in the expectation of those in need of its assistance, or in the gratitude of those who have been defended? To this, then, the first rank of civil dignity was given by our ancestors. Of an eloquent man, then, and one willingly labouring, and, what is according to the customs of our forefathers, defending the causes of many, both ungrudgingly and gratuitously, the benefits and patronage are very extensive.

The subject would admonish me that at this opportunity I should likewise deplore the discontinuance, not to call it the extinction, of eloquence, did I not apprehend lest I should appear to be making some complaint upon my own account. However, we see what orators are extinct, in how few there is promise, in how much fewer ability, in how many presumption. But though all, or even many, cannot be skilful in the law, or eloquent, yet it is in a man's power, by his exertions, to be of service to many, by asking benefits for them, commending them to judges and magistrates, watching the interests of others, entreating in their behalf those very advocates who either are consulted or defend causes. They who act thus, gain a great deal of influence, and their industry diffuses itself most extensively. Furthermore, they need not be admonished of this (for it is obvious), that they take care to offend none while they are wishing to serve others. For oftentime they offend either those whom it is their duty or whom it is their interest not to offend. If unwittingly they do it, it is a fault of negligence; if knowingly, of rashness. It is necessary, too, that you make an apology, in whatever way you can, to those whom you unwillingly offend-how that which you did was of necessity, and that you could not do otherwise; and it will be necessary to make compensation to them for what injury you have inflicted by other efforts and good offices.

XX. But since, in rendering services to men, it is usual to look either to their character or their fortune, it is easy, indeed, to say, and so people commonly say, that in bestowing benefits they only attend to a man's character, not to his fortune. It is a fine speech; but pray is there any one who in rendering a service would not prefer the thanks of a rich and powerful man before the cause of a poor, though most worthy man? For in general our goodwill is more inclined towards him from whom it appears that remuneration would

be easier and quicker. But we ought to consider more attentively what the nature of things is: for of course that poor man, if he be a good man, though he cannot requite a kindness, can at least have a sense of it. Now it was well said, whoever said it, "that he who hath the loan of money, hath not repaid; and he who hath repaid, hath not the loan. But both he who hath requited kindness hath a sense of it, and he who hath a sense of it* hath requited." But they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, prosperous, do not wish even to be bound by a benefit. Moreover, they consider that they have conferred a favour when they themselves have received one, however great; and they also suspect that something is either sought or expected from them but they think it like death to them that they should need patronage, and be called clients. But, on the other hand, that poor man, because in whatever is done for him he thinks it is himself and not his fortune that is regarded, is anxious that he may be seen to be grateful, not only by him who has merited it from him, but also by those from whom he expects the like (for he needs it from many). Nor indeed does he magnify with words any favour of his own doing, if by chance he confers one, but rather undervalues it. And this is to be considered, that if you defend a man of power and fortune, the gratitude is confined to himself alone, or perhaps to his children; but if you defend a poor but worthy and modest man, all poor men who are not worthless (which is a vast multitude among the people) see a protection offered to themselves: wherefore, I think it better that a favour should be bestowed upon worthy persons than upon persons of fortune. We should by all means endeavour to satisfy every description of people. But if the matter shall come to competition, undoubtedly Themistocles is to be received as an authority, who, when he was consulted whether a man should marry his daughter to a worthy poor man, or to a rich man of less approved character, said, “I certainly would rather she married a man without money, than money without a man."

But our morals are corrupted and depraved by the admiration of other men's wealth. Though what concern is its amount to any of us? Perhaps it is of use to him who owns it; not always even that: but admit that it is of use to himself, to be sure he is able to spend more, but how is he an honester man? But if he shall be a good man besides, let his riches not prevent him from getting our assistance-only let them not help him to get it, and let the entire consideration be, not how wealthy, but how worthy each individual is. But the last precept about benefits and bestowing our labour is, do nothing hostile to equity-nothing in defence of injustice. For the foundation of lasting commendation and fame is justice-without which nothing can be laudable.

