In Beza, we find these monstrous errors pushed to a still further length. The principal points of his reasoning are as follows: God wished on one hand to show mercy, and on the other to reveal His justice. Adam was created morally just and holy; for from God's hand nothing unclean can come forth. But how could God unfold His mercies, since the sinner only can be the subject of these? How could He manifest His justice, if no one committed wrong, and thereby incurred punishment? Hence, for the unfolding of these attributes, the Deity must prepare a channel which was found in ordaining the fall of the first These divine objects being perfectly just and holy, their quality is transmitted to the means also selected for their execution.* Here Beza does not speak of a mere co-operation of the Deity in the performance of the mere outward part in an evil action; for God, whether to punish or to exercise mercy, has regard to the inward evil sentiment, since, without this, sin is not possible. It was thus the part of the Deity to call forth somehow an evil sentiment, in order to attain His

man.

Beza (Quæst. et Respons. p. 117,) deduces the sin of Adam from a spontaneo motu voluntatis, that is to say, from a natural impulse, the meaning whereof is, that God so formed human nature, that evil could not fail to arise, which He then makes use of for His own ends.

Beza Absters. calum. Heshus. adv. Calvin. (with the payiz sive Cyclops; in one volume, Genev. 1561, p. 231.) "Superest, ut ostendamus, ita decretum esse a Deo Adami lapsum, ut tamen tota culpa penes Satanam et Adamum resideat. Hoc autem liquido apparebit, si, quemadmodum paulo ante Calvinus nos monuit, diversa atque adeo penitus contraria Dei, Satane, et hominis consilia, ac deinde etiam diversos agendi modos consideramus. Quid enim Deo propositum fuit, quum lapsum hominis ordinaret? Nempe patefaciendæ suæ misericordiæ in electis gratuito servandis, itemque justo suo judicio in reproborum damnanda malitia viam sibi aperire. Nam nisi sibi et posteris suis lapsus esset Adam, nec ulla extaret in hominibus miseria, cujus misereretur Deus in filio suo, nec ulla malitia, quam condemnaret; ac proinde neque appareret ejus misericordia, neque etiam judicium. Hoc igitur quum molitur et exequitur Dominus, quis cum ullius injustitie coarguerit? Quid autem moliebatur Satan, quamvis imprudens Dei consilio subserviret? Nempe quia Deum odit, et totus invidià ex estuat, inimicitias serere voluit inter Deum et hominem. Quid autem cogitant Adamus et Heva, simul atque se dociles Satanæ discipulos præbuerunt? Nempe Deum ut invidum et mendacem coarguere, et eo invito sese in illius solio collocare." The outlines of Beza's reasoning may be seen in Zwingle (De Provid. cap. vi. p. 364.) How little, moreover, the sound common sense of the Christian, who, on one hand, upholds the idea of God's holiness and justice, and, on the other hand, clings to the doctrine of rewards and punishments according to man's works, could be led astray by such dialectic arts, the anonymous writer already cited, very well points out, when he says: "Equidem favi ego aliquando doctrinæ tuæ, Calvine, eamque, quamvis non satis mihi perspicuam, defendi, quod tantum tribuebam auctoritati tuæ, ut vel contra cogitare putarem nefas; sed nunc auditis adversariorum argumentis, non habio quod respondcam........Nam tuæ rationes sunt obscuræ, et fere ejusmodi, ut statim, depo

ends; that is to say, he must annihilate His sanctity, in order on its ruins to attain to compassion and justice. Hence, Beza does not deny that the first man, when he sinned, succumbed under an invincible destiny; that it was thus not left to his freedom to abstain from sin. But, like Luther and Calvin, distinguishing between necessity and compulsion, he says the latter does not occur in sin; that on the contrary, Adam sinned willingly, with an inward pleasure (spontaneo motu, in opposition to libero and voluntario motû,) and although he was not able to avoid sinning, he did not wish to avoid it; and it was this very thing which constituted his criminality.*

It is by these principles, that passages in the Reformed confessions are to be estimated. They all assert, that God is not the author of sin, that is to say, in the sense wherein Zwingle, Calvin, and Beza, attempt to exculpate the Deity, after having denied man's free will.†

sito de manu libro, excidant ex memoria, neque adversarios convincant. At adversariorum argumenta sunt aperta, acria, et quæ facile memoriæ mandentur, et ab illiteratis, quales fere erant qui Christum sectabantur, percipiantur. Hine fit, ut tui dis. cipuli fere magis authoritate tua nitantur, quam ratione. Et quum adversarios vin. cere non possunt, habent eos pro hæritices et pertinacibus, et ab eorum consortio abstinent, et omnes ubique monent, ut abstineant." And such doctrines were to be held as formal articles of faith!

