THE SCEPTIC

The sceptic doth neither affirm, neither deny any position ; but doubteth of it, and opposeth his reasons against that which is affirmed or denied, to justify his not consenting. HIS first reason ariseth from the consideration of the great difference amongst living creatures, both in the matter and manner of their generations, and the several constitutions of their bodies.

Some living creatures are by copulation, and some without it: and that either by fire, as crickets in furnaces; or corrupt water, as gnats; or slime, as frogs; or dirt, as worms; or herbs, as cankerworms; some of ashes, as beetles; some of trees, as the worm psenas, bred in the wild fig-tree; some of living creatures putrified, as bees of bulls, and wasps of horses. By copulation many creatures are brought forth alive, as man; some in the egg, as birds; some in an unshapen piece of flesh, as bears. These great differences cannot but cause a diverse and contrary temperament and quality in those creatures, and consequently a great diversity in their fancy and conceit; so that though they apprehend one and the same object, yet they must do it after a diverse manner; for is it not absurd to affirm, that creatures differ so much in temperature, and yet agree in conceit concerning one and the same object?

But this will more plainly appear, if the instruments of sense in the body be observed: for we shall find, that as these instruments are affected and disposed, so doth the imagination conceit that which by them is connexed unto it. That very object which seemeth unto us white, unto them which have the jaundice seemeth pale, and red unto those whose eyes are bloodshot. Forasmuch then as living crea

tures have some white, some pale, some red eyes, why should not one and the same object seem to some white, to some red, to some pale? If a man rub his eye, the figure of that which he beholdeth seemeth long or narrow; is it then not likely, that those creatures which have a long and slanting pupil of the eye, as goats, foxes, cats, &c. do convey the fashion of that which they behold under another form to the imagination than those that have round pupils do?

Who knoweth not that a glass presenteth the outward object smoother or greater according to the making of the glass? If it be hollow, the object seemeth smaller than it is; if the glass be crooked, then the object seemeth long and narrow. And glasses there be which present the head of him that looketh in them downwards, and the heels upwards. Now then seeing the eye, which is the instrument of sight, in some living creatures is more outward, in some more hollow, in some plain, in some greater, in some less; it is very probable that fishes, men, lions, and dogs, whose eyes so much differ, do not conceive the selfsame object after the same manner, but diversely, according to the diversity of the eye which offereth it unto the fancy.

The same reason holdeth in touching; for seemeth it not absurd to think, that those creatures which are covered with shells, those which are covered with scales, and those which are covered with hairs, and those which are smooth, should all be alike sensible in touching; and every one of them convey the image or quality of the same object which they touch in the very same degree of heat or cold, of dryness or moisture, roughness or smoothness, unto the imagination?

So might it be shewed in hearing: for how can we think that the ear which hath a narrow passage and the ear which hath an open and wide passage do receive the same sound in the same degree? or that the ear whose inside is full of hair doth hear in the same just measure that the ear doth whose inside is smooth? since experience sheweth, that if we stop, or half stop our ears, the sound cometh not to us in the same manner and degree that it doth if our ears

be open.

The like may be thought of smelling; for man himself, abounding with phlegm, is otherwise affected in smelling than he is if the parts about the head be full of blood; and many things afford a delightful smell to some living creatures, which smell to other living creatures seemeth not to be so.

In the taste the same reason appeareth; for to a rough and dry tongue that very thing seemeth bitter (as in an ague) which to the moister tongue seemeth not to be so. Diverse creatures then having tongues drier, or moister, according to their several temperatures, when they taste the same thing, must needs conceit it to be, according as the instrument of their taste is affected, either bitter, or sweet, &c. For even as the hand in the striking of the harp, though the stroke be one, yet causeth a sound sometimes high, sometimes base, according to the quality of the string that is strucken; even so one and the same outward object is diversely judged of and conceited, according to the several and diverse qualities of the instrument of sense which conveyeth it to the imagination. Ointment is pleasing to man, but beetles and bees cannot abide it. Oil to man is profitable, but it killeth bees and wasps. Cicuta feedeth quails, and henbane sows; but both of these hurt man. If a man eat ants he is sick; but the bear, being sick, recovereth by eating them.