XXI. But since I have finished speaking about that kind of benefits which have regard to a single citizen, we have next to discourse about those which relate to all the citizens together, and which relate to the public good. But of those very ones, some are of that kind which relate to all the citizens collectively; some are such that they reach to all individually, which are likewise the more agreeable. The effort is by all means to be made, if possible, to consult for both, and notwithstanding, to consult also for them individually; but in such a manner that this may either serve, or at least should not oppose, the public interest. The grant of corn proposed by Caius Gracchus was large, and therefore would have exhausted the treasury; that of Marcus Octavius was moderate, both able to be borne by the state, and necessary for the commons; therefore it was salutary both for the citizens and for the nation. But it is in the first place to be considered by him who shall have the administration of the government, that each may retain his own, and that no diminution of the property of individuals be made by public authority. For Philip acted destructively, in his tribuneship, when he proposed the agrarian law, which, however, he readily suffered to be thrown out, and in that respect showed himself to be exceedingly moderate; but when in courting popularity he drove at many things, he uttered this besides improperly, "that there were not in the state two thousand persons who possessed property." A dangerous speech, and aiming at a levelling of property-than which mischief, what can be greater? For commonwealths and states were estab

lished principally for this cause, that men should hold what was their own. For although mankind were congregated together by the guidance of nature, yet it was with the hope of preserving their own property that they sought the protection of cities.

Care should also be taken, lest, as often was the case among our ancestors, on account of the poverty of the treasury and the continuity of wars, it may be necessary to impose taxation, and it will be needful to provide long before that this should not happen. But if any necessity for such a burden should befal any state (for I would rather speak thus than speak ominously of our own ;* nor am I discoursing about our own state only, but about all states in general), care should be taken that all may understand that they must submit to the necessity if they wish to be safe.

And also all who govern a nation are bound to provide that there be abundance of those things which are necessaries of which, what kind of a provision it is usual and proper to make, it is not necessary to canvass. For all that is obvious: and the topic only requires to be touched on. But the principal matter in every administration of public business and employments is, that even the least suspicion of avarice be repelled. "Would to heaven," said Caius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had reserved me for those times, and I had been born then, whenever the Romans may have begun to accept bribes-I would not have suffered them to reign much longer." He surely would have had to wait many generations. For it is of late that this evil has invaded this state; therefore I am well pleased that Pontius was in existence rather at that time, since so much power resided in him. It is not yet a hundred and ten years since a law about bribery was passed by Lucius Piso, when previously there had been no such law. But afterwards there were so many laws, and each successive one more severe, so many persons arraigned, so many condemned, such an Italian war excited through fear of condemnations, such a rifling and robbing of our allies, those laws and judgments were sus

*Plutarch relates that Æmilius Paullus, on the conquest of Persius, king of Macedonia, brought home such an immense treasure, that the Roman people were entirely relieved from taxes until the consulship of Hirtius and Pansa, which was the year after Cicero wrote this work.

pended, that we are strong through the weakness of others, not through our own valour.

XXII. Panætius applauds Africanus because he was selfdenying. Why not applaud him? But in him there were other and greater characteristics; the praise of self-restraint was not the praise of the man only, but also of those times. Paullus having possessed himself of the whole treasure of the Macedonians, which was most immense, brought so much wealth into the treasury, that the spoils of one commander put an end to taxes; but to his own house he brought nothing except the eternal memory of his name. Africanus, imitating his father, was nothing the richer for having overthrown Carthage. What! Lucius Memmius, who was his colleague in the censorship, was he the wealthier for having utterly destroyed the wealthiest of cities? He preferred ornamenting Italy rather than his own house-although by the adornment of Italy, his own house itself seems to me more adorned. No vice, then, is more foul (that my discourse may return to the point from whence it digressed) than avarice, especially in great men and such as administer the republic. For to make a gain of the republic is not only base, but wicked also and abominable. Therefore, that which the Pythian Apollo delivered by his oracle, "that Sparta would perish by nothing but its avarice," he seems to have predicted not about the Lacedæmonians alone, but about all opulent nations. Moreover, they who preside over the state can by no way more readily conciliate the goodwill of the multitude than by abstinence and self-restraint.

But they who wish to be popular, and upon that account either attempt the agrarian affair, that the owners may be driven out of their possessions, or think that borrowed money should be released to the debtors, sap the foundations of the constitution; namely, that concord, in the first place, which cannot exist when money is exacted from some, and forgiven to others; and equity, in the next place, which is entirely subverted, if each be not permitted to possess his own. For, as I said before, this is the peculiar concern of a state and city, that every person's custody of his own property be free and undisturbed. And in this destructive course to the state they do not obtain even that popularity which they expect ; for he whose property is taken is