Beza Absters. lib. i. 'Quærenda est vitii origo in instrumentorum spontaneo motu, quo fit ut Deus juste decreverit, quod illi injuste fecerant," etc. A distinction very familiar to Beza! Compare his "Quæst. et Respons. lib. i. p. 120.

+ Confess. Helv. cap. ix. (cd. August. p. 19.) Ergo quoad malum sive peccatum, homo non coactus vel a Deo, vel a diabolo, sed sua sponte malum fecit, et hac parte liberrimi est arbitrii, cap. viii. p. 18. Damnamus præterea Florinum et Blastum, contra quos et Irenæus scripsit, ut omnes, qui Deum faciunt auctorem peccati. Confess. Gallic. cap. viii. lib. c. p. 113. Negamus tamen illum (Deum) esse autorem mali, aut eorum, quæ perperam fiunt, ullam culpam in ipsum transferri posse, quum ipsius voluntas sit summa et certissima omnis justitiæ norma. Habet autem ipse admi rabiles potius quam explicabiles rationes, ex quibus sic utitur diabolis omnibus et pec. cantibus hominibus, tanquam instrumentis, ut quicquid illi male agunt, id ipse sicut juste ordinavit, sic etiam in bonum convertat." The Belgic Confession (cap. xiii. lib. e. p. 177) speaks in the same way.

CHAPTER II.

ON ORIGINAL SIN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

§ v.-The Catholic doctrine of original sin.

It is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the religious controversies of the last three centuries, that the Reformers, according to whose principles Adam in his fall only succumbed under a sentence of irresistible necessity pronounced upon him, should have represented the Deity as kindling into so fearful a wrath, and inflicting so frightful a chastisement for this act of the first man, which, according to their own views, should be called rather his pure misfortune. It is no easy task to explain how ideas so unconnected should have been associated in one and the same head. When we just now used the comprehensive word "Reformers," we did so advisedly; for even Luther and Melancthon had both completely framed their theory of original sin, when they were entangled in those opinions described in the preceding section,-opinions which Zwingle and Calvin only took up, and further developed. How could Adam be the subject of such fearful wrath, if he did only what he was obliged to do; if he perpetrated only what he could not avoid?* Hence arises a conception of original sin on the part of Protestants, which is in almost every respect (we trust we may be pardoned the expression,) devoid of sense and reason. By the most exaggerated description of the effects of Adam's fall, they seem anxious to resuscitate the feeling of sin, and the consciousness of guilt, which, by their view of God's relation to evil, they were on the point of utterly destroying. And yet they only aggravate the matter, as will appear in the course of the present chapter, which must, however, in the first instance, be devoted to an examination of the principles laid down by the Council of Trent.

The doctrine of the Catholic Church on original sin is extremely

Calvin (Instit. lib. iii. cap. 1. sec. 4, fol. 77) very well enlarges on the magnitude of Adam's sin; but his whole description makes no impression, so soon as we remember the author's assertion, that Adam must needs sin. He shows acutely enough the unbelief, ingratitude, and pride of Adam; but it is only a pity that our first parent was obliged to lose faith, gratitude, and humility.

simple, and may be reduced to the following propositions. Adam, by sin, lost his original justice and holiness, drew down on himself by his disobedience the displeasure and the judgments of the Almighty, incur. red the penalty of death, and thus, in all his parts, in his body as well as soul, became strangely deteriorated.* This his sinful condition is transmitted to all his posterity, as descended from him, entailing the consequence that man is of himself incapable, even with the aid of the most perfect ethical law offered to him from without (not excepting even the one revealed in the Old Covenant,) to act in a manner agreeable to God, or in any other way to be justified before Him, save only by the merits of Jesus Christ, the sole mediator betwixt God and man.† If to this we add, that the fathers of Trent attribute to fallen man freewill, representing it, however, as very much weakened, ‡ and in conse quence teach, that not every religious and moral action of man is necessarily sinful, although it be never, in itself and by itself, acceptable to God, nor anywise perfect,§ we then have stated all, which is to be held as strictly the doctrine of the Church. That, moreover, fallen man still bears the image of God, (section 1,) necessarily follows from what has been advanced.||

Concil. Trid. sess. v. decret. de peccat. orig. "Si quis non confitetur primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse, incurrisseque per offensain prævaricationis hujusmodi iram et indignationem Dei, atque ideo mortem..... totumque Adam..... secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse, anathema sit."

