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the same manner, as in the case of Firmin, a person who resembled her in the charitableness of his disposition and character. But it is not necessary to rely upon probabilities in this case We have direct evidence of the fact. The witnesses who have been so often referred to, declare that she was a believer in the Trinitarian doctrines-and upon this point also there is no contradictory evidence whatever.

If we advert to the answer of Mr. Wellbeloved, and others of the defendants, what is it that they say, as to this point? They do not deny, that she entertained Trinitarian opinions-that she was a Trinitarian in her belief. On the contrary they say, that they have heard and believe that very many of the Presbyterians of that period were Trinitarians, but save from the probability arising from such circumstances they cannot say whether she in her religious belief was a Trinitarian. They admit, therefore, the probability of her having been a Trinitarian, which is substantially to the same effect, though not so strong in the expression, as what Mr. Wellbeloved is reported to have stated upon this subject to the Commissioners. For in their report they say, that Mr. Wellbeloved concludes from Lady Hewley's attendance at the chapel during Dr. Colton's time, and from the general state of religious opinions at that period, that she did not entertain what are commonly called Unitarian senti

ments.

But the evidence as to this important part of the case does not rest here. Dr. Colton is admitted to have been a Trinitarian. No doubt is entertained upon that point. Dr. Colton must have been a Trinitarian; because as he was the preacher at St. Saviour's Gate Chapel, he must have subscribed the articles agreeably to the 17th section of the Toleration Act; and we are not to presume that he would have subscribed those articles fraudulently; particularly a man of his character, his learning, and his piety. Dr. Colton, therefore, was a Trinitarian; and, as I have before stated, he was the preacher at Lady Hewley's Chapel. He was her adviser in religious matters, he was the executor to her will, he preached her funeral sermon,and in that sermon there is the strongest evidence of the double fact of Dr. Colton himself being a Trinitarian, and of Lady Hewley, with whose sentiments he

was intimate, entertaining also the same opinions. Never, therefore, was there a stronger body of evidence leading to any conclusion than this, to show that Lady Hewley did not entertain Unitarian opinions.

But I do not stop here. There is that document which has been adverted to by the learned judge, namely Bowles's catechism. Passing over the question relating to the Trinity, although the witnesses who are conversant with the subject state that Bowles's Catechism is to be taken as a Trinitarian catechism, yet this at least is clear,-that the doctrine of original sin is expressed in that catechism in the most clear and distinct terms. I agree entirely with what the learned judge has stated, that when Lady Hewley requires as a qualification for those persons who are to be admitted into the almshouse that they should be able to repeat by heart Bowles's catechism, that she must be taken to have assented to the doctrines contained in it. If so, the evidence is clear that as to one material point she was a believer, viz., in the doctrine of original sin. And if we may rely upon the testimony of those witnesses who have been examined, that this is a Trinitarian catechism, then that also establishes the fact of her being a believer in the doctrine of the Trinity.

I have thus endeavoured to show that Lady Hewley was a Presbyterian, and also to show what were the general doctrines of the Presbyterians at that time. And the result of the further enquiry has been to satisfy my own mind that Lady Hewley was not an exception to the general rule of belief of that class of Dissenters to which she belonged, but that she herself also was a Trinitarian, and a believer in the doctrine of original sin.

That being the case, then, we are prepared for the more satisfactory consideration of the next point. What did she mean by "godly preachers of Christ's holy gospel?" What were the doctrines, the preaching of which she meant to promote and encourage? Is it possible to come to the conclusion, according to any ordinary rules of reasoning, that she intended to found a charity, and to bestow her property for the purpose of preaching doctrines directly at variance with her own? And this not as to subordinate, and trifling, and formal matters, but with respect to points that have always been

considered by every church as essential, -which she herself must have considered as essential.

When I say points which have been always considered as essential, I am not using my own expressions, my own language. It is the language and these are the expressions of a very learned person, Dr. Kenrick, one of the defendants. In the sermon lying before me, he says,"If others have established a distinction between those essential articles of faith which cannot be rejected without perdition, and the non-essentials, on which men may safely differ, we, at least, gain little by the relaxation; for I know of no church which does not regard as essentials those very articles which our name implies that we reject."

Can we believe then, I repeat it, that this pious lady would have given her funds for the purpose of promoting and encouraging the preaching of doctrines directly at variance with those opinions which she entertained upon points which have been universally considered as essential in matters of religious belief? At least, it would require some fact or some argument to justify us in coming to such a conclusion. All the presumptions and probabilities are the other way; and, as a question of fact, I feel myself obliged to come to this conclusion, that it is almost impossible to suppose that such could have been her view and intention.