If then one and the very same thing to the red eye seem red, to another pale, and white to another; if one and the same thing seem not hot or cold, dry or moist, in the same degree, to the several creatures which touch it; if one and the selfsame sound seem more shrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear, and more base to him that hath an open ear; if the same thing, at the same time, seem to afford a pleasant and displeasant smell to diverse and several creatures; if that seem bitter in taste to one, which to another seemeth sweet; that to one hurtful, which to another seemeth healthful; I may report how these things appear diverse to several creatures, and seem to produce diverse effects.

But what they are in their own nature, whether red or

white, bitter or sweet, healthful or hurtful, I cannot tell. For why should I presume to prefer my conceit and imagination, in affirming that a thing is thus or thus in its own nature, because it seemeth to me to be so, before the conceit of other living creatures, who may as well think it to be otherwise in its own nature, because it appeareth otherwise to them than it doth to me?

They are living creatures as well as I: why then should I condemn their conceit and phantasy concerning any thing, more than they may mine? they may be in the truth and I in error, as well as I in truth and they err. If my conceit must be believed before theirs, great reason that it be proved to be truer than theirs: and this proof must be either by demonstration or without it. Without it none will believe: certainly, if by demonstration, then this demonstration must seem to be true, or not seem to be true. If it seem to be true, then will it be a question, whether it be so indeed as it seemeth to be; and to allege that for a certain proof which is uncertain and questionable seemeth absurd.

If it be said, that the imagination of man judgeth truer of the outward object than the imagination of other living creatures doth, and therefore to be credited above others, (besides that which is already said,) this is easily refuted by comparing of man with other creatures.

It is confessed the dog excelleth man in smell and in hearing: and whereas there is said to be a twofold discourse, one of the mind, another of the tongue; and that of the mind is said to be exercised in choosing that which is convenient, and refusing that which is hurtful in knowledge, justice, and thankfulness: this creature chooseth his food, refuseth the whip, fawneth on his master, defendeth his house, revengeth himself of those strangers that hurt him. And Homer mentioneth Argus, the dog of Ulysses, who knew his master, having been from home so many years that at his return all the people of his house had forgot him. This creature, saith Chrysippus, is not void of logic: for

when in following any beast he cometh to three several ways, he smelleth to the one, and then to the second; and, if he find that the beast which he pursueth be not fled one of these two ways, he presently, without smelling any further to it, taketh the third way; which, saith the same philosopher, is as if he reasoned thus: the beast must be gone either this, or this, or the other way; but neither this, nor this; ergo, the third: and so away he runneth.

If we consider his skill in physic, it is sufficient to help himself; if he be wounded with a dart, he useth the help of his teeth to take it out, of his tongue to cleanse the wound from corruption: he seemeth to be well acquainted with the precept of Hippocrates, who saith, " that the rest of the "foot is the physic of the foot ;" and therefore if his foot be hurt, he holdeth it up that it may rest; if he be sick, he giveth himself a vomit by eating of grass, and recovereth himself. The dog then we see is plentifully furnished with inward discourse.

Now outward speech is not needful to make a creature reasonable, else a dumb man were an unreasonable creature.

And do not philosophers themselves reject this as an enemy to knowledge? and therefore they are silent when they are instructed. And yet even as barbarous and strange people have speech, but we understand it not, neither do we perceive any great difference in their words; but a difference there seemeth to be, and they do express their thoughts and meanings one to another by those words: even so those creatures, which are commonly called unreasonable, do seem to parley one with another, and by their speech do understand one the other. Do not birds by one kind of speech call their young ones, and by another cause them to hide themselves? do they not by their several voices express their several passions of joy, of grief, of fear, in such manner that their fellows understand them? do they not by their voice foreshew things to come? But we will return to that creature we first did instance in. The dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth, another