+ Loc. cit. "Si quis hoc Adæ peccatum, quod origine unum est, et propagatione, no nimitatione, transfusum omnibus, inest unicuique proprium, vel per humanæ naturæ vires, vel per aliud remedium asserit tolli, quam per meritum unius mediatoris Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui nos Deo reconciliavit sanguine suo, factus nobis justitia, sanctificatio, et redemptio, anathema sit."

Concil. Trid sess. vi. cap. v. "Si quis liberum hominis arbitrium post Adæ peccatum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, aut rem esse de solo titulo, imo titulum sine re, figmentum denique a Satana invectum in ecclesiam, anathema sit." Cap. i.: "Primum declarat sancta synodus, ad justificationis doctrinam probe et sincere intelligendam, oportere, ut unusquisque agnoscat, et fateatur, quod cum omnes homines in prævaricatione Adæ innocentiam perdidissent, factiim mundi, et, ut Apostolus inquit, naturâ filii iræ,........ usque adeo servi erant peccati, et sub potestate diaboli ac mortis, ut non modo gentes per vim naturæ, sed ne Judæi quidem per ipsam etiam literam legis Moysis, inde liberari, aut surgere possent, tametsi in eis liberum arbitrium mi nime extinctum esset, viribus scilicet attenuatum et inclinatum."

Loc. cit. vii. "Si quis dixerit, opera omnia quæ ante justificationem fiunt, qua. cumque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata, vel odium Dei mereri, anathema sit." || Bellarmin de gratia primi hominis, cap. ii. Imago ad naturam, similitudo ad virtutes pertinet; proinde Adam peccando non imaginem Dei, sed similitudinem perdidit."

If, in reading these decrees of the Council of Trent, we call to mind all those questions, which, since the rise of the Pelagian heresy, and even much earlier, were, on the matter at issue, proposed to scientific investigation, we shall not fail to observe, that the assembled fathers found it expedient in their decision not to touch upon a considerable number of these questions, and to express themselves in regard to them with a certain generality. We say, in regard to these questions; for, on the matter itself, considered according to Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition, the council has pronounced very definite and full declarations. But, as in this doctrine the Lutherans were driven to the most pernicious exaggerations; and as, in the first years of the Reformation, some Catholic theologians,-for example, Albertus Righius, (as is often the case in the refutation of extreme opinions) approximated to the opposite extreme; the decrees of Trent were received with feelings of very great prejudice by the Protestants, who, in their rash vehemence, charged them with Pelagianism.

As regards the deliberations of Trent, Payva ab Andrada, a Portuguese theologian who assisted at them, informs us, in the third book of his defence of the council, that it purposely abstained from any minuter definitions. And Pallavicini says, that the council has expressed itself more negatively, yet with such distinctness, that the errors on this matter then current were, as such, clearly and distinctly rejected. If the Church, he continues, be unable to give any accurate definition of original sin, it is sufficient for her to denote what original sin is not; and this she can do with as much propriety as one, who, having no clear notion of heaven, could still assert with confidence, that it was not composed of linen adorned with gold-paper! The same celebrated historian also relates, that the papal legates reminded the assembled fathers not to decide on the nature of original sin itself, because Scripture and tradition are silent upon this matter; and he adds, the holy synod was not convoked to pronounce upon opinions, but to condemn errors. We shall soon be enabled to see the great propriety of this judgment of Pallavicini's.†

*To this Chemnitius (Exam. Concil. Trid. ed. Francof. 1599, Pt. i p. 168) refers, when he exclaims: "Ad perpetuam igitur rei memoriam notum sit toti orbi Christiano," etc. See also his "Loci Theol." P. i. p. 227. Gerhard loci theolog. tom iv. p. 518, (loc. ix. sec. 58).

+ Loc. cit. p. 248, lib. vii. cap. x. p. 247: "Hic vero admonuerunt (Legati) ne quid certi statuerent de natura ipsa originalis culpæ, de qua scholastici discordant: nec enim synodus collecta fuerat ad decidendas opiniones, sed ad errores recidendos " Further on, it is said: "Quoties damnantur hæretici, optimum consilium est, magis generalia, quippe magis indubitata complecti, quod a synodo peractum est. Quoties in eosdem scriptis agitur, prudentis est, nullam ipsis ansam præferre transferendæ disputationis a re ipsa, quæ certa est, ad modum, qui est incertus."