But another argument arises out of the Act of Parliament to which the learned Judge has referred; or, rather, out of the Acts of Parliament of that period. Those preachers who denied the Deity of Christ, were exempted, if they preached from the benefit of the Act of Toleration. That Act was passed in the year 1688. In 1698, ten years afterwards, and six years before the date of the first of these deeds, the Act against blasphemy was passed; in which those persons who denied that any one of the Three Persons of the Trinity was God, were subject to the severest penalties. Those were called impious and blasphemous doctrines. To teach them, was called a detestable crime. I am not justifying the law. I am making no comment upon it. I am stating only what the law at that time was. Those persons who, by preaching, denied the doctrine of the Trinity,-I think the word is "teach,"-who, either N. S. NO. 136.

in writing, in teaching, or advised speaking, shall maintain those doctrines, are subjected to the penalties of the Act to which I have referred. It was contrary to law, therefore, at that time, to preach those doctrines. To give money for the purpose of encouraging and promoting the preaching of them, would also in itself be illegal.

What are the rules by which the conduct and the language of persons are to be interpreted? The rule is this:-and it is a fair and proper rule,—that where a construction consistent with lawful conduct and lawful intention can be placed upon the words and acts of parties, you are to do so, and not unnecessarily to put upon those words and acts a construction directly at variance with what the law prohibits or enjoins. I cannot, therefore, bring myself to the conclusion that Lady Hewley intended to promote and encourage the preaching of doctrines contrary to law, that she intended herself to violate the law. It would be contrary to every rule of fair construction, and legal presumption, so to decide.

It was argued, however, at the bar, that this law was now repealed; and it was supposed that the repeal of the law would make an alteration in the consideration of the case. It does not appear to me in the slightest degree to affect the question. The question is, What was her intention at the time? What at the time when she executed this deed she intended? Who were the persons whom she meant to include in it? What were the doctrines of which she intended to encourage and promote the preaching? It makes no alteration in this respect,it makes no change as to her intention at the time that a century after, the law has been changed, and that is considered as innocent which at that period was considered as illegal. On these two grounds then, each of which appears to me conclusive; first of all, that I cannot presume that this pious lady intended that her estates should be employed to encourage and promote the preaching of doctrines directly at variance with what she must have considered as essential to Christianity, and that she could not intend to violate the law. On those two grounds, I feel myself, as a conclusion of fact, compelled to come to this determination,-that she did not intend, under 2 G

the description of "godly preachers," to include those persons who impugned the doctrine of the Trinity,-that she did not intend to promote and encourage the preaching of those doctrines. With respect to the law, and her respect for its authority, we find some evidence of it in the second deed--the deed of 1707; for she says, that if by any lawful authority the objects of her bounty in that deed cannot be carried into effect, then she directs her trustees to make a different application of the funds.

It has been said, and the learned Judge has adverted to it, it has been said in general terms, that the religious opinions of that day were liberal and comprehensive, and that in particular, Lady Hewley entertained large and liberal views upon subjects of religion. This, however, rests in general statement, of which there is no sufficient or satisfactory evidence, and from which I can come to no precise or satisfactory conclusion. I am bound therefore, for these reasons, having first established to my satisfaction that she was in her religious opinions and belief a Trinitarian-I feel myself compelled to come to the conclusion, that she never intended that her bounty should be applied for the purpose of promoting or encouraging the preaching of Unitarian doctrines. This is the conclusion of fact to which I have come, and I have the more satisfaction in this result, because I came to it without at all knowing what were the opinions of my two learned Friends; without having had any communication with them upon the subject, 1 formed my opinion upon a careful consideration of the case, thus agreeing, not only in the conclusions, but in the grounds and principles upon which those conclusions with the learned Judges who have favoured me with their assistance on this occasion.

