear of resistance could arrest the arm of authority, and abuse may go far before such resistance need be dreaded. But with feelings alive to good and bad repute, no one in a high station could go on with a system of tyranny, where men might freely speak and freely write, for conscience would be awakened, and remorse and shame would rend his bosom. Therefore, the first object of despots, or of those who wish to be so, is to chain the expression of sentiment, and by so doing, to prevent even its mental existence in many who take their opinions and catch their sentiments

from others. Who but must admire this effectual but peaceful contrivance of the Author of nature, whereby a check to misrule has been set in the breast of the governor, and the spring that moves it in the hands of the governed! or, who can feel tamely towards those who would mar so beautiful a design? If indeed, amid the strife of parties and the rage of contending factions, this power of the press be abused, and unmerited praise and obloquy heaped upon public characters, we ought to deprecate such writing, and apply an antidote as far as possible; but when we can do no more, we must put up with the partial evil for the sake of the general good, remembering that we are but men.'

The above reflections will probably be thought sufficient to show the purpose of moral sentiment, which purpose may be supposed to have been in the mind of the Deity, when he rendered man susceptible of such sentiment, and thus became a final cause. The study of final causes must be highly agreeable to every well constituted mind, as it tends to enlarge the proofs of the wisdom and goodness of the Deity, a truth so improving and so consolatory to the human race: improving from the contemplation of superior excellence; consolatory, from the belief in a superintending Providence which even here orders all for the best, and will complete the scheme hereafter. Whenever final causes appear, they will of course be viewed with interest, but no where with so much pleasure as in the structure and operations

1 See Note C1.

of the human mind, that master-piece of Nature's work, that brightest emanation of the Deity!

There remains but one point to be considered under this head, namely, whether a perception of the utility of moral sentiment at all tend to its formation. Of course moral sentiment must be supposed already to exist before any such consideration could act as a secondary cause to strengthen or direct it, for did it not exist how could we estimate its utility? But moral approbation having sprung from its own original causes, and proving highly salutary in the commerce of mankind, may not this good effect react upon men's minds as a cause, inducing them to cherish more and more a remedy so admirably adapted to most of the disorders of life? If it be rash to say that this reflexion always, or even generally, enters into the minds of men when they approve or disapprove, it would be no less hazardous to deny that it ever comes into view. In the course of ages, this idea must surely have sometimes suggested itself, and whenever it did, it would necessarily add to the force of moral sentiment. But whatever may have actually been the case in time past, it is certainly desirable that this consideration should be attended to in time to come. The former is a speculative question, and belongs to speculative morality; but the latter is altogether practical. By pointing out the great results which are obtained by means of moral sentiment, we may naturally hope to rouse and warm it, when it becomes languid and cold through the deadening influence of custom, the power of bad example, the sophistry of flatterers, and the snares of self-deceit.

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CHAPTER III.

ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

IN

N commencing an inquiry into the real nature of Virtue, a subject which has occupied philosophers in all ages, it is peculiarly necessary to guard against verbal disputes. Let it be understood then that the question here to be discussed is not what may be the meaning of the word virtue as now used, or as it has formerly been used in our language, and still less what may be meant by the similar word in other languages, as by the virtus of the Latins, the vertu of the French, or the virtù of the modern Italians. Inquiries such as these may not be utterly useless; but they belong to the grammarian, not to the moral philosopher. The real question which we have to treat is, what may be the nature of that which generally does and always ought to command our moral approbation as above explained, whether that quality be called by the name of virtue, or by any other. Undoubtedly this word, as at present employed among us, is commonly taken in that sense, though it would be rash to affirm that it is so always. As applied to woman, for instance, the term is used in a much more limited signification, and instead of comprehending every branch of morality, is restricted to one. Among the Romans, virtus was synonymous with valour, and with the modern Italians, virtù has sunk into taste.

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