cannot allow himself to moderate or correct it; he goes on indulging it in that train which take beft and raises the loudest laugh. There is fo much of ill-will and felf-conceit in the world, as gives a relish to ill-natured jokes. There is often in the characters of wits themfelves fuch a defect in more material accomplishments, and fo much envy as to bend their own inclination to the malicious abuse of their talent. On thefe accounts it is no wonder fo much scandal is spoke in the form of wit. Much of that which may feem innocent is not fo. The moment one is held forth in a ridiculous point of view, a prejudice fprings up against him. Wit embitters an evil report, and is a mean of fpreading it. Thoughtless people spread it for the sake of a laugh. One of the firft liberties which the witty affume, when they give way to evil fpeaking, is to break in on the limits of truth. They often find this neceffary to make their ftory palatable. The mirth which it excites reconciles them to the impropriety of it, or rather diverts them from thinking it at all improper. The most of us are too apt to fall, in with this; to confider the wit of a story that is falfe, and the mirth which it occafions as an apology for its falfehood; forgetting that truth is facred, and that a good name is facred. Another liberty which they affume, in procefs of time, is to turn virtue itself into ridicule. They are happy to ridicule that virtue which they cannot imitate, and which is a perpetual reproach. The modeft and diffident, who are thus evil spoken of on account of their virtue, may be tempted to conceal or to abandon it. It were eaty to fhow how the witty, who give way to evil speaking, are gradually betrayed into the worst kind of it, and how it produces the worst effects both on themselves and others. Every one against whom they employ their malicious wit becomes an enemy. Their paffion for wit grows fo violent, that they fometimes facrifice a friend to it. Even thofe who court, admire, and flatter a witty man, dare not truft him. His ill-natured affections get quite the better of the focial and kind. That talent which at first made him known and fought, which heightened focial enjoyment, and made him the . general favourite; has now, by an unhappy abufe, eftranged him from the genuine pleafures of fociety. He is now a melancholy proof, that even in this lite judgments are prepared for the fcorner. • Perfons of wit, who regard their own character and comfort, will carefully avoid this channel of evil speaking. It is not the way to be trusted, it is not the way to be honoured, it is not the way to be useful.' This abrupt ftyle being fo different from the modern tafte in writing, we are apprehenfive, that even folid and useful obfervations (and there are many, very many fuch in the work) will fcarcely be able, in fuch an unusual drefs, to obtain that audience from the public, to which real merit, in whatever garb, is juftly entitled, E. ART. ART. XI. The Elements of the Science of Ethics, on the Principles of Natural Philofophy. By John Bruce, A. M. Profeffor of Philofophy, and Fellow of the Royal Society at Edinburgh. 8vo. 5s. Cadell. 1786. MOR ORALITY, being a fubject of great importance, has always engaged the thoughts of the learned; and has produced, in every age and country where philofophy has been cultivated, many curious and ingenious fpeculations. To the univerfal defire of becoming acquainted with the nature and faculties of our own mind, we owe the valuable productions of a Plato, an Ariftotle, and a Cicero, among the ancients; a Locke, a Clarke, a Hutchefon, and a Smith, among the moderns. It is no wonder that the fubject should have engaged the attention of these great men, fince it is in itfelf a pleafing enquiry, and an inveftigation which muft ever be productive of fingular benefits to mankind, independent of that natural propenfity and laudable curiofity, which incites the inquifitive mind to explain the many and apparently infurmountable difficulties, with which the fubject of Ethics has been furrounded. The Author of the prefent performance has followed a different path from that which has been purfued by any of his predeceffors. He has endeavoured to reduce the fcience of morals to the fame certainty that attends other fciences. He has attempted to diffipate the clouds which obfcure it, by fubjecting it to the fame rules that are obferved in natural philofophy. The science of Phyfics has always proceeded on a natural history, or analyfis of phenomena; and by a fcientific ufe of experiments and evidence, conclufions and inductions have been eftablished which defcribe the laws of