The question then for consideration that remains is this. By whom have these funds been administered, and in what way have they been administered? The trustees are, with one or two exceptions, both the trustees and the subtrustees proved to be Unitarians. Mr. Palmer is a member of the Church of England. Mr. Heywood was not proved to be a Unitarian. With respect to the rest, as I understand and read the evidence, they entertain Unitarian opinions. What are these doctrines? What in their

answer do Mr. Wellbeloved and others of the defendants state to be Unitarian opinions? They state, that they believe it to be true, that the class of Christians styled Unitarians do reject as unscriptural the doctrine that Jesus Christ is really and truly God, and as such, a proper object of divine worship. They believe it to be true, that the class of Christians styled Unitarians, do many of them reject as unscriptural the doctrine of original sin, or that man is born in such a state, that if he were to die in the condition in which he was born and bred, he would perish everlastingly. These are the doctrines stated in the answers of Mr. Wellbeloved, and several of the other defendants, as being the peculiar doctrines of the Unitarians.

An observation was made, I think, by a learned gentleman, whom I now see in Court, on the conduct of Mr. Wellbeloved, with respect to his answers, stating that they were reluctantly extorted, obtained with difficulty. I think I owe it to Mr. Wellbeloved, and to the other defendants, to observe, that from the nature and the delicacy of the subject, they were justified in using much caution; and if we can fairly refer the conduct of men to proper motives, we are not justified in ascribing it to such as are improper. Mr. Wellbeloved may have considered that the questions were not in the first instance put in such a way as to lead properly to these answers, and he may have thought it his duty to exercise great caution on such a subject. But leaving this, besides the answers, we have from the mouth of Mr. Wellbeloved, and we also have from Mr. Kenrick clear and distinct statements of what the opinions of the Unitarians are upon the points in question.

I refer to a document, which is in evidence, a sermon preached by Mr. Wellbeloved at Hull, in which he states his opinions in these terms: "With the doctrines concerning the deity of Christ, we also reject as equally unscriptural, those which other Christian seets hold to be of such vital importance relating to his office, and the design and consequences of his death. We see nothing in the pages either of the Old or New Testament to justify the doctrines which are generally deemed orthodox, relating to original sin." So that he also there states, that they reject the doctrine concerning

the deity of Christ, and this also relating to original sin. In another part of the same sermon, he says, "But it will be said that we deny his deity," that is, the deity of Christ. "We refuse to acknowledge him as the second person of the Godhead. We do not allow him to be one God with the Father, co-eternal and co-equal, or even God of God. We confess," he says, "The man Christ Jesus, but deny him as that incarnate suffering and dying God which he is believed to have been by all others who bear his name. True, we do deny the Jesus of the Athanasian and the Nicene Creeds of the Liturgy, and the Articles of the Established Church of the confessions of faith adopted by almost all the Churches of Christendom." Nothing can be more clear and distinct than these statements, not only as to his own opinions, but as to the opinions of those who think with him, and who come under the class and denomination of Unitarians.

Now, as to Dr. Kenrick, another of the defendants upon this Record, a gentleman of talent and learning, he says, "We are convinced that no doctrines can ultimately prevail among a people allowed to think and examine for themselves, which, like transubstantiation, involve a sensible absurdity, or, like the Trinity, a metaphysical contradiction." "The surrender of their understandings," he says, "is a price which men will not long consent to pay for the belief of any system of Theology." Such are the doctrines stated, by two of the defendants, as the doctrines of the Unitarians. I consider, then, the great body of trustees and subtrustees as disbelievers in the Divinity, or to use the term of the Unitarians, the Deity of Christ," and disbelievers in the doctrine of original sin.

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Having stated this, then the next question is, how and for what purposes have these funds been applied by these trustees? In what manner have they discharged the important duty that was entrusted to them? If we are correct in the conclusion we have come to, as to the intention of Lady Hewley, the funds have been misapplied, and misapplied for a long series of years, and to a very great extent. This alone might be a sufficient ground for removing the trustees. But it has been said, that this was unintentional upon their part, that it was an error of judgment, that they put fairly

and bona fide a construction upon the instruments that would have justified their acts.

But looking at the evidence in this case, I am compelled to come to a different conclusion, and to say, though I do not wish to enter upon the subject, because I am desirous, as far as possible, to abstain from every thing that is personal on this occasion-I am compelled to say, using the most gentle terms, that there has been, in my judgment, a strong and undue leaning in the administration of these funds towards the Unitarian doctrines and Unitarian purposes.

I shall not go through the evidence with respect to this part of the case, but shall content myself with referring only by way of example to two points. How has it happened that almost all the trustees are Unitarians? That the vacancies have been so filled up as to make the whole body substantially Unitarian, as to place the entire controul of these estates and funds, and the management of the whole charity in the hands of Unitarian trustees, persons entertaining Unitarian opinions?

