"By giving exclusively to the King the initiation of laws, it was intended to strengthen the prerogative, and the effect has been to weaken it.

"The form in which this power is exercised is as inconvenient as the principle is false: ministers come down to the houses with their proposed law in the shape of an ordonnance-Louis, by the grace of God,' &c. The ministers thus borrow the individual person and identity of his Majesty; they make him propose this law as the result of his own wisdom and meditation; then the law is discussed; then come alterations, omissions, and amendments; and the wisdom of the King receives a legislative denial in the rejection of his first conceptions. Then must come a second ordonnance, to declare (still by the grace of God, and the wisdom of the King) that the wisdom of the King had been deceived, and that the grace of God had been invoked in vain.

"All this is miserable, and injurious to the royal person and royal dignity. It must be changed: and this solemn form must be reserved for the final sanction of the law-the peculiar duty of the crown when the legislature shall have done theirs-and not for the sketch of a law proposed by ministers, and liable to alteration, and even rejection, by the legislature.

"On all occasions these royal ordonnances should be used with moderation. The style and form they assume is that of absolute authority, because the King of France was formerly the supreme legislator; but Now, that his legislative functions are divided with the two houses, it is more decent, it is more legal, it is more constitutional, that the crown should speak with absolute authority, only when it ratifies and perfects the law, which the wisdom of the other branches of the legislature has previously framed.

Else, the peer and the deputy will be placed between two distinct legislative powers-between the old and the new constitution— between the duty they owe to the ordonnance as subjects, and the duty they owe to their constituents as legislators. How can they' freely and honestly debate such an ordonnance without disrespect to the royal prerogative? How can they refrain from debating it, without an abandonment of principle?

"The present practice would at length lead to one or other of the following serious inconveniences: either the King's name would produce a degree of respect inconsistent with free discussion, or a free discussion would soon impair the respect due to the King's name, and tend to a degradation of the royal authority; in which, and in which alone, consist our hopes of tranquillity and happiness.

"Every one knows, that, in England, the wise rules of parliament and the constitution would be infringed by a member's using the pame of the King, either in support of, or in opposition to, any. proposition whatsoever." (p. 10-12.)

The last sentence leads us to remark, that in many parts of this publication, more particularly where the author ad

verts to the subject of representation, he takes occasion to impress upon his readers the many excellencies of our British system. Setting aside discussions on the corruptions that have crept into it, his panegyrics are doubtless theoretically well deserved; but it has admitted of a serious question whether it be possible yet to communicate such advantages to France. In this kingdom, the representative system has been of gradual growth, from its embryo the Wittenagemot of our Saxon ancestors: that institution, even in feudal times, affording privileges to the people beyond what the lower orders experienced in other countries of Europe: venerable from its antiquity, and admirable from its construction, it has for centuries been looked up to here as a sacred fabric: though eulogized by the ablest foreign writers, it has been adopted by no foreign government, with the exception of the kingdom of the Netherlands, which, within the last three years, almost under the dictation of Great Britain, has adopted its principle. In France, since the restoration of Louis XVIII., it has been attempted to be introduced with certain modifications; but though it is a novelty to that country, (and thus possesses a charm which with us would be an objection,) it will be met by a national repugnance to English politics and practice, and even with more effect by the anti-representative disposition and character of the people. The representative system pre-eminently requires two qualities in which the French are pre-eminently deficient, viz. that individuals should lay aside all their amour propre, and act upon disinterested and enlarged views of public benefit; and that they should possess that degree of reflection and knowledge which will enable them to decide with judgment between conflicting candidates. Certainly the second or third election after the endeavour to establish this system, has begun under very unauspicious circumstances; for all the accounts received from the Continent shew, beyond a doubt, that, instead of endeavouring to maintain the purity of the choice, and the competence of the deputy, the ministers of Louis XVIII. have exerted all kinds of undue influence to procure the return of persons, attached, not to the present royal family, but to what are termed the revolutionary interests: though we admit that many things in the government of Louis XVIII. require alteration, and that, perhaps, immediately, for the security of his throne, yet we must contend, on the other hand, that any government, and any form of government, is better than that which the degraded relics of popular commotion and

of military domination would establish for his kingdom.The reflections we have above made, might more fitly have been introduced afterwards, when we quote what M. de Chateaubriand says upon the subject; but we may properly in this place insert some of his remarks upon the late dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, and the reduction of the number of representatives, which are given in a postscript to his work, as relating to a transaction subsequent to the production of the body of it. He observes :

"We were deceived, then, when we thought the number of de puties of departments too small. The nation, consisting of twentyfour millions of inhabitants, will be sufficiently represented, it seems, by two hundred deputies! The departments of the Lozere, and the Upper and Lower Alps, for example, who will have but one deputy to the Chamber, will they be fully satisfied?

"If we change our ministers every year, are we to have from year to year a new mode of elections? Who can assure me, that the ministers of the next year will not find the representation of this year too numerous? Will not a hundred of their clerks (duly assembled, forsooth) appear to them to form a better Chamber, and more in the interests of France?