nature relative to material objects. Thus, experiment and obfervation were the means by which attraction was firft difcovered; and a careful attention to various phenomena led the contemplative philofopher to form a fyftem agreeable to the laws of nature, and to establish a science on the fame bafis as that on which nature herself is founded, namely on the immutable and everlafting principles of truth. Mr. Bruce, confidering the different fituations of these two fciences, and that the fubject of each of them is nature, was induced to attempt applying the method of ftudying natural philofophy to the fcience of ethics, He begins with explaining the objects of philofophy, and, obferving that they are all to be found in nature, he marks out the specific diftinctions of each, and fhews how the objects to which ethics relate, may be obferved with as much certainty and advantage, as thofe of the material world, which engage the attention of the natural philofopher. The The first part of this work is employed in giving a history of ethics. Our Author, confidering ethics as an art, is induced to treat largely on art in general, which he defines to be the application of rules to the purposes of life.' It would be in vain, he thinks, to feek for the origin of arts in the defaced veftiges of antiquity; he therefore traces the drigin of arts from the characters of the human mind in the progreffive fituation of man from rudeness to refinement. The love of life, of pleasure, and of novelty, are, in his opinion, uniform propenfities in the mind, which impel it to the invention and improvement of the arts. These propenfities are feparately treated, and the progreffive methods, by which they create or improve, refpectively, the neceffary, the fine, and the liberal arts, are pointed out. Mr. Bruce then fhews how thefe fame propenfities produce the ethital arts, or thofe which regulate our conduct; thefe he divides into neceffary, useful, and liberal. The first appearance of ethics, as an art, is vilible in the rude forms of fubordination and jurifdiction; ethics, as an art, he thinks, is obfervable in the proverbs and maxims of every early and rude people, but more especially in thofe collections of proverbs, made by wife men and diftinguished characters, and in the inftruction given by allegories and fables; but above all, in the arrangement of the cardinal virtues by the Greek moralifts. Our Author takes a very extenfive view of the feveral ftages of the art, and dwells long on the improvements it underwent by the Greeks, who referred all the maxims of morality to the duties which we owe to ourfelves, comprehended under the three great divifions, Temperance, Fortitude, and Prudence; and to the duties which we owe to mankind, included under the very general term of Justice. Mr. Bruce then proceeds to confider ethics as a science. In this part of the work the reader is prefented with a concise and comprehenfive hiftory of the moral philofophy of the ancients; and with many fenfible remarks on the caufes which retard the progress of fcience in general, but more especially the fcience of the human mind. In the next chapter, our Author, confidering the fate of ethics both as an art and a science among the moderns, enters into a paticular detail of the tenets of most of the modern moralifts: the opinions of Hobbes, Malebranche, Cudworth, Clarke, Hutchinfon*, Hume, and Smith, are feparately examined. The fecond part of this work is entitled Of the Principles of Natural Philofophy.' Mr. Bruce here fhews the neceffity of method in the ftudy of nature; but he is fomewhat defective in the practice of that accuracy which he recommends. It is uni *The Author means Hutcheson, Profefior of Moral Philofophy at Glafgow. verfally verfally allowed that natural philofophy, in all its branches, owes its prefent perfection to the accuracy with which it hath been treated by late philofophers; who have been convinced, that, in order to make their writings intelligible, it was neceffary to affix certain and determinate ideas to certain terms, fo that the fame words or expreffions might always convey the fame ideas. Mr. Bruce has involved himfelf in no little obfcurity by ufing, in this part of his work, the fame word in different fignifications; for the word method, in the phrafe Method in the ftudy of nature neceffary' (which is the title of the first fection of chap. i. part ii.) being ufed without the article a, fignifies order, in which fenfe we took it; but we were furprized at finding in the next paragraph that method is ufed by Mr. Bruce to fignify manner, way, or means, when he fays, The human mind has but two obvious methods of acquiring the knowledge of nature.' But we shall proceed with the Author's plan. 