As to the hindrance mentioned, "The abuse of expert testimony," I admit that this has been very much abused, but I know of no way to remedy it. There are any number of cases being tried daily where it is absolutely necessary to have expert testimony-both in the civil and criminal trials, and because some who have posed as experts have proven to be ignoramuses or perjurers, or both, is no reason why the Bar should rise up and condemn all experts. No expert ever testified to an untruth that it could not have been discerned by the counsel in the case if they had taken the pains to investigate the subject. I maintain that the practice of paying exorbitant contingent fees to experts, either to make out a case or sustain a defense, should be condemned in unmeasured terms, and lawyers who engage in such pernicious practices should be disbarred. When this is done it will have a very salutary effect.

Upon the fourth hindrance," Reversals in Appellate Courts on the ground of petty technical errors in mere procedure," I wish to call attention to the fact that under our Criminal Code no reversal shall be had unless the error affects the substantial rights of the accused, and I will state without fear of contradiction that an examination of the opinions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky for the past five years will show that this provision of our Criminal Code is strictly adhered to, and the active practicing lawyers over the State have found that it is useless to appeal criminal cases unless there is a substantial error, and the result is that there is a very small per cent. of the criminal cases ever taken to our Court of Appeals.

As to the fifth proposition, that maudlin sentiment for the accused and failure of the court and jury to punish is largely responsible, I beg to say that I have not found it so in my experience. I think there has been very little sympathy displayed for any criminal being tried in this State. Of course all persons charged with a serious crime have some close friends who evince their friendliness for him, whether he is guilty or innocent, but I have never observed any undue sentiment for the criminal, except in a few isolated cases, and I know of no legal reforms which could reach it.

Mr. McDermott then deals with insanity and the "Unwritten Law."

There is no such thing known or recognized in Kentucky procedure as the "Unwritten Law," which applies to any par

ticular class of homicides, but the law of emotional insanity is recognized by our courts as it is by the courts of every other state in the Union, and it is immaterial whether the same is produced by one cause or another. The suggestion that if the defense is insanity it should be plead specifically for the reason that the prosecution would not be taken by surprise should not be adopted for in every instance the prosecuting attorneys are always prepared and in nearly every case have a well defined general idea of the defense to be used.

Referring to his suggestion that there should be a law passed which should require the jury to state in its verdict whether or not it acquitted the defendant on the ground of insanity, this has been the law in Kentucky for many years, and the courts in trying criminal cases in this state follow this provision of the Code strictly. The section of the Criminal Code to which I refer is 268, and it is made mandatory on the judge who tries the case to instruct the jury that if they shall return a verdict of not guilty upon the ground of insanity they must so state in their verdict.

I have an abiding faith in the integrity and intelligence of our courts and the honesty of our juries. I also believe that our laws are ample to punish every wrongdoer and redress every injury done.

At this time there are cries going up from all sides calling for reforms, many of them radical and a few of them conservative. Indeed, some of the reforms demanded within the past year or so have been so extremely radical that if the legislative bodies throughout this country had listened and granted these appeals nothing short of actual revolution would have been produced. Some of them have been advocated by the profession, while a great many have come from the laymen who have become aroused on account of the results of some criminal trial that did not come up to the standard which they might have had in their mind in the particular case, when in most instances judgment had been formed from highly colored newspaper reports with reference to some sensational testimony and without any regard for the well-established rules of court procedure which must apply in all cases alike.

Still other cries of reform have come from politicians, who care not for results provided they can further their interests by cries for reform, which they think will meet the approval of the

masses.

THERE IS NEED OF REFORM.

(Iowa Daily Nonpareil.)

THAT there is need of reform in court procedure in this country is generally admitted. And the reform should come from the courts and the lawyers themselves. The McNamara case in California furnishes an example. The Hyde case in Missouri is another. These things could not happen in England. The courts in the mother country are supreme and they retain their prerogatives. Here it is more a question of lawyers. With reference to the Hyde case the Kansas City Star comments as follows:

A State's attorney in the Hyde case complained with some bitterness that the Supreme Court of Missouri had not read the record of the first trial. If the statement was true, was the court to blame? Or was the responsibility with the lawyers who conducted the case and who spun it out to the extent of 2,000,000 words, contained in 5,000 pages of closely typed legal cap pages?

Are the multifold objections, exceptions, arguments, quarrels, repetitions of testimony, etc., a help to the Appellate Court in getting at the merits of the case? Could a judge on appeal be reasonably expected to plod word for word through all the weariness of a stenographic report of what takes place in a criminal trial as contentiously contested as the Hyde case was?

Now, it is not necessary to blame the lawyers in any given case. They are following the professional ethic of doing everything they can do for their clients. It is the system of criminal court procedure which is at fault. An English Appellate judge reads simply a brief abstract of what takes place at the jury trial. He reviews only the major points of vital interest. And the trial judge is vested with powers which our system takes from him. The American procedure makes the lawyers the big figures in the case.

In this case one of "the learned prosecutors" protests that the Supreme Court did not read the record. It makes one think of that honorable and reverend phrase: "hoist by his own petard."

As the Star points out, the fault lies in the system more than it does with the lawyers. Ideally speaking, the mission of the

lawyer is only to see that his client receives justice. But custom has changed this conception. The lawyer is employed to see that his client gets justice if justice is on his side and to defeat justice if it is on the other side. The American system places too much emphasis on the lawyer. We could adopt some features of the English system with great benefit to all concerned.