Oh no, say they; we will keep hereafter to the charter.—God grant! it is all I desire; but I am not at all easy upon the subject. "In virtue of the 14th article of the charter, which gives the King the power of making rules and ordonnances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the státe, may not the ministers see the safety of the state wherever they see the triumph of their systems? There are so many constitutionalists, who would now govern by ordonnances, that we may see, instead of laws, some fine morning, the whole Charter confiscated to the profit of Art. XIV.

"Let me state the true reason why France is again thrown, as it were, into a lottery-wheel.

"The party that would drag down France to her ruin would, as the first step, sell the woods of the clergy: it would sell them-not as a good system of finance, but as a good revolutionary measure not to pay the Allies, but to consecrate the Revolution; and, as it well knows that the Chamber of Deputies would never have consented to this sale, it has availed itself of the ill-humour and idle terrors of the Ministers, to persuade them, very unluckily, that their existence is incompatible with that of the Chamber.

"It feared, besides, that the Chamber might, as was its duty, enlighten the King as to the real opinion of France.

"In fine-I have already said it,that party has never forgiven the deputies for having unmasked its projects, and deposed, in the regicides, the princes of the Revolution.

"You will read in the papers long and laboured articles in praise of the dissolution of the Chamber; but recollect, while you read,

that the press is not free; that it is in the hands of ministers; that it is these very ministers that have dissolved the Chamber, and written, or paid for, the articles. You observe that the funds rose; but you should know, that on the day the ordonnance was published, a speculation, a trick, was played on the Exchange; and a jobber had the audacity to exclaim, The scoundrels shall never return!'-These scoundrels were the deputies!

"What are the wishes of the King?-If it were permitted to pe netrate into the secrets of his royal wisdom, might we not presume, that by leaving constitutionally full liberty of action and opinion to his responsible ministers, he carried his views much farther than they? Perhaps he thinks that France may send him back the same deputies with whom they were both so justly satisfied; that we shall have a new Chamber, as royalist as the last, though convoked upon other principles; and, if that should be the case, that there would then be no possibility of mistake as to the real opinion of France." (p. 252—254.)

We will now return to the main body of the work. M. de Chateaubriand very fitly censures with severity the secret suggestion of laws to the Crown;

"For they who speak but privately to kings,

Do seldom speak the best and fittest things;"

as one of our old poets remarks. From thence he proceeds to the constitution and privileges of the House of Peers of France; and subsequently, in these terms, speaks of the Chamber of Deputies, and its relation with the Ministers.

"Our Chamber of Deputies would be perfectly well constituted, if the laws for regulating elections, and those regarding the responsibility of ministers, were conclusively framed. But the Chamber is as yet deficient in the precise knowledge of its own powers, and of those truths which can only be the children of experience.

"Its first duty is, to cause itself to be respected. It ought not to suffer ministers to establish any principle of independence of the legislature, or of being at liberty to attend or not, as they may please, the summons of the Chambers. In England, ministers are liable to be questioned, not only on legislative proceedings, but on questions of their individual administration, on the appointments which they make, and even upon articles of news which appear in the public journals.

"If that sweeping phrase which we have lately heard, ministers are accountable for their administration* to the King only,' be tole

* The French use the word administration as contradistinguished from legislature, finance, or justice, to signify the mere civil duties of government, and the actual execution of these duties by the minister and his subordinate.-Trans.

rated, we shall soon see that every thing will be administration: incapable ministers may ruin the country at their ease; and the Chamber, become their slaves, will fall into disrepute and disgrace.

"But what means have the Chambers of making themselves heard? If ministers refuse to answer them, how can they oblige them? and will they not, by a summons which they cannot enforce, impair their dignity, and render themselves ridiculous, by an empty presump:

tion?'

"I reply, that the Chamber has several modes of maintaining its rights.

"Let us state the true principles of this question.

"The Chambers have a right of putting to the ministers what questions they please.

"The ministers ought always to attend, and to answer, whenever the Chambers desire it.

"Ministers are not indeed, on all occasions, bound to enter into explanations. They may decline doing so, but they should ground their refusals on reasons of state, of which in due time the Chambers may be informed. The Chambers, treated with this attention, will go no further. A minister demanded that six millions per annum should be placed at his disposal; he gave his word of honour that it was necessary for the public service; and the deputies did not hesitate to vote it without any further explanation. Upon the honour of a gentleman,' is an old pledge, on which a Frenchman will always obtain credit.

Again: the Chambers will never interfere in the administration of affairs, will never create inconvenient discussions, will never expose the ministry to real embarrassment, if the ministers are what they ought to be,-masters of the Chambers in fact, and their servants in form.

"But how shall we attain this desirable result? Very easily:the ministry must be identified with the majority of the Chambers, and act with it, else no government can go on.

"I am aware that the kind of authority which the Chambers during their session exercise over the ministry, recals to our minds the usurpations of the Constituent Assembly. But again, I say, comparisons between that day and this are not only odious, but lame. "I deny that the experience of that period forbids us to hope that we may establish a representative monarchy in France. That government was not a representative monarchy, founded on natural principles, and balanced by a real distribution of powers-one absolute assembly, and a monarch whose veto was not absolute! What resemblance is there between the political system under the Constituent Assembly, and ours under the Charter.

"Let us give the Charter a fair trial: if it fails-if the public opinion and the public service do not go with it-then we may say that a representative government is not suited to the feelings of France; but, until then, we have no right to condemn that which we have never tried." (p. 33-36.)