'The human mind,' fays he, has but two obvious methods of acquiring the knowledge of nature. Ift, It is addreffed by fome general rule or principle, under the authority of which it is to explain every particular phenomenon or cafe. 2d, It is to obferve particular phenomena or cafes, and from their coincidence in qualities and relations, it is to deduce the rule or law of nature by which they are diftinguished.' Thefe methods of Mr. Bruce do not effentially differ from thofe of the old schools, à prioré and à pofteriore. He prefers the latter, which he terms the method of science: he here treats largely of fcience in general, and of the fcience of analyfis and of induction, in particular; analyfis is fubdivided into analysis by compofition, and analyfis by decompofition. Thefe fubtilities confufe the fubject without any neceffity, not to mention the contradiction in the term, analyfis by compofition! In the third part, Mr. Bruce attempts to adopt those methods which he had before explained. He is defirous of introducing analyfis and induction into the fcience of ethics, and from the uniform and regular appearance of certain phenomena, to establifh fixed and determinate rules. In this part, however, we think he has failed. The plan is ingenious, but the execution is imperfect. Nevertheless, the very laudable endeavours which our Author has made to remove the difficulties, and illuminate the obfcurities to which ethics has long been fubject, intitles him to gratitude; and we should be happy to see his future attempts crowned with better fuccefs. The following hints may, perhaps, not be unworthy the attention either of Mr. Bruce or any other ingenious perfon, who may be defirous of pursuing this important fubject, or of making any future attempts to reduce morality to fure and certain principles. The The precifion and accuracy which mathematicians have introduced into the ftudy of natural philosophy, appears to be the chief, if not the only reafon why that science has been brought to fo great a ftate of perfection by the moderns. From analogy then, moral philofophy can never receive greater improvement than by introducing mathematical precifion into the study of it. Let moralifts use no terms but fuch as are defined, and have determinate fignifications annexed to them and we hefitate not to pronounce that moral philofophy will be much improved, and wear a very different afpect from that which the hath been accuftomed to affume. Let no propofition be advanced that cannot be fully and clearly demonftrated: this precaution will effectually prevent contradiction in principles, fince nothing contradictory will then gain admiffion into the fyftem. Above all, let the writers on the subject be men of univerfal learning, and well versed in mathematical knowledge, for in vain may they attempt to apply to any other fcience, the principles or methods of one, in which they have made little or no proficiency. We must not conclude without obferving, that we have seldom feen a book in which impropriety of expreffion and provincial idiom fo frequently occur as in the prefent performance: the language is in general obfcure, and betrays hafte or negligence in the Author. This we are the more furprised at, fince, in fome parts of his work, he has given proofs of elegance of style, propriety of diction, and juftnefs of fentiment. ART. XII. The Anatomy of the Absorbing Vessels of the Human Body. WE E find in this work more than the title promifes; for, befide the anatomy of the lymphatics, the whole doctrine of abforption is here amply explained, the objections against it are answered, and the opinion of former phyfiologifts is overturned. That the lymphatics are the only abforbent veff-ls, is the fact that Mr. C. throughout his whole performance, is defirous to eftablifh. His arguments, which are chiefly thofe of the late Dr. Hunter, muft however be examined, and only fuch conclufions admitted as can be fupported by ftrict reafoning, founded on obfervation, and the known laws of nature. Our Author begins, not with defcribing the parts, as is ufual with moft phyfiologifts, but with treating on abforption in general, which he defines to be A property in certain veffels of the body, by which they take up the fluids in which their orifices are immerfed, and propel them forward to the blood-yeffels." Whether it is a property may be doubtful; it is certainly an action. Abforption neceffarily fuppofing the prefence of a fluid in fome cavity, or at leaft fo fituated as to be in contact with the mouths i |