Another subject to which I shall also refer, in illustration of what I have stated, relates to the exhibitions to Manchester College. Almost all the exhibitions of late years have been given to persons educated at that College. Upon a careful examination of the evidence, I must consider, that so far as relates to the education for the ministry, Manchester College is substantially an Unitarian establishment. I refer to the evidence, among others, of Mr. Manning Walker, who was himself educated as an Unitarian, and was a member of that College. It appears to me strong and decisive upon this point. If I required further confirmation, I might refer to Mr. Wellbeloved's letter, in which he calls upon the Unitarian Dissenters to subscribe to the support of that establishment for the purpose of maintaining a succession of well educated ministers in their class of Dissenters, obviously meaning, indeed the fact is proved by the evidence, meaning those of Unitarian opinions.

These circumstances, with others, lead me therefore to the conclusion, not merely that these parties have misapplied the funds, but that in the exercise of their trust they have manifested a strong and undue leaning in favour of persons of their own persuasion. I think then,

looking at these circumstances, and considering the extensive and continued misapplication of the funds which has taken place, and adverting also to the consideration of the danger of future abuse, if persons maintaining one particular class of opinions are to be entrusted with the management and entire control of funds which are to be applied for the benefit of persons maintaining other opinions, that am bound to come to the conclusion that the Vice-Chancellor was correct in removing the trustees. After what I have already stated, it follows, that I think he was correct in the declaration that he has made. And the result therefore of my judgment is this-Feeling myself confined in the principle of it by the learned Judges near me, and coming to the further conclusions, which I have stated, founded upon these principles, I think that the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor should be affirmed. It is not a case for costs, and I think it should be simply affirmed.

Mr. Booth.-Does your lordship think, under the circumstances, the trustees were not justified so far in appealing, considering the grounds that the judgment went upon, as to entitle them to costs in a question so important?

Mr. Knight. If your lordship will hear me upon that.

Lord Lyndhurst.-I say nothing about their own costs.

Mr. Knight.-So I thought. Their costs are not to come out of the estate.

Mr. Booth.-Does not your lordship think it right to give them the costs out of the estate?

Lord Lyndhurst.-Certainly not-that is not the effect of what I stated, it was after a judgment.

Mr. Booth.-Will your lordship allow me to mention an omission in the decree of the Vice Chancellor, which I believe, if it had been adverted to at the time would have been supplied?

Lord Lyndhurst.-My attention was never drawn to any thing of the sort in the argument.

Mr. Booth. This has arisen since.The decree gives the costs to the defendants in the fullest manner. Now, upon the question of the exceptions to the answer, costs were incurred by the defendants. The trustees were called upon to state as to their religious belief, and exceptions were taken to the report of the

Master, and it was carried, first before the Vice Chancellor and then before the Lord Chancellor my Lord Brougham, and upon that occasion his lordship expressed a clear opinion that the trustees ought to have their costs out of the estate. I have got here the short-hand writer's note of what passed-and I trust your lordship will think that that ought to be comprised in the costs coming out of the estate. Lord Lyndhurst.-Does it come within the terms of the decree as to costs?

Mr. Booth.-Referring parties to tax "their costs of this suit up to this time as between solicitor and client, and that the Master should enquire whether the relators and defendants had properly incurred any, and what costs, charges, and expences relating to this cause beyond their costs thereof, and if the Master should find that the relators and defendants have properly incurred." Now, Lord Brougham expressly stated that they ought to have their costs out of the fund, and if that had been called to the Vice Chancellor's attention, I believe beyond all question he would have said the same.

Mr. Knight. These costs are either costs in the cause, in which case they will be taxed and paid to them, or they are charges properly incurred. They are one or other of those unless they are charges improperly incurred. The point will be brought under the attention of the Court if necessary, upon excepting to the Master's report upon that subject.

Lord Lyndhurst.-And the present Lord Chancellor will decide it. In the situation in which I stand I wish to decide nothing which is not absolutely necessary, I have been called to the decision of this question much against my will.

Mr. Knight.-As your lordship has not given to the relators the costs of the appeal, but has left each party to bear his own, your lordship will think it right to add a declaration that the relators will have their expences out of the fund.

Lord Lyndhurst.-Of course.

Mr. Booth.-Upon the former occasion, when the hearing broke off before my Lord Brougham, the trustees desired to have his judgment without further expense, and the relators refused-and upon this occasion the relators desired to have judgment without further expense, and we consented. Does not your lordship think that a reason for giving us the eosts?

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